Incident: Inadequate Financial Reporting Due to Libra Courts Management System Failure

Published Date: 2011-12-16

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the Libra magistrates' courts case management system happened before the report from the National Audit Office (NAO) was published on December 16, 2011 [Article 54494].
System 1. Libra magistrates' courts case management system [54494] 2. Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office system [54494]
Responsible Organization 1. The Libra magistrates' courts case management system contributed to the software failure incident by causing limitations in the underlying systems, leading to the inability of HM Courts Service to provide proper accounting records [54494].
Impacted Organization 1. HM Courts Service [54494] 2. Ministry of Justice (MoJ) [54494]
Software Causes 1. Limitations in the underlying systems of the Libra magistrates' courts case management system contributed to the inability of HM Courts Service to produce basic financial information, leading to the failure incident [Article 54494].
Non-software Causes 1. Inadequate underlying systems and limitations in the functionality of the Libra system used by HM Courts Service [54494].
Impacts 1. The inability of HM Courts Service to produce basic financial information to support its accounts, leading to the disclaimed audit opinion on its trust statement accounts by the National Audit Office [54494].
Preventions 1. Conducting thorough testing and quality assurance procedures before implementing the Libra magistrates' courts case management system could have potentially identified any limitations in the underlying systems that led to the inability to produce proper accounting records [54494]. 2. Regularly updating and maintaining the Libra system to ensure it meets the evolving needs and requirements of the HM Courts Service could have helped prevent the software failure incident [54494]. 3. Implementing a robust change management process to address any issues or limitations identified in the system promptly could have mitigated the impact of the software failure incident [54494].
Fixes 1. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) plans to look at the functionality of Libra to address the limitations in the underlying systems contributing to the inability to provide proper accounting records [54494]. 2. The MoJ intends to replace the current Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office IT system with Pentip to improve the accounts for fixed penalties [54494].
References 1. National Audit Office (NAO) [Article 54494] 2. Ministry of Justice (MoJ) [Article 54494]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the Libra magistrates' courts case management system has happened again within the same organization, HM Courts Service. The National Audit Office (NAO) report highlighted that due to limitations in the underlying systems, HM Courts Service was unable to provide proper accounting records, leading to the disclaiming of the audit opinion on its trust statement accounts. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) plans to look at the functionality of Libra to address these issues [54494]. (b) There is no specific mention in the article about the software failure incident happening again at other organizations or with their products and services. Therefore, there is no information available to indicate a similar incident occurring at multiple organizations.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article as it mentions limitations in the underlying systems of the Libra magistrates' courts case management system. The National Audit Office (NAO) report highlighted that HM Courts Service was unable to provide proper accounting records due to these limitations in the system [54494]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also apparent in the article. It states that HM Courts Service faced challenges in improving the extent of available data and reducing the level of outstanding debt, indicating issues with the operation or use of the system [54494].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) The software failure incident related to the inability of HM Courts Service to produce basic financial information was primarily within the system. The failure was attributed to limitations in the underlying systems, specifically the Libra magistrates' courts case management system and the Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office system [54494]. The National Audit Office disclaimed its audit opinion on the trust statement accounts due to the system's inability to provide proper accounting records [54494]. The Ministry of Justice planned to look at the functionality of Libra to address the issues [54494]. Additionally, improvements to the accounts for fixed penalties were linked to the replacement of the current Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office IT system with Pentip [54494].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the Libra magistrates' courts case management system was primarily attributed to limitations in the underlying systems, indicating a failure due to contributing factors introduced without human participation. The National Audit Office (NAO) report highlighted that HM Courts Service was unable to provide proper accounting records related to the collection of fines, confiscation orders, and penalties due to these limitations in the system [54494]. (b) The article mentions that the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the courts service's parent department, plans to look at the functionality of Libra to address the issues. Additionally, the MoJ stated that improvements to the accounts for fixed penalties are unlikely until the current Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office IT system is replaced with Pentip, indicating human actions being taken to address the software failure incident [54494].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The article mentions that the Libra magistrates' courts case management system contributed to the inability of HM Courts Service to produce basic financial information, indicating a software failure. However, it does not specifically mention any hardware-related contributing factors to the failure incident [54494]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The article clearly states that the software failure incident was due to limitations in the underlying systems, specifically mentioning HM Courts Service's inability to provide proper accounting records relating to the collection of fines, confiscation orders, and penalties. This points to a software-related failure [54494].