| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack has happened again within the same organization. The incident involves the potential exploitation of security flaws in the UK's nuclear weapons program, specifically in the Trident system, which could lead to devastating consequences if successfully attacked by hackers [Article 59298, Article 59078].
(b) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack has also been a concern for other organizations or systems. The report highlights the broader issue of cyber vulnerabilities in critical systems, emphasizing the need for enhanced cybersecurity measures not only for the Trident program but also for other systems that rely on networked computers, devices, and software [Article 59298, Article 59078]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is highlighted in the articles. The vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack is attributed to flaws in the system's design and development. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) report points out dangerous security flaws in the UK's nuclear weapons program, emphasizing that the Trident system is undeniably vulnerable to cyber interference due to its reliance on numerous computers, complex software, and endless lines of code [59298, 59078].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also discussed in the articles. The report mentions that even though submarines on patrol are air-gapped and not connected to the internet, they are vulnerable to the introduction of malware at other points, such as during maintenance while docked at the Faslane naval base in Scotland. This highlights a potential failure due to contributing factors introduced by the operation or maintenance of the system [59078]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack is primarily within the system. The vulnerability arises from within the system itself, as the submarines, although air-gapped while on patrol, rely on networked computers, devices, and software that need to be regularly upgraded, reconfigured, and patched [Article 59078]. The report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) highlights that the submarines are vulnerable to the introduction of malware at points such as during maintenance while docked at the Faslane naval base in Scotland, indicating internal system vulnerabilities [Article 59078]. The incident is a result of weaknesses in the design, programming, and maintenance of the Trident system's cyber systems, which are integral parts of the submarines and their operations [Article 59078]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The articles report on the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack that could render Britain's nuclear weapons useless. The vulnerability is attributed to security flaws in the Trident system, particularly the introduction of malware into the submarines' systems during maintenance and refurbishment periods. This malware could lie dormant and be activated remotely at critical moments, potentially allowing rival states to disable nuclear arms during times of war [59298, 59078].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The articles do not specifically mention any software failure incident occurring due to human actions. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The articles discuss the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack that could render Britain's nuclear weapons useless. This vulnerability is attributed to the introduction of malware into the submarines' systems during maintenance while docked at the Faslane naval base in Scotland [Article 59078].
- The report highlights that even though submarines on patrol are air-gapped and not connected to the internet, they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks at other points, such as during maintenance when they are docked. The submarines, missiles, warheads, and support systems rely on networked computers, devices, and software, which need to be regularly upgraded, reconfigured, and patched, making them susceptible to cyber vulnerabilities [Article 59078].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident is primarily attributed to security flaws in the UK's nuclear weapons program, which could allow hackers to take control of Trident submarines and potentially start a catastrophic nuclear war. The security flaws mentioned in the articles point to vulnerabilities in the software systems of the submarines that could be exploited by injecting malicious software during maintenance periods [Article 59298].
- The report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) emphasizes that the Trident system, which relies on numerous computers, complex software, and lines of code, is undeniably vulnerable to cyber interference. The report warns about the potential consequences of a security breach, including the neutralization of operations, loss of life, and the catastrophic exchange of nuclear warheads, all stemming from software vulnerabilities [Article 59298]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Trident submarine fleet vulnerability to a cyber-attack is considered malicious. The incident involves the potential for hackers to exploit security flaws in the UK's nuclear weapons program by injecting malicious software into the submarines during maintenance and refurbishment, allowing for remote activation at critical moments [59298, 59078]. The report by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) highlights the catastrophic consequences that could result from such a cyber-attack, including the neutralization of operations, loss of life, and the potential for a catastrophic exchange of nuclear warheads [59298, 59078]. The incident is characterized by the deliberate attempt to compromise the security and functionality of the Trident system for harmful purposes. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack was primarily due to poor decisions. The incident was a result of dangerous security flaws in the UK's nuclear weapons program, which could potentially lead to devastating consequences if exploited by hackers [59298, 59078]. The failure was exacerbated by complacency and false claims by officials that the submarines were safe from hacking while at sea, despite the vulnerabilities present during maintenance and refurbishment periods when the submarines could be injected with malicious software [59298, 59078]. Additionally, the report highlighted the need for a massive and expensive operation to strengthen the resilience of subcontractors, maintenance systems, components design, and software updates to mitigate the cyber vulnerabilities in the Trident system [59078]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) pointed out dangerous security flaws in the UK's nuclear weapons program, highlighting the vulnerability of the Trident submarine fleet to cyber-attacks [59298, 59078]. The report emphasized that despite claims that the submarines are safe from hacking while at sea, the vessels are vulnerable to cyber threats during maintenance and refurbishment when they could be injected with malicious software. This vulnerability indicates a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security of the Trident system against cyber threats.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also apparent in the articles. The report by BASIC warned that a successful cyber-attack on the Trident submarine fleet could lead to catastrophic consequences, including the neutralization of operations, loss of life, or even the exchange of nuclear warheads [59298, 59078]. The accidental introduction of malware during maintenance or other vulnerable points could compromise the Trident system's security, indicating that such failures could occur unintentionally due to the complex nature of maintaining and upgrading networked computers, devices, and software within the system. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of the UK's Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack can be considered as both a permanent and temporary failure.
(a) Permanent: The vulnerability of the Trident submarine fleet to a catastrophic cyber-attack can be seen as a permanent failure due to the inherent design and operational vulnerabilities that exist in the system. The report highlights that the submarines, while on patrol, are air-gapped and not connected to the internet, which has led officials to claim that Trident is safe from hacking. However, the report from the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) points out that this claim is false and complacent, indicating a permanent vulnerability in the system [Article 59078].
(b) Temporary: On the other hand, the vulnerability can also be seen as a temporary failure as the submarines are only at sea part of the time and are vulnerable to the introduction of malware at other points, such as during maintenance while docked at the Faslane naval base in Scotland. This temporary vulnerability arises during specific circumstances, such as when the submarines are not at sea and are undergoing maintenance or refurbishment, making them susceptible to cyber-attacks [Article 59078]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not specifically mention a software crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles is related to the potential omission of performing intended functions. The vulnerability highlighted in the articles suggests that a cyber-attack could lead to the neutralization of operations, loss of life, or even the catastrophic exchange of nuclear warheads [Article 59298, Article 59078].
(c) timing: The articles do not mention a software failure incident related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but at the wrong time.
(d) value: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the potential incorrect performance of the system's intended functions. The concern is that a successful cyber-attack could render Britain's nuclear weapons useless, indicating a failure in the system's value [Article 59298, Article 59078].
(e) byzantine: The articles do not describe a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The software failure incident described in the articles involves the potential compromise of the Trident submarine fleet's cybersecurity, which could have severe consequences such as loss of life and rendering nuclear weapons ineffective. This could be categorized as a critical security flaw rather than a specific type of software failure behavior [Article 59298, Article 59078]. |