Published Date: 2017-07-19
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident involving the Segway MiniPro electric scooter hacking happened in January [61279]. The incident occurred in January, as mentioned in the article. |
| System | 1. Segway MiniPro app's Bluetooth communication system failed to properly authenticate commands, allowing unauthorized access to the scooter [Article 61279]. 2. Segway MiniPro's software update platform lacked a mechanism to confirm the integrity of firmware updates, enabling the installation of malicious firmware updates [Article 61279]. 3. The GPS feature "Rider Nearby" in the Segway MiniPro app provided a tool for potential abuse through publicly available, persistent location tracking, leading to its discontinuation [Article 61279]. |
| Responsible Organization | 1. The software failure incident with the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was caused by vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride, an embedded device security consultant at IOActive [61279]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Segway MiniPro users [61279] |
| Software Causes | 1. Lack of authentication using the user-chosen PIN for Bluetooth communication, allowing arbitrary commands to be sent to the scooter without proper authorization [Article 61279]. 2. Absence of a mechanism to confirm the integrity of firmware updates, enabling the installation of malicious firmware updates that could override safety mechanisms [Article 61279]. 3. Unintentional aid in malicious activity through the GPS feature "Rider Nearby," which provided persistent location tracking that could be abused [Article 61279]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of proper authentication mechanisms in the communication between the Segway MiniPro app and the scooter, allowing unauthorized access [Article 61279]. 2. Absence of a mechanism to confirm the integrity of firmware updates sent to the device, leading to the potential installation of malicious firmware [Article 61279]. 3. Inadequate security measures in the Bluetooth communication protocols of the device, potentially leaving vulnerabilities in the way users access the device's Bluetooth management interface [Article 61279]. |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident with the Segway MiniPro electric scooter allowed attackers to remotely hack the ride, stop it short, or even drive the rider into traffic, posing serious safety risks [61279]. 2. The vulnerabilities discovered in the Segway MiniPro app allowed attackers to bypass safety protections, take control of the device, and potentially cause harm to riders [61279]. 3. The incident highlighted the dangers of IoT vulnerabilities and the physical safety risks associated with unsecured "smart" transportation devices [61279]. 4. As a result of the software failure incident, Segway addressed the bulk of the problems in an app update, added mechanisms like cryptographic signing to validate firmware updates, and eliminated certain features to prevent full takeovers [61279]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing proper authentication mechanisms at every level of the system, including using the user-chosen PIN for Bluetooth communication authentication, could have prevented unauthorized access [Article 61279]. 2. Incorporating mechanisms like cryptographic signing to validate firmware updates could have prevented the installation of malicious firmware updates and overridden safety mechanisms [Article 61279]. 3. Conducting thorough security evaluations of Bluetooth communication protocols and implementing robust security measures could have prevented vulnerabilities in the Bluetooth management interface [Article 61279]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implement mechanisms like cryptographic signing to validate firmware updates to prevent full takeovers [61279]. 2. Evaluate Bluetooth communication protocols and security to address weaknesses in how users can access the device's Bluetooth management interface [61279]. 3. Eliminate features that unintentionally aid in malicious activity, such as the GPS feature "Rider Nearby" [61279]. | References | 1. Thomas Kilbride, an embedded device security consultant at IOActive [61279] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident related to the Segway MiniPro electric scooter happened within the same organization, Segway, which is owned by Chinese scooter-maker Ninebot. The vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app were discovered by Thomas Kilbride, an embedded device security consultant at IOActive, and were disclosed to Segway. Segway addressed the bulk of the problems in an app update in April, adding mechanisms like cryptographic signing to validate firmware updates and eliminating the Rider Nearby feature [61279]. (b) The software failure incident involving vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app highlights the broader issue of IoT vulnerabilities and the risks associated with digitally connected vehicles. This incident serves as a reminder of the dangers of device hacking and the potential real-world harm that can result from such vulnerabilities. The article mentions that IoT vulnerabilities have led to real-world harm in many incidents, emphasizing the importance of securing smart transportation devices to prevent physical safety risks [61279]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident in the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was primarily due to design factors introduced during the system development phase. The vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride were related to flaws in the design of the Segway MiniPro app and its communication with the scooter. These design weaknesses allowed attackers to bypass safety protections, send arbitrary commands, and potentially install malicious firmware updates, compromising the security and control of the device [61279]. (b) Additionally, the software failure incident also had elements related to operation factors. The misuse or exploitation of the vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app by attackers could lead to operational failures, such as remote-controlling the hoverboard, shutting it off while someone was on it, or potentially causing harm to the rider. The operation of the system, in this case, was impacted by the design flaws that allowed for unauthorized access and control of the scooter [61279]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident in the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was primarily due to vulnerabilities within the system itself. The Segway MiniPro app had security flaws that allowed attackers to bypass safety protections, take control of the device remotely, and even install malicious firmware updates. The lack of proper authentication using the user PIN number and the absence of integrity checks for firmware updates were key factors contributing to the vulnerability [61279]. These issues were addressed by Segway through app updates and implementing mechanisms