Published Date: 2017-12-14
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in August [68957]. 2. The software failure incident happened in December [66006]. |
| System | 1. Schneider's Triconex safety system firmware [67136, 67190] 2. Triconex industrial safety technology [65915, 67368, 66006] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Hackers likely working for a nation-state were responsible for causing the software failure incident at an industrial facility using Schneider's Triconex safety systems [67136, 65915, 66084, 67368, 66006]. 2. The attack was sophisticated and likely supported by a government, with evidence pointing towards the possibility of Iranian hackers being behind the attack [66084, 68957]. 3. The attackers exploited a flaw in Schneider's technology, specifically targeting the Triconex safety systems, which are used in various critical infrastructure facilities [67190, 67368]. 4. The malware used in the attack, known as Triton, was designed to compromise industrial control systems and manipulate safety systems to potentially cause physical harm or an explosion [65915, 66006]. 5. The attackers had deep knowledge of the targeted systems and invested significant time and resources into the attack, indicating a high level of sophistication [67136, 65915]. 6. The attack on the safety systems was a significant escalation in cyber threats to critical infrastructure, posing risks of physical damage and potential harm to individuals [66006, 67368]. 7. The incident was a watershed moment in cybersecurity, highlighting the vulnerability of industrial control systems to cyber attacks [66006, 67368]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. A petrochemical company with a plant in Saudi Arabia [68957] 2. An industrial facility targeted by hackers [67190] 3. Critical infrastructure facility [66084] 4. At least one industrial plant [66006] |
| Software Causes | 1. The failure incident was caused by hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, specifically in its Triconex safety system firmware, allowing them to introduce malware into the industrial plant [67136, 67190, 67368]. 2. The malware used in the attack, known as Triton, targeted the Triconex safety controllers made by Schneider Electric, compromising the safety systems and potentially causing physical harm or explosions [65915, 66006]. 3. The attackers deployed a remote-access Trojan as part of a complex malware infection scenario, exploiting a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware [67368]. 4. The malware was capable of scanning and mapping an industrial network, providing reconnaissance, and giving hackers remote control over the systems [67368]. 5. The attackers were able to take remote control of a safety control workstation, reprogram controllers, and cause related processes to shut down, leading to the plant detecting the attack [66006]. 6. The malware was designed to manipulate industrial safety systems, potentially causing significant damage or even fatalities by sabotaging safety mechanisms [65915, 66006]. 7. The attackers had to understand the design of the industrial facility well enough to know how to trigger an explosion, indicating a high level of sophistication and knowledge of the systems [68957]. 8. The malware was the first reported cyber attack on a safety system at an industrial plant, marking a significant escalation in cyber threats to critical infrastructure [66006]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Flaws in the plant's security procedures that allowed access to some of its stations and safety control network [67136]. 2. Exploitation of a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware [67136]. 3. Manipulation of the Triconex safety system to steadily increase its ability to make changes and issue commands [67136]. 4. Deployment of a remote access trojan in the second stage of the exploitation [67136]. 5. Infiltration of the critical safety systems for industrial control units used in nuclear, oil, and gas plants [66006]. |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident involving the Triton malware targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric SE, leading to the halt of operations at an undisclosed industrial facility [Article 66006, Article 67368]. 2. The attackers exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware, allowing them to install a remote-access Trojan as part of a complex malware infection scenario [Article 67368]. 3. The malware was capable of scanning and mapping an industrial network for reconnaissance and providing hackers with remote control over the systems, potentially leading to physical harm or an explosion [Article 67368]. 4. The attack on the safety systems for industrial control units used in nuclear, oil, and gas plants was considered a watershed moment, as it demonstrated the potential for hackers to cause physical damage to industrial plants by sabotaging safety systems before launching attacks [Article 66006]. 5. The incident raised concerns about the potential for significant damage, including explosions, oil spills, equipment malfunctions, and gas leaks that could result in injuries or deaths [Article 66006]. 6. The attackers inadvertently caused some controllers to enter a failsafe mode, leading to the shutdown of related processes and allowing the plant to detect the attack [Article 66006]. 7. The attack on the critical safety systems for industrial control units was the first reported breach of a safety system at an industrial plant by hackers, marking a significant escalation in cyber threats to industrial infrastructure [Article 66006]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing previously recommended protocols for securing Triconex systems could have prevented the attack [67368]. 2. Developing tools to identify and remove the malware used in the attack could have helped prevent the incident [67368]. 3. Ensuring robust cybersecurity measures and continuous monitoring of industrial control systems could have potentially prevented the breach [66006]. 4. Timely software updates and patches to fix vulnerabilities in the Triconex firmware could have mitigated the risk of exploitation by hackers [67368]. 5. Enhanced cooperation and information sharing within the security industry and with government agencies could have provided early warnings and preventive measures against such attacks [67368]. |
