Published Date: 2017-05-03
| Postmortem Analysis | |
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| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident involving the industrial robotic arm happened in the last year and a half [Article 58971]. 2. Published on 2017-05-03 07:00:00+00:00. 3. The incident occurred approximately between November 2015 and May 2017. |
| System | 1. ABB IRB140 industrial robotic arm [58971] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. The software failure incident was caused by hackers who were able to compromise the industrial robotic arm by exploiting security vulnerabilities in its controller computer [58971]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Industrial robotic arm users, including industries such as automotive manufacturing, food processing, packaging, and pharmaceuticals, were impacted by the software failure incident [58971]. |
| Software Causes | 1. Security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm allowed for a range of attacks, such as changing the operating system, tampering with data, and loading malicious commands from the internet [58971]. 2. Weak encryption used to protect input data allowed hackers to alter parameters of the robotic arm [58971]. 3. Flaws in the HTTP interface of the robot allowed for unauthorized commands to be run [58971]. 4. Remote attackers could exploit exposed FTP servers connected to the robots to upload files that would be automatically downloaded and run upon reboot [58971]. 5. Attackers with physical access to the computer controller could fully rewrite its firmware, allowing them to control the robot's actions [58971]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of proper physical security measures for the industrial robotic arm, allowing potential attackers to physically access the controller computer and rewrite its firmware [58971]. |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident allowed hackers to perform physical sabotage on an industrial robotic arm, potentially causing millions of dollars worth of product defects and damage to machinery or human operators [58971]. 2. The researchers identified security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robot, enabling them to change the machine's operating system, tamper with data, and load malicious commands from anywhere on the internet [58971]. 3. The flaws in the industrial robot's security could have allowed remote attackers to upload files to the robot's FTP servers, run unauthorized commands, alter parameters, rewrite firmware, and cause serious physical harm [58971]. 4. The incident highlighted the potential for serious physical harm, such as tricking a victim into entering the robot's cage and causing injury, extending the arm beyond its operating thresholds, or reducing manufacturing precision [58971]. 5. The researchers demonstrated that even subtle hacks on the industrial robot could introduce imperceptible aberrations into its movement, potentially leading to product failures [58971]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing secure coding practices during the development of the industrial robotic arm's controller computer to prevent security vulnerabilities [Article 58971]. 2. Regularly updating the firmware and software of the industrial robots to patch known security flaws [Article 58971]. 3. Conducting thorough security assessments and penetration testing on industrial robots to identify and address potential vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by hackers [Article 58971]. 4. Enhancing network security measures to prevent unauthorized access to the industrial robots, such as restricting access to FTP servers and strengthening encryption protocols [Article 58971]. 5. Educating operators and manufacturers about cybersecurity best practices and the potential risks associated with internet-connected industrial robots to promote a security-conscious culture [Article 58971]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing security fixes for the identified vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm [Article 58971]. 2. Regularly updating the software of industrial robots to address security flaws and vulnerabilities [Article 58971]. 3. Enhancing network security measures to prevent unauthorized access and manipulation of industrial robots [Article 58971]. | References | 1. Researchers at the security firm Trend Micro and Italy's Politecnico Milano [58971] 2. ABB, the Swedish-Swiss firm [58971] 3. International Federation of Robotics [58971] 4. Security consultancy IOActive [58971] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident related to industrial robots being vulnerable to cyber attacks has been identified in the case of ABB's IRB140. Researchers found security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm, allowing for various attacks including changing the operating system, tampering with data, and loading malicious commands from the internet [58971]. (b) The software failure incident is not limited to ABB's IRB140. Researchers at Trend Micro and Italy's Politecnico Milano believe that other industrial robots, including larger and more powerful ones like ABB's IRB 460, are also vulnerable to similar attacks due to basic security flaws. They argue that the identified vulnerabilities in ABB's robot could be applicable to other categories of robots as well, indicating a broader issue across the industry [58971]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where researchers found a broad collection of security vulnerabilities in the controller computer that pilots the industrial robotic arm. These security flaws allowed the team to pull off a range of attacks, like changing the machine's operating system with a USB drive plugged into the computer's ports and subtly tampering with its data. They also managed to load their own malicious commands onto the machine from anywhere on the internet [58971]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where the researchers found that any remote attacker could use the internet-scanning tool Shodan to find exposed, accessible FTP servers connected to the robots, and upload files to them that would be automatically downloaded and run whenever the robot is next rebooted. An attacker on the same network as the robot could have used a flaw in its HTTP interface to cause it to run unauthorized commands or broken the weak encryption the robot's controller used to protect its input data, allowing a hacker to subtly alter its parameters [58971]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within the system. The researchers identified a broad collection of security vulnerabilities within the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm, allowing them to perform various attacks like changing the operating system, tampering