| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article mentions a specific incident where researchers tested a robot from ABB and were able to hack into its network and manipulate its actions by reverse-engineering the control program and software. ABB has since fixed the flaws in its machine's software [59336].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article highlights that the cybersecurity firm Trend Micro found weaknesses in the network security of factory robots from various companies including ABB, Fanuc, Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Yaskawa. These robots were found to have poor software protection, outdated software, and some used simple usernames and passwords that couldn't be changed or didn't even require a password. This indicates that similar software vulnerabilities were present across multiple organizations producing industrial robots [59336]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where researchers conducted tests on factory robots and found weaknesses in network security and software protection. They discovered that some robots had weak network security with simple usernames and passwords that couldn't be changed, while others didn't even require a password. Additionally, the industrial machines were running on outdated software, and tens of thousands of robots were using public IP addresses, increasing the risk of hackers gaining easy access [59336].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the same article where it is mentioned that operators and programmers can manage the machines remotely, sending commands through their computers or phones. If the connection is insecure, hackers could potentially hijack the machines, leading to sabotage and product defects. This highlights how the misuse or insecure operation of the machines could result in software failure incidents [59336]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within the system. The failure was related to weak network security, simple usernames and passwords, lack of password requirements, poor software protection, and the use of outdated software within the factory robots themselves [59336]. These internal system vulnerabilities allowed the researchers to hack into the robot's network and manipulate its actions, highlighting the importance of addressing cybersecurity issues within the system itself to prevent such incidents. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The article mentions that factory robots have weak network security, with some systems using simple usernames and passwords that couldn't be changed, and others not even requiring a password. Additionally, the industrial machines were found to have poor software protection and some ran on outdated software. This vulnerability in the robots' software and network security made them susceptible to hacking and manipulation by external parties without direct human involvement [59336].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The article highlights that operators and programmers can manage the robots remotely, sending commands through their computers or phones. If the connection is insecure, hackers could hijack the machines, leading to sabotage and product defects. In this case, the failure was facilitated by human actions such as insecure remote management practices that allowed hackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the system [59336]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article mentions that factory robots have weak network security, with some systems using simple usernames and passwords that couldn't be changed, and others not even requiring a password. This indicates a hardware-related vulnerability in the robots' security systems [59336].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The article highlights that the industrial machines also have poor software protection, with some running on outdated software. Additionally, the researchers were able to hack a robot's network and alter its behavior by reverse-engineering the control program and software, showcasing a software-related vulnerability [59336]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involved a series of tests conducted by Politecnico di Milano and cybersecurity firm Trend Micro, where researchers were able to hack into a factory robot from ABB by reverse-engineering the control program and software. They were able to manipulate the robot's network and make it draw a line that was slightly off, showcasing the vulnerability of the machine to cyber attacks [59336]. This incident demonstrates how hackers could potentially hijack industrial machines, leading to sabotage and product defects, highlighting the malicious intent behind the software failure. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the intent of poor decisions is evident in the article. The incident involved factory robots with weak network security and poor software protection. The robots were found to have simple usernames and passwords that couldn't be changed, some didn't even require a password, and some ran on outdated software. Additionally, tens of thousands of robots were using public IP addresses, increasing the risk of hackers gaining easy access [59336]. These vulnerabilities highlight poor decisions in the design and implementation of the robots' software and security features, ultimately leading to the potential risk of being hacked due to these weaknesses. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article. The researchers from Politecnico di Milano and cybersecurity firm Trend Micro conducted tests on factory robots and found weak network security, simple usernames and passwords that couldn't be changed, and outdated software in some systems [59336]. These vulnerabilities in the robots' software and network security indicate a lack of professional competence in ensuring robust cybersecurity measures during the development and deployment of the machines.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is highlighted in the article through the discovery of flaws in the machine's software by Trend Micro. The researchers were able to hack a robot from ABB by reverse-engineering the control program and software, allowing them to switch the machine's drawing path slightly off course [59336]. This accidental manipulation of the robot's behavior demonstrates how unintended software vulnerabilities can lead to failures or defects in automated systems. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article [59336] can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident involved vulnerabilities in the network security and software protection of factory robots from various manufacturers like ABB, Fanuc, Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Yaskawa. The researchers were able to hack into a robot from ABB by reverse-engineering the control program and software, allowing them to manipulate the machine's actions. This incident highlights specific circumstances, such as weak network security and outdated software, that contributed to the vulnerability of the robots to hacking. The vulnerabilities were identified and addressed by ABB, indicating that the failure was not permanent but rather temporary and specific to certain circumstances that were rectified. |
| Behaviour |
crash, value, other |
(a) crash: The article mentions a software failure incident where researchers were able to hack into a robot's network and manipulate its behavior. Specifically, they were able to alter the robot's programming to draw a line that was 2 millimeters off from the intended straight line. This manipulation of the robot's behavior can be considered a form of crash as the system lost control over its intended function of drawing a straight line [59336].
(b) omission: The article does not specifically mention any instances of the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The article does not mention any failures related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident described in the article involves the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The researchers were able to manipulate the robot's behavior by hacking into its network and changing its programming to draw a line that deviated from the intended straight line by 2 millimeters [59336].
(e) byzantine: The article does not describe the software failure incident as involving the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident described in the article can be categorized as unauthorized manipulation of the system's functions by external actors. This unauthorized access and control over the robot's behavior can be considered as another form of software failure behavior [59336]. |