Published Date: 2017-08-22
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in January [62106]. 2. The article [62106] was published on 2017-08-23. 3. Therefore, the software failure incident occurred in January 2017. |
| System | 1. Universal Robots industrial robots (UR3, UR5, UR10) [62224] 2. Softbank Robotics consumer robots (NAO, Pepper) [62224] 3. UBTECH Robotics Alpha 1S and Alpha 2 robots [62224] 4. ROBOTIS home robots (ROBOTIS OP2, THORMANG3) [62224] 5. Asratec Corp's robots using the affected V-Sido technology [62224] 6. Rethink Robotics Baxter and Sawyer assembly-line robots [62106] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Researchers Cesar Cerrudo and Lucas Apa of cybersecurity firm IOActive discovered and reported nearly 50 vulnerabilities in robots from various manufacturers, highlighting the potential risks associated with these vulnerabilities [62106, 62224]. 2. The robot manufacturers, including Rethink Robotics, Universal Robots, SoftBank Robotics, Asratec Corp, Ubtech, and Robotis Inc, were responsible for the software failure incident as they failed to adequately address the vulnerabilities identified by the researchers, leaving the robots susceptible to hacking and potential misuse [62106, 62224]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Users and bystanders were impacted by the software failure incident as the vulnerabilities in robots could allow hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots move violently, putting users and bystanders in danger [62106]. 2. Companies and countries could potentially be impacted by the vulnerabilities in robots, as cyber criminals could exploit these vulnerabilities to disrupt factories through ransomware attacks or by manipulating robots to embed flaws in products they are programmed to build [62106]. 3. The public, developers, and organizations using robots were impacted by the vulnerabilities discovered in various consumer and industrial robots, as these vulnerabilities could lead to robots being turned into bugging devices, weapons, or used for physical attacks [62224]. |
| Software Causes | 1. Insecure communication, authentication issues, missing authorization, weak cryptography, privacy issues, weak default configuration, and vulnerable open source robot frameworks and libraries were identified as software causes of the failure incident [62224]. 2. Software vulnerabilities such as the lack of response from manufacturers to address security flaws, allowing hackers to exploit robots easily, disable safety features, and potentially weaponize robots were also highlighted as software causes of the failure incident [62106]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of response and slow reaction by robot manufacturers to address the vulnerabilities reported by cybersecurity researchers [62106, 62224] 2. Inadequate security measures and protocols implemented by the robot manufacturers to protect against potential hacks and attacks [62106, 62224] 3. Potential dangers posed by the vulnerabilities in robots, such as the ability to disable safety features, spy on users, and cause physical harm [62106, 62224] 4. Concerns raised by cybersecurity experts about the alarming threat posed by the vulnerabilities in robots, including the potential for cyber criminals to disrupt factories and cause harm [62106] |
| Impacts | 1. The vulnerabilities in various robots allowed hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots move violently, posing dangers to users and bystanders [62106]. 2. The software vulnerabilities in robots could potentially be exploited by cybercriminals to disrupt factories through ransomware attacks or by embedding flaws in products [62106]. 3. The discovered vulnerabilities in robots could lead to robots being turned into bugging devices or even weapons, with the potential for causing physical harm, such as skull fractures [62224]. 4. The software flaws in robots could allow them to be hijacked and used for secretive listening or physical attacks, raising concerns about the security of robots in various settings, including homes, offices, and factories [62224]. 5. The slow response by manufacturers to address the identified vulnerabilities in robots raised concerns about the security of emerging technologies and the potential risks associated with insecure robot technology [62106, 62224]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing secure communication protocols to prevent hackers from intercepting communications and stealing confidential information [Article 62224]. 2. Enforcing strong authentication mechanisms to ensure that only authorized users can access robot services remotely [Article 62224]. 3. Enhancing authorization processes to protect critical functions and prevent unauthorized access to robot functionalities [Article 62224]. 4. Improving default configurations and password management to avoid insecure features and password issues [Article 62224]. 5. Conducting regular security audits and addressing vulnerabilities promptly to maintain a secure robot ecosystem [Article 62106, Article 62224]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing software updates and patches to address the identified vulnerabilities in the robots [62106, 62224]. 2. Enhancing authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to robot services [62224]. 3. Strengthening authorization protocols to protect critical functions of the robots [62224]. 4. Improving default configurations to ensure secure features and password management [62224]. 5. Enhancing encryption practices to protect data transmission and storage [62224]. 6. Conducting rigorous security certifications and testing to identify and mitigate cybersecurity risks [62224]. | References | 1. Researchers Cesar Cerrudo and Lucas Apa of cybersecurity firm IOActive [62106, 62224] 2. Spokespersons from robot manufacturers such as Rethink Robotics, Universal Robots, Asratec Corp, Robotis Inc, SoftBank Robotics, and Ubtech [62106, 62224] 3. Joshua Ziering, founder of Kittyhawk.io [62106] 4. Nathan Wenzler, chief security strategist at AsTech [62106] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - Rethink Robotics, the manufacturer of Baxter and Sawyer assembly-line robots, was mentioned in both articles as one of the companies contacted by the researchers regarding the vulnerabilities in their robots [62106, 62224]. The articles highlight that only some of the identified problems had been fixed by Rethink Robotics, indicating that the software failure incident persisted within the organization despite being notified about the vulnerabilities. