| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to smart guns being hacked has happened again within the same organization. The incident involved the Armatix IP1 smart gun, which was hacked by a skilled hacker named Plore. Plore demonstrated critical vulnerabilities in the Armatix IP1 at the Defcon hacker conference, showing that the gun could be hacked using various techniques, including extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism with cheap magnets [61033].
(b) The software failure incident related to smart guns being hacked has also happened at other organizations or with their products and services. The article mentions that as gun violence rates continue to rise, some safety advocates have turned to technology like smart guns to help solve tragedies. The IP1 smart gun from German manufacturer Armatix was marketed as the first smart gun to be sold, but it was hacked by a hacker known as "Plore," who found a way to shoot the gun without needing the watch, essentially turning it back into a regular pistol [61344]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to the design phase. The smart gun, Armatix IP1, was found to have critical vulnerabilities in its security mechanisms by a hacker named Plore. These vulnerabilities allowed the gun to be hacked using various techniques, such as extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism with cheap magnets [Article 61033]. The flaws in the design of the smart gun's security features, including the radio-based safety mechanism and the firing pin locking mechanism, were exploited by the hacker, highlighting design weaknesses in the system.
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. Despite the smart gun being designed to only fire when the owner is wearing a special Armatix watch, the hacker demonstrated that the gun could be fired by anyone even when the watch was more than ten feet away. Additionally, the gun's radio signals could be jammed to prevent its owner from firing it, and the locking mechanism could be disabled by placing cheap magnets alongside its barrel, allowing the gun to be fired at will even when the watch was absent [Article 61033]. These operational vulnerabilities show that the system's intended security measures could be easily bypassed in practice, indicating failures in the operational aspects of the smart gun. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the smart gun by Armatix can be categorized as a within_system failure. The failure was due to critical vulnerabilities found within the security mechanisms of the smart gun itself, allowing a hacker to exploit these weaknesses and bypass the authentication measures intended to ensure only authorized users could fire the gun. The hacker, known as Plore, demonstrated various techniques to hack the gun, such as extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism using cheap magnets [61033, 61344]. These vulnerabilities were inherent to the design and implementation of the smart gun system, highlighting internal weaknesses that allowed for unauthorized access and operation of the firearm. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- In the software failure incident involving the Armatix IP1 smart gun, the failure was primarily due to vulnerabilities in the gun's security mechanisms. These vulnerabilities allowed for the gun to be hacked and fired without the necessary authentication from the owner's watch. The hacker, Plore, demonstrated various techniques to exploit these vulnerabilities, such as extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism using cheap magnets [61033, 61344].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The failure in the smart gun incident can also be attributed to human actions, specifically the actions of the hacker Plore who actively sought out and exploited the vulnerabilities in the Armatix IP1 smart gun. Plore conducted in-depth research, developed various attacks, and ultimately demonstrated how the gun could be hacked using simple tools like magnets. His actions highlighted the weaknesses in the smart gun's design and security measures [61033, 61344]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The software failure incident in the articles is primarily related to hardware vulnerabilities in the smart gun, specifically the Armatix IP1. The hacker, Plore, was able to exploit hardware weaknesses in the gun's design, such as using magnets to manipulate the firing pin locking mechanism and firing the gun without the necessary authentication from the watch [61033, 61344].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident in the articles is not directly related to software vulnerabilities. Instead, the failure is attributed to hardware vulnerabilities in the smart gun's design that allowed the hacker to bypass the intended security measures [61033, 61344]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is malicious in nature. The failure was caused by a skilled hacker who goes by the pseudonym Plore, who intentionally exploited critical vulnerabilities in the Armatix IP1 smart gun's security mechanisms. Plore demonstrated various techniques to hack the gun, including extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism using cheap magnets [61033, 61344]. Plore's actions were aimed at showing the flaws in the smart gun's security measures and highlighting the potential dangers of relying on such technology for gun safety.
(b) The software failure incident in the articles is non-malicious. The failure was not caused by unintentional errors or faults in the software but rather by deliberate actions of a hacker who identified and exploited vulnerabilities in the smart gun's security system. The incident was a result of the inherent weaknesses in the design and implementation of the Armatix IP1 smart gun, which allowed for unauthorized firing of the gun without the necessary authentication from the owner's watch [61033, 61344]. The failure was not accidental but a deliberate demonstration of the gun's lack of robust security measures. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The software failure incident involving the Armatix IP1 smart gun was primarily due to poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the security mechanisms [61033, 61344].