with data, and loading malicious commands onto the machine from anywhere on the internet [58971]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involves factors originating from outside the system. The researchers found that remote attackers could exploit vulnerabilities to upload files to the robot's FTP servers, run unauthorized commands through the HTTP interface, and break the weak encryption used to protect input data. Additionally, attackers with local network or physical access could rewrite the firmware, potentially causing serious physical harm or tricking operators into dangerous situations [58971]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident involved researchers demonstrating how hackers could tweak an industrial robotic arm to cause product defects and potentially damage the machinery or harm the human operator without direct human involvement. The researchers identified security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robot, allowing them to perform various attacks remotely, such as changing the operating system, tampering with data, and loading malicious commands from the internet [Article 58971]. (b) While the software failure incident was initiated by non-human actions, it is important to note that the vulnerabilities exploited by the researchers were introduced by human actions during the design and implementation of the industrial robot's software and security measures. The flaws in the controller computer's security allowed for the potential sabotage and hijacking of the robotic arm, highlighting the critical role of human actions in ensuring robust cybersecurity measures in industrial systems [Article 58971]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is primarily related to hardware vulnerabilities in industrial robots. The researchers identified security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm, allowing them to perform various attacks such as changing the operating system, tampering with data, and loading malicious commands from the internet [58971]. (b) The software failure incident also involves software vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm. The flaws identified by the researchers allowed for attacks like uploading malicious code, altering manufacturing parameters, reducing precision, and potentially causing physical harm or product defects [58971]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involved researchers demonstrating how hackers could tweak an industrial robotic arm to cause millions of dollars worth of product defects, damage the machinery, or harm the human operator [Article 58971]. The researchers were able to perform attacks like changing the machine's operating system, loading malicious commands from the internet, uploading files to the robot's FTP servers, running unauthorized commands, altering parameters, rewriting firmware, and causing physical harm to humans [Article 58971]. These actions were carried out with the intent to sabotage and potentially cause serious harm, indicating a malicious objective behind the software failure incident. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | (a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions but rather due to intentional actions by hackers who exploited security vulnerabilities in the industrial robotic arm's software. The incident involved researchers demonstrating how hackers could sabotage and hijack the robotic arm to cause product defects, damage machinery, or harm human operators [58971]. The vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the robotic arm allowed the researchers to perform various attacks, including uploading malicious commands from the internet, changing the machine's operating system, and tampering with its data [58971]. The incident highlighted the risks associated with networked and internet-connected industrial robots and the potential for serious physical harm if exploited by malicious actors. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. The researchers identified a broad collection of security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm, allowing them to perform various attacks like changing the machine's operating system, tampering with its data, and loading their own malicious commands onto the machine from anywhere on the internet [58971]. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental as the researchers found that even known security flaws could linger in the robots for years due to factories often skipping software updates to avoid costly delays in manufacturing processes. This unintentional neglect of security updates could leave the robots vulnerable to attacks [58971]. |
| Duration | permanent | (a) The software failure incident described in the article is more of a permanent nature. The researchers identified a broad collection of security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of the industrial robotic arm, allowing for a range of attacks to be carried out, such as changing the machine's operating system, tampering with its data, and loading malicious commands onto the machine from anywhere on the internet [58971]. The vulnerabilities found in the industrial robot could potentially allow for serious physical harm, such as tricking a victim into entering the robot's cage and causing them injury, or extending the arm beyond its operating thresholds, potentially damaging it permanently. Additionally, the machine could be hacked to change its manufacturing parameters or reduce its precision, altering the final product [58971]. These aspects indicate that the software failure incident had lasting consequences and could lead to permanent damage or defects. |
| Behaviour | omission, value, other | (a) crash: The articles describe a scenario where researchers were able to compromise an industrial robotic arm by exploiting security vulnerabilities in its controller computer. This led to the potential of the arm being hijacked, introducing defects, stopping production, or altering its behavior completely [58971]. (b) omission: The software failure incident could lead to the omission of the robotic arm's intended functions. For example, attackers could upload malicious commands to the arm, causing it to stop production or introduce defects in the products being manufactured [58971]. (c) timing: The incident does not specifically mention timing-related failures where the system performs its intended functions but at incorrect times. (d) value: The software failure incident could lead to the robotic arm performing its intended functions incorrectly. Attackers could alter the arm's behavior, change manufacturing parameters, reduce precision, or extend the arm beyond its operating thresholds, potentially causing damage or altering products [58971]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not