like cryptographic signing to prevent full takeovers. (b) outside_system: While the software failure incident was mainly caused by vulnerabilities within the system, external factors such as potential attacks from malicious actors outside the system also played a role. Attackers could exploit the vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app to remotely hack the scooter, posing risks to users' safety. The article highlights the dangers of device hacking and the real-world harm that can result from IoT vulnerabilities, emphasizing the importance of securing digitally connected vehicles like the Segway MiniPro [61279]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident in the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was primarily due to non-human actions. The vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app allowed for remote hacking and control of the scooter without requiring the user-chosen PIN for authentication. Additionally, the lack of an integrity check for firmware updates meant that malicious updates could be installed, overriding safety mechanisms. The GPS feature "Rider Nearby" also unintentionally aided in potential malicious activity, leading to its discontinuation by Segway [Article 61279]. (b) However, human actions were also involved in this software failure incident. Thomas Kilbride, an embedded device security consultant at IOActive, discovered the vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app through his investigation into the security behind its features. He disclosed these bugs to Segway, prompting the company to address the issues in an app update in April [Article 61279]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The article mentions vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app that allowed attackers to bypass the hoverboard's safety protections from afar and take control of the device [Article 61279]. - The communication between the app and the Segway scooter revealed that a user PIN number meant to protect the Bluetooth communication wasn't being used for authentication at every level of the system, indicating a hardware-related vulnerability [Article 61279]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The vulnerabilities found in the Segway MiniPro app, such as the lack of authentication using the user PIN number and the absence of mechanisms to confirm firmware updates, point to software-related issues that were exploited by attackers [Article 61279]. - The article highlights that the app allowed for remote control of the hoverboard, applying firmware updates, and changing LED colors, indicating software functionalities that were vulnerable to exploitation [Article 61279]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident in this case was malicious in nature. The vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride in the Segway MiniPro app allowed for potential attacks by malicious actors to remotely hack the scooter, bypass safety protections, take control of the device, and even install malicious firmware updates that could override fundamental programming [61279]. These vulnerabilities could have resulted in serious harm to users if exploited by attackers with malicious intent. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | (a) The software failure incident related to the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was primarily due to poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the software features. The vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride were a result of inadequate security measures and oversights in the authentication process. For example, the user PIN number meant to protect Bluetooth communication was not used for authentication at every level of the system, allowing arbitrary commands to be sent to the scooter without needing the PIN [61279]. (b) Additionally, the incident also involved accidental decisions or unintended consequences, such as the unintentional aid in malicious activity provided by the GPS feature known as "Rider Nearby." This feature, although designed for social purposes, could easily be abused for persistent location tracking, leading to potential privacy and security risks. As a response to these accidental decisions, Segway discontinued the feature to mitigate the unintended consequences [61279]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The software failure incident in the Segway MiniPro app was primarily due to development incompetence. The vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride, an embedded device security consultant at IOActive, were a result of inadequate security measures in the app's design and implementation. For example, the app did not properly authenticate commands sent to the scooter, lacked mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates, and had features like the "Rider Nearby" GPS tracking that could be easily abused [61279]. (b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be attributed to accidental factors. The lack of proper authentication and integrity checks in the app, as well as the unintended consequences of features like the GPS tracking, could be considered accidental oversights in the development process that led to vulnerabilities being exploited by attackers [61279]. |
| Duration | temporary | (a) The software failure incident in the article was temporary. The vulnerabilities in the Segway MiniPro app that allowed for remote hacking and control of the scooter were identified by Thomas Kilbride, an embedded device security consultant at IOActive. These vulnerabilities were disclosed to Segway in January, and the company addressed the bulk of the problems in an app update in April [61279]. This indicates that the software failure was not permanent but was addressed and patched within a specific timeframe. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride allowed attackers to remotely take control of the Segway MiniPro electric scooter, potentially causing harm to the rider by bypassing safety protections and manipulating the device [Article 61279]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The system omitted to perform its intended functions of properly authenticating commands sent to the scooter and confirming the integrity of firmware updates, leading to vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers [Article 61279]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with a timing failure. The system did not exhibit issues related to performing its intended functions too late or too early [Article 61279]. (d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized as a value failure. The system performed its intended functions incorrectly by allowing unauthorized commands to be sent to the scooter and potentially installing malicious firmware updates, compromising the safety mechanisms of the device [Article 61279]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure. The system did not exhibit inconsistent responses or interactions that would characterize a byzantine failure [Article 