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The articles mention that several robot manufacturers were contacted by the researchers regarding the vulnerabilities in their robots, including Universal Robots of Denmark, SoftBank Robotics, Asratec Corp of Japan, Ubtech of China, and Robotis Inc of South Korea [62106, 62224]. It was noted that most of these manufacturers had not addressed the identified issues, indicating a recurring software failure incident across multiple organizations in the robotics industry. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the articles. Researchers from cybersecurity firm IOActive discovered nearly 50 vulnerabilities in robots from various manufacturers, including home, business, and industrial robots. These vulnerabilities allowed hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and even make the robots move violently, posing a danger to users and bystanders [62106, 62224]. The vulnerabilities were a result of design flaws in the robots' software and systems, highlighting the importance of addressing security concerns during the development phases. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the articles as well. IOActive found that the vulnerabilities in the robots could be exploited to disrupt factories through ransomware attacks or by manipulating the robots to embed flaws in the products they were programmed to build. This highlights the risks associated with the operation and use of vulnerable systems, where cybercriminals could exploit weaknesses to cause significant impacts on companies and countries [62106, 62224]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the vulnerabilities in robots can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system. (a) within_system: The vulnerabilities in the robots, such as insecure communications, authentication issues, missing authorization, weak cryptography, weak default configuration, and vulnerable open source frameworks, are contributing factors that originate from within the system [62224]. (b) outside_system: The lack of response and slow reaction by the robot manufacturers to address the reported vulnerabilities, as well as the potential threat posed by cyber criminals exploiting these vulnerabilities, are contributing factors that originate from outside the system [62106, 62224]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - Researchers discovered nearly 50 vulnerabilities in home, business, and industrial robots that could allow hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots lurch and move violently, putting users and bystanders in danger [62106]. - The vulnerabilities in the robots could lead to them being turned into bugging devices or even weapons with just a little hacking, posing serious threats to people, animals, and organizations they operate in and around [62224]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The slow reaction by the robot industry in addressing the vulnerabilities was noted, with only one manufacturer confirming fixes for some issues while others did not respond or had not fixed the problems raised by researchers [62106]. - The cybersecurity firm IOActive contacted the vendors in January about the vulnerabilities but found little evidence that the 50-plus vulnerabilities demonstrated had been fixed, indicating a lack of responsiveness from the vendors to address the security flaws [62224]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The articles report on vulnerabilities in robots that could allow hackers to exploit the hardware components of the robots, such as microphones, cameras, arms, and legs, to cause harm [62106, 62224]. - Researchers found that the vulnerabilities in the robots could lead to safety features being disabled, robots moving violently, and potential physical harm to users and bystanders due to the hardware manipulation [62106, 62224]. - Specific examples include the possibility of a robot causing a skull fracture if taken over by someone with malicious intentions due to the hardware vulnerabilities [62224]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The articles highlight that the vulnerabilities in the robots were primarily related to software issues, such as insecure communications, authentication issues, missing authorization, weak cryptography, privacy issues, weak default configuration, and vulnerable open source robot frameworks and libraries [62106, 62224]. - The vulnerabilities in the software of the robots allowed for remote hacking, disabling safety features, and potential physical attacks, indicating that the software flaws were significant contributing factors to the failure incident [62106, 62224]. - The research conducted by cybersecurity firm IOActive focused on identifying flaws in the software used in various robots, emphasizing the importance of addressing these software vulnerabilities to prevent potential harm [62106, 62224]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to malicious intent. Researchers discovered nearly 50 vulnerabilities in various robots that could allow hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots move violently, potentially causing harm to users and bystanders [62106, 62224]. The vulnerabilities could be exploited to turn robots into bugging devices or even weapons, with the potential for robots to injure nearby humans or carry out physical attacks if taken over by someone with malicious intentions [62106, 62224]. The researchers highlighted the alarming threat posed by these vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need to secure robots to prevent potential harm caused by malicious exploitation [62106, 62224]. (b) The software failure incident is not related to non-malicious factors. