| Recurring |
multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the malware CopyCat infecting Android devices has not been specifically mentioned to have happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. Therefore, there is no evidence of a similar incident occurring again at one specific organization.
(b) The article mentions that the malware CopyCat infected more than 14 million Android devices globally, with victims primarily in Asia but also including over 280,000 devices in the US and more than 381,000 devices in Canada [Article 61341]. This indicates that the incident of malware infecting devices has occurred across multiple organizations or with their products and services, affecting users in various countries. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it mentions that the CopyCat malware was able to exploit five exploits that hit devices running Android 5.0 and earlier, which had been discovered and patched more than two years ago. However, older Android devices were still vulnerable to the attack because users did not patch their devices frequently or at all. This indicates a failure due to contributing factors introduced by system development and updates [61341].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it describes how CopyCat infected more than 14 million Android devices worldwide by pretending to be a popular app and collecting data about the infected device. The malware then hijacked the device's Zygote, allowing it to control every new app downloaded and every app opened on the phone. This indicates a failure due to contributing factors introduced by the operation or misuse of the system [61341]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident of the CopyCat malware infecting Android devices can be attributed to factors originating from within the system. The malware itself was designed to root phones, hijack apps, collect data, download rootkits, and manipulate the device's Zygote to control app launches and ad revenue redirection [61341]. These actions were all initiated and executed by the malware within the Android devices, showcasing a failure originating from within the system.
(b) outside_system: On the other hand, the spread of the CopyCat malware was facilitated by contributing factors originating from outside the system. The malware was distributed through third-party app downloads and phishing attacks, bypassing Google Play's security measures [61341]. Additionally, the malware creators seemed to spare devices in China, possibly to avoid police investigations, indicating external factors influencing the malware's behavior and distribution. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was caused by a new strain of malware called CopyCat, which infected over 14 million Android devices worldwide. CopyCat rooted phones, hijacked apps, and generated fraudulent ad revenue without direct human participation in the distribution of the malware. The malware spread through exploits on devices running Android 5.0 and earlier, affecting users who downloaded apps from third-party markets. The malware's actions, such as collecting data, downloading rootkits, and replacing Referrer IDs, were all automated processes initiated by the malware itself [61341].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
While the malware itself was not directly distributed through Google Play, human actions such as downloading apps from third-party stores and falling victim to phishing attacks contributed to the spread of CopyCat. Additionally, the connections between CopyCat and the Chinese ad network MobiSummer suggest potential human involvement in the creation and operation of the malware. The fact that the malware spared devices in China, possibly to avoid police investigations, also hints at human decision-making behind the cyberattack [61341]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article does not mention any specific hardware-related contributing factors that led to the CopyCat malware infecting Android devices. It primarily focuses on how the malware operated, spread, and generated revenue through fraudulent ad activities. Therefore, there is no direct evidence or mention of hardware contributing to the failure incident.
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident with the CopyCat malware is clearly attributed to software-related factors. The malware itself is a strain of malicious software that infects Android devices, roots phones, hijacks apps, collects data, downloads rootkits, and manipulates the device's security system to generate fraudulent ad revenue. The failure incident, in this case, originates from the software itself, which is designed to exploit vulnerabilities in Android devices and deceive users into downloading and using malicious apps [61341]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involves a new strain of malware called CopyCat that infected over 14 million Android devices worldwide, rooting phones and hijacking apps to generate fraudulent ad revenue for the hackers. The malware pretends to be a popular app, collects data about the infected device, downloads rootkits to root the phone, and hijacks the device's Zygote to control app launches. CopyCat also replaces the Referrer ID on apps with its own to divert ad revenue to the hackers. The malware helped hackers make over $1.5 million in just two months by displaying fake ads on infected devices [61341].
(b) The incident is non-malicious as there is no indication that the failure was unintentional or caused by factors not intended to harm the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the CopyCat malware can be attributed to poor decisions made by the cybercriminals behind the attack. The malware was designed to infect Android devices, root phones, hijack apps, and generate fraudulent ad revenue. The cybercriminals behind CopyCat used various tactics such as distributing fake apps, hijacking the device's Zygote, and replacing Referrer IDs to divert ad revenue to themselves instead of the legitimate app creators [61341]. These actions demonstrate a deliberate and malicious intent to exploit vulnerable devices for financial gain, indicating poor decisions made by the attackers. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the CopyCat malware attack reported in Article 61341. The malware infected over 14 million Android devices worldwide, generating fraudulent ad revenue for the hackers. The malware was able to root phones, hijack apps, and manipulate the Zygote launcher, indicating a high level of sophistication in its design and execution. Additionally, the malware exploited five known vulnerabilities in Android devices, which had been discovered and patched more than two years ago, highlighting a failure in ensuring devices were updated and secure [61341].
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is seen in how the CopyCat malware spread through third-party app downloads and phishing attacks, rather than being distributed through Google Play. This accidental distribution method allowed the malware to infect a significant number of devices, with victims in various countries, including the US, Canada, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Myanmar. The malware's ability to replace Referrer IDs on apps and generate revenue for the hackers through fraudulent ads was a result of its accidental infiltration into users' devices [61341]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article about the CopyCat malware can be considered as a permanent failure. The malware infected more than 14 million Android devices globally, leading to significant financial losses for victims and generating fraudulent ad revenue for the hackers. Despite efforts by Google to block CopyCat through Play Protect and blacklisting it, the malware continued to impact devices through third-party app downloads and phishing attacks. The malware exploited vulnerabilities in Android devices running older versions, and even though the attack slowed down after being blacklisted, infected devices could still be affected by the malware [Article 61341].
(b) The software failure incident can also be seen as a temporary failure in the sense that the attack hit its peak between April and May of 2016 and has slowed down since Google took measures to block CopyCat. The malware's impact has decreased over time, indicating that the immediate threat has been mitigated to some extent. However, the potential for infected devices to still be affected by the malware suggests that the issue has not been completely resolved, making it a temporary failure in that sense [Article 61341]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident related to the CopyCat malware can be categorized as a crash. The malware roots phones, hijacks apps, and essentially cuts off the security system of the infected device, leading to a state where the system is not performing its intended functions [Article 61341].
(b) omission: The malware incident can also be linked to omission as the CopyCat malware omits the intended functions of the device by collecting data, downloading rootkits, and hijacking the device's Zygote, leading to the omission of normal device operations [Article 61341].
(c) timing: The timing of the failure is not explicitly mentioned in the article. However, the malware's actions, such as collecting data, downloading fake apps, and replacing Referrer IDs to redirect ad revenue, could potentially lead to timing issues if the system performs its functions too late or too early [Article 61341].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be associated with a value failure as the CopyCat malware performs its intended functions incorrectly by redirecting ad revenue to hackers instead of the legitimate app creators, thereby manipulating the value exchange in the system [Article 61341].
(e) byzantine: The behavior of the software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions. The CopyCat malware consistently carries out its malicious activities to generate fraudulent ad revenue without displaying inconsistent behavior [Article 61341].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software failure incident is the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in older Android devices. The malware leverages old exploits that had been discovered and patched more than two years ago, targeting users who do not frequently update their devices, leading to a security breach and financial exploitation [Article 61341]. |