specifically mention byzantine failures where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The software failure incident also highlights the potential for serious physical harm due to the compromised robotic arm. Attackers could trick operators into dangerous situations, potentially causing bodily harm. Additionally, the incident raises concerns about the security of industrial robots connected to the internet, exposing them to various vulnerabilities and potential attacks [58971]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | actuator, processing_unit, network_communication, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The software failure incident discussed in the articles did not specifically mention any failure related to the sensor layer of the cyber-physical system. (b) actuator: The incident involved tweaking an industrial robotic arm, which is an actuator in a cyber-physical system, to cause product defects and potential physical harm. The attackers were able to load their own malicious commands onto the robotic arm, changing its behavior and introducing defects [Article 58971]. (c) processing_unit: The failure was related to security vulnerabilities found in the controller computer that pilots the industrial robotic arm. These vulnerabilities allowed the attackers to perform various attacks, such as changing the operating system, tampering with data, and loading malicious commands onto the machine [Article 58971]. (d) network_communication: The incident involved attackers exploiting vulnerabilities in the network communication of the industrial robotic arm. They were able to find exposed FTP servers connected to the robots, upload files to them, and run unauthorized commands. Additionally, attackers could cause the robot to run unauthorized commands by exploiting flaws in its HTTP interface [Article 58971]. (e) embedded_software: The failure incident was related to security flaws in the embedded software of the industrial robotic arm's controller computer. Attackers were able to exploit these vulnerabilities to upload their own code, change the machine's behavior, introduce defects, and potentially cause physical harm [Article 58971]. |
| Communication | connectivity_level | The software failure incident described in the article [58971] was related to the connectivity level of the cyber-physical system. The researchers identified security vulnerabilities in the controller computer of an industrial robotic arm, allowing them to perform various attacks by uploading their own malicious commands onto the machine from anywhere on the internet. They were able to find exposed, accessible FTP servers connected to the robots, upload files to them, and run unauthorized commands. Additionally, they could break the weak encryption used to protect input data, alter parameters, and even fully rewrite the firmware of the controller. These vulnerabilities at the network and transport layer allowed for potential physical harm and sabotage of the robotic arm, demonstrating failures introduced by the connectivity level of the cyber-physical system. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incident described in the article [58971] was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The researchers found security vulnerabilities in the controller computer that pilots the industrial robotic arm, allowing them to perform a range of attacks such as changing the machine's operating system with a USB drive, tampering with its data, and loading their own malicious commands onto the machine from anywhere on the internet. These actions demonstrate failures introduced by bugs, operating system errors, and incorrect usage at the application layer of the cyber physical system. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | harm, property, delay, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: The articles do not mention any incidents of people losing their lives due to the software failure. (b) harm: The software failure incident had the potential to cause serious physical harm. The researchers found that attackers could trick victims into entering the protective cage of the industrial robotic arm, potentially causing them serious injury. Additionally, the arm could be hacked to extend beyond its operating thresholds, potentially damaging it permanently. The researchers also demonstrated how the attack could introduce imperceptible aberrations into the arm's movement, which could impact the resulting product [58971]. (c) basic: The articles do not mention any impact on people's access to food or shelter due to the software failure. (d) property: The software failure incident could have led to significant property damage. Attackers could have caused millions of dollars worth of product defects by tweaking the industrial robotic arm. Additionally, the arm could be hacked to change its manufacturing parameters, reduce its precision, or potentially damage itself permanently [58971]. (e) delay: The articles mention that software updates for robots can often cause costly delays in manufacturing processes, leading factories to skip them. This means that even known security flaws could linger in the robots for years, potentially causing delays in production processes [58971]. (f) non-human: The software failure incident impacted non-human entities, specifically the industrial robotic arm. Attackers could have fully hijacked the robotic arm, changed its operating system, tampered with its data, and loaded malicious commands onto it from anywhere on the internet. The researchers identified security vulnerabilities in the controller computer that pilots the arm, allowing for a range of attacks to be carried out on the machine [58971]. (g) no_consequence: The articles do not mention that there were no real observed consequences of the software failure. (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss potential consequences of the software failure that did not occur. The researchers found security flaws in the industrial robotic arm that could have been exploited by attackers to cause physical harm, damage the machinery, introduce defects in products, stop production, or alter manufacturing parameters. While these consequences were identified as possibilities, there is no mention of them actually occurring [58971]. (i) other: The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure beyond those related to physical harm, property damage, potential delays, and impacts on the industrial robotic arm. |
| Domain | manufacturing | (a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the manufacturing industry. The incident involved the compromise of an industrial robotic arm used in various manufacturing processes such as automotive manufacturing, food processing, packaging, and pharmaceuticals [58971]. |
Article ID: 58971