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the vulnerabilities in robots can be attributed to both poor decisions and accidental decisions. 1. Poor Decisions: The incident can be linked to poor decisions made by the robot manufacturers in not adequately addressing the vulnerabilities highlighted by cybersecurity researchers. Despite being warned about nearly 50 vulnerabilities in their robots, only a few problems were addressed by the manufacturers [62106]. The slow reaction by the robot industry in fixing the vulnerabilities was noted, indicating a lack of proactive measures to secure the robots [62106]. 2. Accidental Decisions: The incident can also be associated with accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The vulnerabilities discovered by cybersecurity firm IOActive were not intentionally introduced but were the result of flaws in the design and implementation of the robots' software and security features [62224]. The vulnerabilities, such as insecure communications, authentication issues, weak cryptography, and weak default configuration, were unintended weaknesses that could be exploited by hackers [62224]. Therefore, the software failure incident involving the vulnerabilities in robots can be attributed to a combination of poor decisions made by manufacturers in addressing the issues and accidental decisions leading to unintended vulnerabilities in the software. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The articles report that researchers from cybersecurity firm IOActive discovered nearly 50 vulnerabilities in robots from various manufacturers, allowing hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots move violently, putting users and bystanders in danger. Despite warning six manufacturers about these vulnerabilities, only one manufacturer, Rethink Robotics, claimed to have fixed some of the issues, while the others did not address the problems adequately [62106, 62224]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The articles do not mention the software failure incident occurring accidentally. |
| Duration | temporary | From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in robots can be categorized as a temporary failure. The vulnerabilities discovered by cybersecurity firm IOActive in various consumer and industrial robots were due to factors introduced by certain circumstances, such as insecure communication, authentication issues, missing authorization, weak cryptography, privacy issues, weak default configuration, and vulnerable open source robot frameworks and libraries [62224]. The incident was not described as a permanent failure caused by all circumstances, but rather specific vulnerabilities that could be addressed and fixed by the manufacturers. The article mentioned that some manufacturers had already fixed certain issues, while others had not responded or confirmed the fixes [62106, 62224]. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, byzantine, other | (a) crash: The articles report on vulnerabilities in robots that could potentially lead to dangerous outcomes, such as robots lurching and moving violently, disabling safety features, and causing harm to users and bystanders [62106, 62224]. These vulnerabilities could result in a crash scenario where the system loses control and fails to perform its intended functions, potentially causing physical harm. (b) omission: The vulnerabilities identified in the robots could allow hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots move violently, indicating instances where the system omits to perform its intended functions correctly [62106, 62224]. For example, the researchers were able to remotely disable key safety features in an industrial robot, potentially leading to injuries to nearby humans [62224]. (c) timing: The articles do not specifically mention any instances where the system performs its intended functions correctly but at the wrong time. (d) value: The vulnerabilities identified in the robots could lead to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, such as being hacked to carry out physical attacks or causing harm to users and bystanders [62106, 62224]. For example, a robot could be programmed to violently jab a screwdriver, demonstrating incorrect behavior [62106]. (e) byzantine: The vulnerabilities in the robots could potentially lead to inconsistent responses and interactions, as hackers could exploit the weaknesses to disrupt factories, embed flaws in products, or use robots for ransomware attacks [62106, 62224]. This could result in the system behaving erroneously with unpredictable outcomes. (f) other: The vulnerabilities identified in the robots could lead to a variety of other behaviors not explicitly categorized in the options provided. For example, the potential for robots to be turned into bugging devices or weapons, the lack of response from manufacturers to address the vulnerabilities, and the overall alarming threat posed by the insecure robots [62106, 62224]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | sensor, actuator, processing_unit, network_communication, embedded_software | (a) sensor: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles is related to vulnerabilities in robots that could allow hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots lurch and move violently. These vulnerabilities could potentially be exploited through sensors like microphones and cameras embedded in the robots [62106, 62224]. (b) actuator: The failure could also be related to the actuator layer of the cyber physical system, as the vulnerabilities discovered by cybersecurity firm IOActive could allow hackers to remotely disable safety features of robots in a way that could result in someone programming the robot to injure nearby humans. This indicates a potential actuator-related failure due to contributing factors introduced by actuator error [62224]. (c) processing_unit: The vulnerabilities found in the robots could also be related to the processing unit layer of the cyber physical system. The vulnerabilities could allow hackers to compromise key components of the robot ecosystem, hack the robot, and gain complete control