Incident: European Commission's Failure to Address Defeat Device Cheating in Car Emissions.

Published Date: 2016-06-19

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the suspected cheating emissions tests by a car maker was reported in the article published on 2016-06-19 [44801]. Therefore, the software failure incident happened in 2010.
System The software failure incident described in the article involves the failure of emissions testing systems in vehicles, specifically related to defeat devices used by car manufacturers to cheat emissions tests. The systems that failed in this incident are: 1. Emissions testing systems in vehicles, involving the use of defeat devices to manipulate emissions test results [44801].
Responsible Organization 1. Car manufacturer suspected of cheating emissions tests [44801]
Impacted Organization 1. The European Commission [44801]
Software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by the use of defeat device software by car manufacturers to cheat emissions tests, as seen in the case of VW [44801].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper oversight and action by the European Commission despite warnings from experts about potential cheating in emissions tests by car manufacturers [44801]. 2. Failure of the European Commission to investigate defeat devices issue further despite being aware of the risks and concerns raised by its own departments [44801]. 3. Inadequate response and lack of action by the EU's enterprise department in addressing calls for a probe into defeat devices raised by the environment department [44801]. 4. Delayed and insufficient action by the European Commission in alerting member states and taking proactive measures to address the serious environmental problem caused by defeat devices in vehicles [44801].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident involving defeat devices in car emissions testing had significant environmental impacts, leading to higher NOx emissions in real-world conditions compared to lab tests [44801]. 2. The incident raised doubts about the competence of the European Commission in handling the issue, highlighting a collective blindness to the defeat device problem within the Commission and other EU institutions [44801]. 3. The failure to address the issue promptly resulted in a lack of legal consequences for car manufacturers like VW in Europe, despite ongoing legal proceedings in the US [44801]. 4. The incident also raised questions about the responsibility of the European Commission in alerting member states to the defeat devices issue and ensuring enforcement of legislation by national supervisors [44801].
Preventions 1. Implementing stricter regulations and oversight on emissions testing and compliance by the European Commission and other relevant authorities [44801]. 2. Mandating thorough investigations into suspected defeat devices in vehicles based on early warnings and reports from experts [44801]. 3. Enforcing legal consequences for manufacturers found to be using defeat devices to cheat emissions tests [44801]. 4. Enhancing communication and collaboration between the European Commission, member states, and car manufacturers to address environmental concerns and ensure compliance with regulations [44801].
Fixes 1. Implement stricter regulations and oversight on emissions testing and compliance for car manufacturers to prevent the use of defeat devices [44801]. 2. Conduct thorough investigations into car manufacturers suspected of using defeat devices and hold them accountable for any illegal practices [44801]. 3. Enhance communication and collaboration between EU institutions, such as the European Commission, to ensure a more coordinated approach in addressing issues related to defeat devices [44801].
References 1. European Commission's in-house science service (Joint Research Centre) [44801] 2. EU's enterprise department [44801] 3. EU's environment department (DG Envi) [44801] 4. European Parliament's 'dieselgate' inquiry [44801] 5. Campaign group Transport and Environment [44801] 6. Dutch environmental magazines Down to Earth and OneWorld [44801] 7. Kathleen van Brempt, chair of the dieselgate inquiry [44801] 8. Seb Dance, inquiry's coordinator [44801] 9. Daniel Calleja Crespo, director of the EU's enterprise department [44801] 10. Karl Falkenberg, former director of DG Envi [44801] 11. Dutch environment minister [44801]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to cheating emissions tests, involving the use of defeat devices, was reported to have happened at multiple car manufacturers, not just Volkswagen. The article mentions that the description of the suspected test cheat bore the hallmarks of a "thermal window" defeat device, which is software used by numerous car manufacturers [44801]. (b) The software failure incident of using defeat devices to cheat emissions tests was not limited to one organization but was a widespread issue across the automotive industry. The article highlights that there were "increasing evidence of illegal practices [by car manufacturers] that defeat the anti-pollution systems" [44801].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: The articles mention that the European commission's in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre (JRC), had warned the commission in 2010 about potential cheating by a car-maker involving a "defeat device" that could cheat emissions tests. The JRC's testing had found a peculiar combustion strategy hinting towards a defeat strategy used by the manufacturer [44801]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: The articles highlight that despite being aware of higher real-world NOx emissions from vehicles compared to test conditions, the commission did not see cheating going on. The commission's director mentioned that practices like deploying emission abatement techniques that are switched off at low temperatures or when the vehicle needs additional power are illegal according to European law. However, the commission did not take action to investigate these practices further or demand corrective action from manufacturers [44801].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) The software failure incident related to the emissions cheating scandal involving car manufacturers like VW can be categorized as within_system. The defeat device software used by VW to cheat emissions tests was a deliberate strategy implemented within the system of the vehicles to detect test conditions and adjust emissions accordingly to pass the tests while emitting higher levels of harmful pollutants in real-world conditions [44801]. The software manipulation was an internal mechanism designed to deceive regulatory tests and did not involve external factors beyond the control of the car manufacturers.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the use of defeat device software by car manufacturers to cheat emissions tests. The defeat device software detected when a car was being driven under lab test conditions and adjusted itself to reduce emissions of harmful nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution. This led to significantly higher NOx emissions in real-world conditions [44801]. (b) Human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The European commission's handling of the issue, including the failure to investigate defeat devices further despite warnings and evidence dating back to 2010, raised questions about the competence and actions of commission officials. There were calls for investigations and probes into defeat devices, but responses from officials were lacking or inadequate. The commission's failure to take proactive steps, such as alerting member states or contacting car manufacturers, also contributed to the continuation of the issue [44801].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware. (b) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to software manipulation by car manufacturers to cheat emissions tests. The incident involved the use of defeat device software by VW and potentially other car manufacturers to adjust emissions during lab test conditions, leading to higher NOx emissions in real-world driving conditions. The software manipulated the emissions control systems to reduce harmful emissions during testing but increase them during normal driving, indicating a deliberate software strategy to deceive regulators [44801].