| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
- The article mentions that the researchers Lucas Apa and Cesar Cerrudo demonstrated hacker attacks against robots, including the Alpha2 and NAO robots, which are products of UBTech and Softbank respectively [62201].
- The researchers found vulnerabilities in the robots' software, indicating that similar incidents have occurred with these companies' products before.
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
- The article states that the researchers found more than 50 hackable security vulnerabilities in robots and robotics software sold by companies including UBTech, Softbank, Rethink Robots, Robotis, and Arsatec [62201].
- Additionally, another team of researchers from Italy's Politecnico Milano showed vulnerabilities in the ABB IRB140 industrial robot arm, indicating that similar incidents have occurred with other companies' products as well. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The security researchers demonstrated hacker attacks they developed against popular robots, including domestic robots and an industrial robotic arm. They found vulnerabilities in the robots' software design, such as lack of real authentication, easily-cracked integrity checks, and absence of encryption in connections. For example, they were able to gain unauthorized access to the robot arm's operating system through a common security vulnerability called a "buffer overflow" and overwrite critical safety settings, potentially causing physical harm to humans working alongside the robot [62201].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The security researchers were able to fully control the smaller companion robots by installing software on them. They demonstrated that the robots could be manipulated to send audio and video to a remote spy, turning them into surveillance devices. Additionally, they showed how they could hijack a robot's commands to see through its cameras and control their direction, highlighting the privacy invasion that could occur due to operational vulnerabilities in the robots [62201]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily within the system. The security researchers demonstrated hacker attacks against various robots, including domestic and industrial robots, by exploiting vulnerabilities within the robots' software. For example, they were able to hack the robots to change critical safety settings, send unauthorized commands, and even control the robots fully. The vulnerabilities found in the robots' software, such as lack of authentication, easily-cracked integrity checks, and absence of code-signing, allowed the researchers to manipulate the robots' behavior [62201]. These internal software weaknesses within the robots themselves led to the potential for serious consequences, including physical harm to humans and privacy invasion.
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident is also influenced by factors outside the system. The articles highlight the role of human hackers in exploiting the vulnerabilities present in the robots' software. The threat posed by hackers who can take control of robots, manipulate their actions, and potentially cause harm to humans is a significant external factor contributing to the software failure incident [62201]. The actions of external entities, such as malicious hackers, play a crucial role in triggering the software failures in this case. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The article discusses how security researchers were able to demonstrate hacker attacks against popular robots, such as the Alpha2, NAO, and a robotic arm sold by Universal Robots. The vulnerabilities in the robots' software, such as lack of real authentication and easily-cracked integrity checks, allowed the researchers to gain unauthorized access and control over the robots [62201].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The same article highlights how the vulnerabilities in the robots' software were exploited by human hackers. The security researchers were able to hack into the robots, change critical safety settings, send them unauthorized commands, and even turn them into surveillance devices that could transmit audio and video to a remote location. These actions were all initiated by human hackers, showcasing the potential dangers of such exploits [62201]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article discusses a software failure incident related to robots, specifically the Universal Robots' "collaborative" robots, where the researchers found that the robots' software had no real authentication and only easily-cracked integrity checks meant to prevent a hacker from installing malicious updates. They were able to gain unauthorized access to the robot arm's operating system through a common security vulnerability called a "buffer overflow" and overwrite critical safety settings, potentially causing physical harm to both the robot itself and human workers within reach [62201].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The same article also highlights software failures in smaller companion robots like the Alpha2 and NAO, where the researchers were able to fully control these robots by installing software on them. Vulnerabilities such as lack of code-signing in the Alpha2's Android operating system and encryption issues in the NAO robot's code allowed for malicious apps to be injected and for control of the robots' cameras and microphones, leading to privacy invasion concerns [62201]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involves security researchers demonstrating hacker attacks against popular robots, such as the Alpha2, NAO, and a robotic arm sold by Universal Robots, with the intent to show how these machines can be hacked to change critical safety settings, turn into surveillance devices, and potentially cause physical harm to humans [62201]. The researchers were able to exploit vulnerabilities in the robots' software, such as lack of authentication, easily-cracked integrity checks, and absence of security measures like code-signing and encryption, to gain unauthorized control over the robots [62201]. The potential consequences of these malicious attacks include catastrophic harm to both the robots themselves and human workers in industrial settings [62201].