over the affected robots. This suggests a processing unit-related failure due to contributing factors introduced by processing error [62224]. (d) network_communication: The software failure incident could be linked to the network communication layer of the cyber physical system. The vulnerabilities discovered included insecure communication, authentication issues, and missing authorization, which could allow hackers to intercept communications, remotely access services, and bypass authentication, potentially leading to network communication-related failures [62224]. (e) embedded_software: The failure could also be associated with the embedded software layer of the cyber physical system. The vulnerabilities found in the robots included weak default configuration, vulnerable open source frameworks, and weak cryptography, indicating potential issues introduced by the embedded software. Additionally, the vulnerabilities could allow hackers to abuse the robot's functionality, compromise the robot's operating system, and send exposed private information to remote servers, highlighting embedded software-related failures [62224]. |
| Communication | connectivity_level | From the provided articles, it is evident that the software failure incident was related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed at the connectivity_level. The vulnerabilities discovered in various robots, including consumer and industrial robots from different manufacturers, were primarily related to insecure communication, authentication issues, missing authorization, weak cryptography, and privacy issues at the network or transport layer. These vulnerabilities could allow hackers to intercept communications, steal confidential information, compromise key components of the robot ecosystem, and gain complete control over the affected robots [62106, 62224]. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incident reported in the articles was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The failure was due to vulnerabilities in the robots' software that could allow hackers to exploit them for malicious purposes, such as spying on users, disabling safety features, and causing the robots to move violently, potentially endangering users and bystanders [62106, 62224]. These vulnerabilities were related to bugs, weak default configurations, insecure communications, authentication issues, missing authorization, weak cryptography, and privacy issues within the robots' software [62106, 62224]. The failure was not caused by hardware issues but rather by flaws in the software applications controlling the robots, making it an application layer failure in the cyber physical system. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | harm, property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - The articles do not mention any incidents of people losing their lives due to the software failure. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - The articles mention that the vulnerabilities in robots could potentially lead to physical harm to users and bystanders. For example, hackers could disable safety features and make robots lurch and move violently, putting users and bystanders in danger [62106]. - The vulnerabilities discovered by IOActive could result in someone programming robots to injure nearby humans, with the potential for serious harm such as skull fractures [62224]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - The articles do not mention any impact on people's access to food or shelter due to the software failure. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The vulnerabilities in robots could be exploited by cyber criminals to disrupt factories by ransomware attacks or embed flaws in products, impacting companies and potentially countries [62106]. - The vulnerabilities discovered by IOActive could lead to robots being hijacked and used as secretive listening devices or weapons, posing a threat to organizations and individuals [62224]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The articles do not mention any instances where people had to postpone activities due to the software failure. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The vulnerabilities in robots could potentially impact the functioning of the robots themselves, leading to safety risks and potential misuse [62106, 62224]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The articles clearly outline the potential consequences and risks associated with the vulnerabilities in robots, indicating that there are significant concerns about the security of these devices [62106, 62224]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss the potential consequences of the vulnerabilities in robots, such as robots being weaponized to cause harm, disruption of factories, and physical attacks on humans. These consequences have not been observed but are highlighted as risks [62106, 62224]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure beyond those related to physical harm, potential weaponization, and security risks. |
| Domain | manufacturing, health | (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the industry of manufacturing. The incident involved vulnerabilities in robots used in home, business, and industrial settings, which could allow hackers to spy on users, disable safety features, and make robots move violently, putting users and bystanders in danger [62106, 62224]. (f) The software failure incident also pertains to the manufacturing industry as it specifically mentions industrial robots from various manufacturers being vulnerable to hacking, which could result in serious consequences such as disabling safety features and causing physical harm to humans [62106, 62224]. (j) Additionally, the incident is relevant to the health industry as it highlights the potential dangers posed by hacked robots, including the possibility of physical attacks by robots like the Alpha 2 robot from Ubtech, which could be programmed to violently jab a screwdriver [62106, 62224]. (m) The software failure incident is not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided. |
Article ID: 62106
Article ID: 62224