61279]. (f) other: The other behavior exhibited in the software failure incident is the unintentional aid in malicious activity through the GPS feature known as "Rider Nearby." This feature, although not directly causing a crash or omission, could have been abused for potentially harmful purposes, leading to unintended consequences [Article 61279]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | network_communication, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The software failure incident related to the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was primarily due to vulnerabilities in the embedded software and network communication rather than sensor errors. The vulnerabilities allowed attackers to exploit the Bluetooth communication between the mobile app and the scooter without needing the user-chosen PIN, enabling them to send arbitrary commands to the scooter and potentially install malicious firmware updates [61279]. (b) actuator: The software failure incident did not involve actuator errors but rather vulnerabilities in the embedded software and network communication of the Segway MiniPro electric scooter. The vulnerabilities allowed attackers to take control of the device remotely and override safety mechanisms by exploiting the communication between the mobile app and the scooter [61279]. (c) processing_unit: The software failure incident was primarily related to vulnerabilities in the embedded software and network communication of the Segway MiniPro electric scooter. The vulnerabilities allowed attackers to bypass safety protections, send arbitrary commands, and potentially install malicious firmware updates, highlighting weaknesses in the processing unit's software and communication protocols [61279]. (d) network_communication: The software failure incident was significantly influenced by vulnerabilities in network communication between the mobile app and the Segway MiniPro electric scooter. The lack of proper authentication mechanisms and integrity checks in the communication protocol allowed attackers to exploit the Bluetooth connection, send unauthorized commands, and potentially install malicious firmware updates, compromising the security of the network communication [61279]. (e) embedded_software: The software failure incident with the Segway MiniPro electric scooter was primarily attributed to vulnerabilities in the embedded software. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to exploit the software update platform, bypass safety mechanisms, and take control of the device remotely by sending arbitrary commands and potentially installing malicious firmware updates, highlighting weaknesses in the embedded software's security [61279]. |
| Communication | link_level | The software failure incident described in the article [61279] was related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed at both the link_level and connectivity_level. 1. **Link Level**: The vulnerability discovered by Thomas Kilbride allowed him to send arbitrary commands to the Segway MiniPro scooter without needing the user-chosen PIN. This indicates a failure at the link level where the communication between the app and the scooter was not adequately protected, allowing unauthorized access and control [61279]. 2. **Connectivity Level**: Additionally, Kilbride found that the hoverboard's software update platform lacked a mechanism to confirm the integrity of firmware updates sent to the device. This flaw at the connectivity level meant that an attacker could easily trick the device into installing a malicious firmware update, compromising the fundamental programming and safety mechanisms of the scooter [61279]. Therefore, the software failure incident in this case involved vulnerabilities at both the link level and connectivity level of the cyber physical system, leading to potential security risks and control issues. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incident described in the article [61279] was indeed related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The vulnerability discovered by Thomas Kilbride in the Segway MiniPro app allowed attackers to exploit flaws in the application's security features, enabling them to bypass safety protections, take control of the device remotely, and potentially cause harm to users. Kilbride found that the app lacked proper authentication mechanisms, allowing arbitrary commands to be sent to the scooter without requiring the user-chosen PIN. Additionally, the software update platform did not have a mechanism to confirm the integrity of firmware updates, making it possible for attackers to install malicious firmware updates that could override safety mechanisms. These issues highlight how vulnerabilities at the application layer can lead to serious consequences in cyber physical systems. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: The articles do not mention any incidents of people losing their lives due to the software failure. [61279] (b) harm: The article discusses the potential for physical harm due to the software failure, mentioning that someone could be thrown off the hoverboard or seriously injured if an attacker decides to hack it. However, there is no specific mention of actual physical harm occurring. [61279] (c) basic: The articles do not mention any impact on people's access to food or shelter due to the software failure. [61279] (d) property: The software failure incident could have allowed attackers to take control of the Segway MiniPro, potentially leading to theft of the device. However, there is no specific mention of property loss occurring. [61279] (e) delay: The articles do not mention any instances of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure. [61279] (f) non-human: The software failure incident impacted the Segway MiniPro electric scooter, a non-human entity, by allowing attackers to remotely hack and take control of the device. [61279] (g) no_consequence: The articles do not mention that there were no real observed consequences of the software failure. [61279] (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss potential consequences of the software failure, such as physical harm to riders, theft of Segways, and the risks associated with IoT vulnerabilities in digitally connected vehicles. However, it is not explicitly stated that these consequences actually occurred. [61279] (i) other: The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure beyond those discussed in the options (a) to (h). [61279] |
| Domain | transportation | (a) The failed system in this incident was related to the transportation industry. The Segway MiniPro electric scooter, along with its paired mobile app, was the subject of the software failure incident. The vulnerabilities discovered by Thomas Kilbride allowed attackers to remotely hack the scooter, bypass safety protections, and take control of the device [Article 61279]. The incident highlighted the risks associated with digitally connected vehicles and the importance of securing IoT devices in the transportation sector. |
Article ID: 61279