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The software failure incident related to the inability of HM Courts Service to produce basic financial information to support its accounts was non-malicious. The failure was attributed to limitations in the underlying systems, specifically the Libra magistrates' courts case management system and the Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office system, which impacted the recording of payments and accounting records for fines, confiscation orders, and penalties [54494].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the Libra magistrates' courts case management system was primarily due to poor decisions. The National Audit Office (NAO) report highlighted limitations in the underlying systems, specifically mentioning that HM Courts Service was unable to provide proper accounting records relating to the collection of fines, confiscation orders, and penalties due to the functionality issues with Libra [54494]. Additionally, the cost of the Libra system was significantly higher than initially estimated, indicating potential poor decision-making during the project bidding and implementation phases.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of the Libra magistrates' courts case management system. The National Audit Office (NAO) report highlighted limitations in the underlying systems, specifically mentioning that HM Courts Service was unable to provide proper accounting records due to the system's shortcomings. The article also mentions that the cost of the Libra system was significantly higher than initially estimated, indicating potential issues with project management and cost estimation by the development organization [54494]. (b) The software failure incident does not explicitly indicate any accidental factors contributing to the failure.
Duration permanent (a) The software failure incident related to the Libra magistrates' courts case management system was more of a permanent failure. The National Audit Office (NAO) disclaimed its audit opinion on HM Courts Service's trust statement accounts due to limitations in the underlying systems, specifically mentioning the inability to provide proper accounting records relating to the collection of fines, confiscation orders, and penalties [54494]. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) acknowledged that improvements to the accounts for fixed penalties are unlikely until the current Vehicle Procedures and Fixed Penalty Office IT system is replaced with Pentip, indicating a long-term issue with the existing system [54494].
Behaviour omission, value (a) crash: The software failure incident in this case does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The issue is related to the inability of the software to provide proper accounting records, specifically in relation to the collection of fines, confiscation orders, and penalties [54494]. (b) omission: The software failure incident does involve an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The HM Courts Service has not been able to provide proper accounting records due to limitations in the underlying systems, leading to the inability to support its accounts [54494]. (c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing, where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The issue is more about the inability to provide accurate financial information rather than timing-related errors [54494]. (d) value: The software failure incident does involve a failure related to value, where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. The inability to provide proper accounting records for fines, confiscation orders, and penalties indicates a failure in accurately recording and reporting financial data [54494]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident is not characterized by a byzantine behavior, where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The issue here is more about the limitations in the underlying systems affecting the ability to produce accurate financial information [54494]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a failure due to limitations in the underlying systems, leading to the inability to provide proper accounting records for fines, confiscation orders, and penalties. This could be seen as a form of system deficiency impacting the core functionality of the software [54494].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence unknown (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? The articles do not mention any direct consequences such as death, harm, impact on basic needs, property loss, or non-human entities due to the software failure incident. The main consequence discussed is the inability of HM Courts Service to produce basic financial information to support its accounts, leading to the disclaimed audit opinion on its trust statement accounts by the National Audit Office [54494].
Domain information, finance, government (a) The failed system, Libra magistrates' courts case management system, was intended to support the production and distribution of information related to the HM Courts Service's financial transactions, fines, confiscation orders, and penalties [54494]. The system was crucial for recording payments, managing accounts, and providing financial information to auditors. (h) The software failure incident was particularly impactful on the finance industry as it hindered HM Courts Service's ability to produce proper accounting records for the collection of fines, confiscation orders, and penalties [54494]. The National Audit Office disclaimed its audit opinion on the trust statement accounts due to limitations in the underlying systems, including Libra. (l) The government sector was directly affected by the software failure incident as the HM Courts Service, a government entity, relied on the Libra system for managing court cases, recording payments, and providing financial information to auditors [54494]. The Ministry of Justice, as the parent department, was involved in planning improvements to address the system's limitations. (m) The failed system, Libra, was not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided [54494].

Sources

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