- The manufacturer, Armatix, claimed that the electronic security measures of the smart gun would "usher in a new era of gun safety," but the hacker Plore demonstrated critical vulnerabilities in the security mechanisms, showing that the gun could be easily hacked in multiple ways [61033].
- The security flaws in the smart gun, such as the ability to extend the range of the watch's radio signal, jam the gun's radio signals, and disable the gun's locking mechanism with cheap magnets, highlight poor decisions in the design and testing of the product [61033, 61344].
- The hacker Plore's findings exposed the inadequacy of the smart gun's security measures, indicating that the product failed to live up to its promise of enhanced safety, reflecting poor decisions in the development of the technology [61033, 61344].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- The software failure incident involving the Armatix IP1 smart gun was not primarily due to accidental decisions or unintended mistakes but rather stemmed from deliberate actions taken by the hacker Plore to exploit the security vulnerabilities of the product [61033, 61344].
- Plore's hacking of the smart gun involved intentional efforts to bypass the security mechanisms using techniques like extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and disabling the gun's locking mechanism with magnets, indicating a deliberate and calculated approach rather than accidental decisions [61033, 61344].
- The hacker's actions were driven by a challenge he saw online and a desire to test the security of the smart gun, demonstrating a purposeful intent to uncover and exploit the flaws in the technology [61033, 61344]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles. The smart gun, Armatix IP1, was found to have critical vulnerabilities by a hacker named Plore. Plore discovered various techniques to hack the gun, including extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism with cheap magnets [61033]. Additionally, Plore found that the gun's security mechanisms were easily defeated, highlighting a lack of robust security measures in the smart gun's development [61033].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the articles. Despite the advanced technology and security features of the $1,500 smart gun, it was ultimately compromised by a simple method involving magnets. The hacker, Plore, demonstrated how he could shoot the gun without needing the watch by using three magnets, a piece of wood, and a screw, showcasing a shockingly simple hack that turned the smart gun back into a regular pistol [61344]. This accidental oversight in the design of the smart gun's security system allowed for an easy and unexpected breach, leading to the failure of the intended security measures. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles seems to be permanent. The smart gun, Armatix IP1, was found to have critical vulnerabilities that allowed it to be hacked in various ways, such as extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism with cheap magnets. These vulnerabilities were fundamental flaws in the design and security mechanisms of the smart gun, indicating a permanent failure in terms of providing the promised security and authentication features [61033, 61344].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered temporary in the sense that the vulnerabilities were discovered and demonstrated by a skilled hacker named Plore. The temporary aspect lies in the fact that the failure was not inherent to the software itself but rather due to specific circumstances and actions taken by the hacker to exploit the weaknesses in the smart gun's security mechanisms. Once these vulnerabilities are addressed and fixed by future smart gun manufacturers, the temporary nature of the failure can be mitigated [61033, 61344]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the failure is related to security vulnerabilities in the smart gun system that allow it to be hacked and fired without the necessary authentication [61033, 61344].
(b) omission: The failure is not due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the issue lies in the system's security mechanisms being bypassed, allowing the gun to be fired without the required authentication [61033, 61344].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The issue is not about timing but rather about the system being compromised in a way that allows unauthorized firing of the gun [61033, 61344].
(d) value: The failure is due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The smart gun system is supposed to only fire when the owner is wearing a special watch, but the security vulnerabilities discovered by the hacker "Plore" allow the gun to be fired without the necessary authentication, rendering the system ineffective [61033, 61344].
(e) byzantine: The failure is not characterized by the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The issue is more straightforward in that the security mechanisms of the smart gun system are compromised, leading to unauthorized firing of the gun [61033, 61344].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability exploit. The failure is a result of the system's security mechanisms being bypassed through various techniques, such as extending the range of the watch's radio signal, jamming the gun's radio signals, and mechanically disabling the gun's locking mechanism using magnets, allowing unauthorized firing of the gun [61033, 61344]. |