| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to IMSI catcher detection apps failing to effectively detect IMSI catchers has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The study conducted by researchers from Oxford University and the Technical University of Berlin found that popular IMSI catcher detection apps such as SnoopSnitch, Cell Spy Catcher, GSM Spy Finder, Darshak, and AIMSICD were ineffective in detecting IMSI catchers, highlighting fundamental technical shortcomings in these privacy protection apps [61941].
(b) The software failure incident related to IMSI catcher detection apps failing to effectively detect IMSI catchers has also happened at multiple organizations or with their products and services. The study revealed that these detection apps, which have been downloaded hundreds of thousands of times, were not able to effectively detect IMSI catchers, indicating a broader issue in the development of such privacy protection apps across different organizations [61941]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the development of IMSI catcher detection apps. Researchers from Oxford University and the Technical University of Berlin conducted a study on five stingray-detection apps and found that these apps failed to detect IMSI catchers effectively. The lead researcher mentioned that these apps lack fundamental technical capabilities and highlighted the problems in building privacy protection apps for everybody [61941].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the operation of the stingray-detection apps. Despite the apps being designed to send alerts when a phone connects to a rogue cell tower, the researchers were able to fully circumvent each app, tricking the phones into handing over sensitive data. This failure in operation allowed for the exploitation of the apps' limitations by the researchers using their surveillance setup, White-Stingray, to bypass the detection mechanisms of the apps [61941]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily within the system. The failure of the IMSI catcher detection apps to effectively detect IMSI catchers and protect against tracking and wiretapping is attributed to fundamental technical capabilities lacking in the apps themselves. The study conducted by researchers from Oxford University and the Technical University of Berlin revealed that the detection apps could be fully circumvented, allowing sensitive data to be stolen. The apps were found to only look for certain clues and techniques used by fake cell tower systems, leaving gaps that could be exploited by sophisticated surveillance tools like the White-Stingray developed by the researchers [61941].
(b) outside_system: The failure of the software incident is also influenced by factors outside the system. The researchers built their own surveillance setup, White-Stingray, to conduct the tests on the detection apps since actual stingray devices are expensive and difficult to obtain outside of government agencies. The White-Stingray system used a PC and a software-defined radio to mimic the capabilities of a real IMSI catcher. This external factor of not having access to actual stingray devices led to the development of a custom surveillance tool for testing the detection apps, highlighting the challenges posed by the availability and accessibility of such surveillance equipment [61941]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the limitations and vulnerabilities in the design and functionality of the IMSI catcher detection apps. The researchers found that the detection apps lacked fundamental technical capabilities and were easily circumvented by their White-Stingray surveillance setup, which was built using a PC and a software-defined radio [61941].
(b) However, human actions also play a role in this software failure incident. The developers of the IMSI catcher detection apps rushed to offer these tools to smartphone users without fully addressing the complexities and vulnerabilities associated with detecting IMSI catchers. Additionally, the study conducted by researchers from Oxford University and the Technical University of Berlin highlighted the problems in building privacy protection apps for everybody, indicating a potential lack of thorough testing and validation of these apps before being released to the public [61941]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where researchers built their own surveillance setup called White-Stingray using a PC and a software-defined radio to test IMSI catcher detection apps [61941]. This setup was used to mimic the behavior of actual IMSI catchers, which are hardware devices used for surveillance. The White-Stingray system was designed to receive and transmit a wide range of radio frequencies, similar to actual IMSI catchers, to test the effectiveness of the detection apps.
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the same article where researchers tested five stingray-detection apps designed to alert users when their phones connect to rogue cell towers [61941]. The study found that these apps failed to effectively detect IMSI catchers and lacked fundamental technical capabilities. The apps were unable to detect various techniques used by the White-Stingray system to track or tap a phone, highlighting the limitations in building privacy protection apps for detecting IMSI catchers. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The failure was due to the researchers being able to fully circumvent five stingray-detection apps, allowing them to trick phones into handing over sensitive data. The researchers built their own surveillance setup called White-Stingray to test the apps, and they were able to bypass the detection mechanisms of the apps by using various techniques that the apps did not check for. This incident highlights the vulnerabilities in the existing IMSI catcher detection apps and the challenges in building effective privacy protection apps against malicious actors [61941]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the detection apps for IMSI catchers can be attributed to both poor decisions and accidental decisions:
(a) poor_decisions: The failure of the detection apps can be linked to poor decisions in their design and implementation. The lead researcher of the study highlighted that the apps lacked fundamental technical capabilities and failed to detect IMSI catchers effectively, indicating shortcomings in the design and development of these privacy protection apps [61941].
(b) accidental_decisions: The failure of the detection apps can also be associated with accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The apps were found to be easily circumvented by the researchers, allowing them to trick the phones into handing over sensitive data. This suggests that there were unintended vulnerabilities or oversights in the apps' functionality that led to their failure to detect IMSI catchers effectively [61941]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The article discusses how researchers from Oxford University and the Technical University of Berlin conducted a study on five stingray-detection apps and found that they could fully circumvent each one, allowing them to trick the phones into handing over sensitive data. The lead researcher on the study highlighted that these apps fail to detect IMSI catchers and lack fundamental technical capabilities, pointing to problems in building privacy protection apps for everybody [61941].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental as the apps designed to detect IMSI catchers were not intentionally created to fail. The researchers tested popular detection apps and found that they were not effective in detecting the surveillance setup they created, showcasing unintentional shortcomings in the apps' capabilities [61941]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident discussed in the articles is more likely to be categorized as a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. This is because the failure was due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances, specifically the limitations and vulnerabilities of the IMSI catcher detection apps tested by the researchers from Oxford University and the Technical University of Berlin [61941]. The failure was not inherent to all circumstances but rather specific to the capabilities and design of the detection apps when faced with sophisticated surveillance techniques employed by the researchers using their White-Stingray setup. |
| Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the failure is related to the inability of the software to effectively detect IMSI catchers, allowing for potential spying and data theft [61941].
(b) omission: The failure can be categorized as an omission since the software tools designed to detect IMSI catchers omitted to perform their intended functions effectively. The detection apps failed to detect IMSI catchers and lacked fundamental technical capabilities, allowing researchers to fully circumvent them and trick phones into handing over sensitive data [61941].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions either too late or too early. Instead, the issue lies in the software's inability to detect IMSI catchers effectively, regardless of when the detection occurs [61941].
(d) value: The failure is not due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of the value provided. The issue is with the software's inability to detect IMSI catchers, leading to potential privacy breaches and data theft [61941].
(e) byzantine: The failure does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The software's failure in this case is more straightforward, involving the lack of effective detection of IMSI catchers [61941].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software in this failure incident is the inability to detect IMSI catchers effectively, despite being designed specifically for that purpose. The software's shortcomings in detecting rogue cell towers and protecting against tracking highlight the challenges in building privacy protection apps for everybody [61941]. |