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The software failure incident related to the emissions scandal involving VW and potentially other car manufacturers was non-malicious. The incident involved the use of defeat device software that detected lab test conditions and adjusted emissions to pass the tests while emitting higher levels of harmful nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution under real-world conditions. The European Commission and its experts were warned about potential cheating by car manufacturers through the use of defeat devices as early as 2010 [44801]. The incident was characterized by a failure to detect and address the issue promptly, rather than a deliberate act to harm the system.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident: The articles suggest that the software failure incident related to the emissions cheating scandal involving car manufacturers, particularly highlighted by the VW emissions scandal, was more aligned with poor decisions rather than accidental decisions. The European commission was warned by its own experts as early as 2010 about potential cheating by a car maker using defeat devices to manipulate emissions tests [44801]. Despite these warnings and concerns raised by various departments within the EU, including the environment department, the commission did not take decisive action to investigate or address the issue promptly. There were instances where calls for probes into defeat devices were left unanswered, indicating a lack of proactive measures to tackle the problem. The failure to act on these warnings and concerns can be attributed to poor decisions made at various levels within the European commission, leading to a lack of proper enforcement and oversight in addressing the issue.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the European Commission's handling of the defeat device issue in the car industry. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) had warned the commission as far back as 2010 about potential cheating by a car-maker involving a defeat device [44801]. Despite receiving warnings and evidence, the commission's science service and other departments failed to take appropriate action or investigate further, showcasing a lack of professional competence in addressing the issue promptly and effectively. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is seen in the commission's claim that they were not aware of any actual instances of fraud regarding defeat devices until the VW emissions scandal broke out [44801]. The commission spokesperson mentioned that they were shocked by the revelations of Volkswagen's emissions manipulation, indicating that the commission did not have concrete evidence or awareness of the fraudulent practices being carried out by car manufacturers. This lack of awareness suggests that the failure to detect the use of defeat devices was accidental rather than intentional.
Duration temporary The software failure incident related to the emissions cheating scandal involving car manufacturers, particularly Volkswagen, can be considered as a temporary failure. This is because the incident was caused by specific circumstances such as the use of defeat device software that detected lab test conditions and adjusted emissions accordingly, rather than being a permanent failure inherent to all circumstances [44801].
Behaviour crash, omission, timing, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the emissions scandal involving car manufacturers, particularly Volkswagen, can be categorized as a crash. The defeat device software used by VW detected when a car was being driven under lab test conditions and adjusted itself to reduce emissions of harmful nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution. However, under real-world conditions, the software failed, leading to higher NOx emissions in approximately 11 million affected VW cars [44801]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The software omitted to perform its intended functions of regulating emissions properly in real-world conditions, leading to higher NOx emissions than allowed by regulations. The software's failure to accurately control emissions during normal driving conditions was a significant omission that resulted in environmental harm [44801]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident can be considered in the context of the software performing its intended functions but at the wrong time. The defeat device software in the cars adjusted emissions during lab test conditions to meet regulatory standards but failed to do so effectively in real-world driving situations. This timing issue led to discrepancies in emissions levels between test conditions and actual driving conditions [44801]. (d) value: The software failure incident can also be categorized as a value failure. The defeat device software manipulated emissions values by reducing harmful nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions during lab test conditions to meet regulatory standards. However, in real-world conditions, the software's incorrect functioning led to higher NOx emissions, indicating a failure in accurately representing emission values [44801]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions. In this case, the defeat device software consistently adjusted emissions based on detecting lab test conditions, indicating a deliberate but faulty behavior to deceive emissions tests [44801]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be characterized by a deliberate attempt to deceive emissions tests by implementing defeat device software that manipulated emissions during specific conditions. This behavior can be classified as deceptive or fraudulent, as the software was designed to provide false emissions values during testing, leading to higher emissions in real-world driving scenarios [44801].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No information about people losing their lives due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [44801]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - No information about people being physically harmed due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [44801]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - No information about people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [44801]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident related to emissions cheating by a car manufacturer (VW) led to higher NOx emissions in real-world conditions, impacting the environment and potentially causing harm to public health [44801]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - No information about people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure was mentioned in the articles [44801]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident involving defeat devices in cars led to higher NOx emissions, impacting the environment and air quality [44801]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident involving emissions cheating by a car manufacturer had real consequences related to increased NOx emissions and potential harm to public health [44801]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discussed potential consequences of the software failure, such as the impact on the environment, air quality, and public health due to higher NOx emissions resulting from defeat devices in cars [44801]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The software failure incident led to a lack of action by the European Commission in addressing defeat devices in cars, potentially allowing harmful emissions to continue unchecked [44801].
Domain transportation, manufacturing The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the automotive industry, specifically concerning emissions testing and defeat devices used by car manufacturers to cheat emissions tests. This incident falls under the category of manufacturing ([44801]).

Sources

Back to List