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities exploited by the security researchers were not intentionally introduced by the manufacturers of the robots. The researchers identified over 50 hackable security vulnerabilities in robots and robotics software from various companies, including UBTech and Softbank, and initially obscured the specific vulnerabilities to give the manufacturers a chance to address them [62201]. However, the researchers found that the security issues persisted even after monitoring updates for the robots and did not necessarily depend on users setting strong passwords or securing their Wi-Fi networks [62201]. This indicates that the vulnerabilities were not deliberately introduced by the manufacturers but were present due to oversight or inadequate security measures. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions is evident in the article. The security researchers demonstrated hacker attacks against popular robots, including domestic and industrial robots, by exploiting vulnerabilities in their software. For example, they found that the robots' software had inadequate authentication and easily-cracked integrity checks, making them susceptible to unauthorized access and control [62201]. These poor decisions in the design and implementation of the robots' software contributed to the potential risks posed by the hacking attacks. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article where security researchers Lucas Apa and Cesar Cerrudo demonstrated hacker attacks against popular robots, including domestic and industrial robots. They found vulnerabilities in the robots' software, such as lack of real authentication and easily-cracked integrity checks, which allowed them to gain unauthorized access and control over the robots. For example, they were able to overwrite critical safety settings on the industrial robot arm, potentially causing harm to human workers [62201].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is highlighted in the article where the researchers discovered vulnerabilities in the robots' software that were not intentionally designed but existed due to oversight or premature release of the products. For instance, the Alpha2 robot by UBTech ran a version of Google's Android operating system that lacked code-signing, making it susceptible to rogue software installation. Similarly, the NAO robot by Softbank had vulnerabilities in its code that were not adequately addressed before being pushed to market [62201]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more aligned with a permanent failure. The security researchers demonstrated hacker attacks against various robots, showing how they could gain unauthorized access, change critical safety settings, and fully control the robots [62201]. These vulnerabilities in the robots' software and lack of proper authentication mechanisms make them susceptible to being hacked, potentially leading to catastrophic consequences such as causing harm to humans or invading privacy. The researchers highlighted that the security issues observed in the robots were not adequately addressed by the manufacturers, indicating a persistent and ongoing risk of exploitation [62201]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The article describes a scenario where the researchers were able to gain unauthorized access to a robot arm's operating system and overwrite critical safety settings, potentially causing the robot to damage itself or harm human workers within reach. This could lead to a crash scenario where the system loses its state and fails to perform its intended functions, endangering both the robot and humans [62201].
(b) omission: The researchers demonstrated that they could fully control smaller companion robots meant for entertainment and education by installing software on them. They were able to manipulate the robots' cameras and microphones, intercepting and moving data around a target's house. This indicates an omission failure where the system omits to perform its intended functions of protecting user privacy and security [62201].
(c) timing: The articles do not provide specific information about a timing failure where the system performs its intended functions but at the wrong time.
(d) value: The researchers found vulnerabilities in the software of the robots that allowed them to install rogue software, inject malicious apps, and gain unauthorized control over the robots. These actions indicate a value failure where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly by allowing unauthorized access and control [62201].
(e) byzantine: The articles do not mention a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can also be categorized as a security vulnerability. The vulnerabilities found in the robots' software allowed the researchers to hack into the robots, change critical safety settings, intercept data, and gain unauthorized control. These security weaknesses pose a significant risk to both the robots and the users, highlighting a critical aspect of the software failure incident [62201]. |