| Fixes | 1. Developing tools to identify and remove the malware, which are expected to be released in February [67368]. 2. Releasing a software update to fix the security bug in the Triconex technology [67368]. | References | 1. Schneider Electric SE [67136, 65915, 67190, 67368, 66006] 2. Security researchers from various companies (e.g., FireEye, Dragos, Symantec) [67136, 65915, 66006] 3. Industrial control company Schneider Electric [67136] 4. S4 security conference [67136] 5. Threat tracking firm Treadstone 71 [67136] 6. Former director of the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team within the Department of Homeland Security [67136] 7. Security company Dragos Inc. [65915] 8. CyberX [66006] 9. Symantec [66006] 10. US Department of Homeland Security [66006] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) In the software failure incident reported in Article 67190, Schneider Electric SE disclosed that hackers exploited a flaw in its software in a watershed hack discovered last month that halted plant operations at an industrial facility. This incident was a significant breach of a safety system at an industrial plant by hackers, targeting the Triconex safety systems made by Schneider Electric SE [67190]. (b) The software failure incident involving the infiltration of critical safety systems for industrial control units used in nuclear, oil, and gas plants has happened before at other organizations. In a similar incident reported in Article 66006, hackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric SE, marking the first reported breach of a safety system at an industrial plant by hackers. This incident was believed to be state-sponsored and was a significant attack on safety systems in industrial plants [66006]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: - The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, specifically in the Triconex safety system, which was a vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware [Article 67368]. - The attackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a workstation running the Triconex safety shutdown system, indicating a flaw in the design of the system that allowed for such remote access and manipulation [Article 66006]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: - The attackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric, which is used in nuclear facilities, oil and gas plants, mining, water treatment facilities, and other plants to safely shut down industrial processes when hazardous conditions are detected [Article 67368]. - The hackers caused some controllers to enter a failsafe mode, disrupting related processes and causing the plant to identify the attack, showcasing a failure in the operation of the safety systems [Article 66006]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | The software failure incident reported in the articles is a combination of within_system and outside_system factors. Within_system: - The attack exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware, allowing the hackers to install a remote-access Trojan as part of a complex malware infection scenario [67368]. - The malware targeted the Triconex firmware and manipulated the system to increase its ability to make changes and issue commands [67136]. - The attackers took remote control of a workstation running a Schneider Electric Triconex safety shutdown system and sought to reprogram controllers used to identify safety issues, causing some controllers to enter a fail-safe mode [65915]. Outside_system: - The attack was likely state-sponsored, targeting the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric SE [66006]. - The attackers had sophisticated knowledge of Schneider products and the target industrial plant, indicating a significant amount of time and resources invested in reverse-engineering Schneider code [67136]. - The attack was a dangerous escalation in international hacking, demonstrating the ability to inflict serious physical damage and potentially trigger an explosion, indicating a high level of planning and resources [68957]. These factors show a combination of within_system vulnerabilities being exploited by attackers with outside_system motivations and resources. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident involving the Triconex safety system was caused by hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, leading to a breach in the critical safety systems for industrial control units [Article 67368]. - The attackers used sophisticated malware named "Triton" to take remote control of a safety control workstation, causing some controllers to enter a failsafe mode and shut down related processes at the plant [Article 66006]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The hackers, believed to be state-sponsored, targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric SE, indicating a deliberate human action to infiltrate the critical safety systems [Article 66006]. - The attackers exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware, indicating a deliberate human action to identify and exploit the security flaw [Article 67368]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, specifically in the Triconex safety systems, which are hardware components used in industrial plants [Article 67368]. - The attackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric, which is a hardware component used in nuclear, oil, and gas plants [Article 66006]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The incident involved the use of sophisticated malware named "Triton" to take remote control of a safety control workstation, indicating a software-based attack [Article 66006]. - The malware exploited a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware, indicating a software-based vulnerability [Article 67368]. - The malware was designed to compromise industrial control systems, specifically targeting Schneider's Triconex products, which are software systems used by human operators to monitor industrial processes [Article 65915]. - The malware was capable of scanning and mapping an industrial network, providing reconnaissance, and giving hackers remote control over systems, indicating a software-based attack [Article 67368]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious: - The software failure incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology to halt operations at an industrial facility, with the attack believed to be state-sponsored [Article 67368]. - The attackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric, aiming to take remote control of a safety control workstation and reprogram controllers to cause related processes to shut down, potentially leading to physical damage or an explosion [Article 66006]. - The malware used in the attack, known as Triton, was sophisticated and designed to compromise industrial control systems, specifically targeting safety systems in critical infrastructure plants [Article 66006]. (b) The objective of the software failure incident was non-malicious: - The software failure incident was not accidental but rather a deliberate attack by hackers exploiting a vulnerability in Schneider Electric's technology [Article 67368]. - The attackers used sophisticated malware to infiltrate the critical safety systems for industrial control units, indicating a deliberate intent to disrupt operations at the targeted facility [Article 66006]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident was to sabotage the firm’s operations and trigger an explosion, as part of a dangerous escalation in international hacking. The attackers aimed to inflict lasting damage on petrochemical companies and send a political message, impacting the Saudi economy and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s plans for economic diversification [Article 68957]. (b) The attackers in the software failure incident likely made mistakes in their computer code, inadvertently causing the shutdown of the plant’s production systems. This accidental action prevented significant damage from occurring during the attack [Article 67368]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, specifically in the Triconex safety systems [Article 67368]. - The attackers were able to exploit a previously unknown vulnerability in an older version of the Triconex firmware, indicating a flaw in the system's development or security measures [Article 67368]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The attackers inadvertently caused the shutdown of some controllers in the industrial plant while probing the system, leading to a failsafe mode and the plant identifying the attack [Article 66006]. - The attackers' actions were believed to have inadvertently caused the shutdown while they were trying to understand the system and potentially modify safety systems for future attacks [Article 66006]. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident reported in the articles was temporary. The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's Triconex safety systems, causing a halt in operations at an industrial facility [Article 67368]. The attack targeted the safety systems, leading to a shutdown of industrial processes at the plant [Article 66006]. The incident was described as a watershed moment, marking the first reported breach of a safety system at an industrial plant by hackers [Article 66006]. The attackers used sophisticated malware named Triton to take remote control of a safety control workstation and reprogram controllers, causing related processes to shut down [Article 66006]. The attack was believed to be state-sponsored and aimed at causing physical damage to the plant [Article 66006]. Schneider Electric was working on a software update to fix the issue, indicating that the failure was not permanent and could be addressed through software updates [Article 67368]. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, specifically the Triconex safety system, which led to the halt of operations at an industrial facility [Article 67368]. The attackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a safety control workstation, causing some controllers to enter a failsafe mode and shut down related processes [Article 66006]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The attackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric, which is used in nuclear, oil, and gas plants, and successfully infiltrated the critical safety systems, halting operations at least one facility [Article 66006]. The malware used in the attack was designed to manipulate safety systems, potentially causing physical harm or an explosion by disabling safety measures [Article 65915]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with the timing failure category as there is no indication in the articles that the system performed its intended functions either too late or too early. (d) value: The software failure incident does not align with the value failure category as there is no indication in the articles that the system performed its intended functions incorrectly. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with the byzantine failure category as there is no indication in the articles that the system behaved erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a targeted cyberattack on industrial control systems, specifically the Triconex safety system, with the intent to manipulate safety systems and potentially cause physical harm or an explosion at an industrial facility [Article 66006]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | sensor, actuator, processing_unit, network_communication, embedded_software | (a) sensor: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by sensor error - The attackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a safety control workstation, causing some controllers to enter a failsafe mode as they attempted to reprogram them, leading to related processes shutting down and the plant detecting the attack [Article 66006]. (b) actuator: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by actuator error - The attackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric SE, which is used to safely shut down industrial processes when hazardous conditions are detected, indicating a potential failure in the actuator system [Article 66006]. (c) processing_unit: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by processing error - The malware Triton infected a Windows computer attached to the safety system, indicating a potential failure in the processing unit that allowed the malware to take control of the system [Article 66006]. (d) network_communication: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by network communication error - The attackers exploited a flaw in Schneider's technology, which halted operations at an industrial facility, suggesting a failure in the network communication that allowed the hackers to infiltrate the critical safety systems [Article 67368]. (e) embedded_software: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by embedded software error - The malware Triton was the first reported breach of a safety system at an industrial plant by hackers, indicating a potential failure in the embedded software that allowed the attackers to take remote control of the safety control workstation [Article 66006]. |
| Communication | link_level, connectivity_level | (a) The failure was related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed: - The Triton malware targeted the Triconex safety system firmware, exploiting a vulnerability in the Triconex controllers [67136]. - The attackers used sophisticated malware to take remote control of a workstation running a Schneider Electric Triconex safety shutdown system, affecting the communication and control of the safety systems [65915]. - The hackers exploited a flaw in Schneider's technology, specifically in the Triconex system, which is used to safely shut down industrial processes when hazardous conditions are detected [67368]. - The attackers targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology made by Schneider Electric SE, which is used in nuclear facilities, oil and gas plants, mining, water treatment facilities, and other plants to safely shut down industrial processes when hazardous conditions are detected [66006]. (b) The failure was related to the connectivity level of the cyber physical system that failed: - The Triton malware was capable of scanning and mapping an industrial network to provide reconnaissance and give hackers remote control over the systems, indicating a breach at the network level [67368]. - The Triton malware infected a Windows computer attached to the safety system, suggesting a breach at the network level [66006]. |
| Application | TRUE | The software failure incident related to the application layer of the cyber physical system that failed due to contributing factors introduced by bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, and incorrect usage is evident in the following articles: 1. The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in Schneider Electric's technology, specifically targeting the Triconex safety systems used in industrial facilities [Article 67368]. 2. The attackers used sophisticated malware named "Triton" to take remote control of a safety control workstation, causing some controllers to enter a failsafe mode and shut down related processes [Article 66006]. These articles provide information indicating that the failure was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system, involving bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, and incorrect usage. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | death, harm, property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - The attack in August was believed to be an attempt to sabotage the firm’s operations and trigger an explosion, potentially causing deaths [Article 68957]. - The attackers compromised Schneider’s Triconex controllers, which are used in various facilities including nuclear plants, where explosions could lead to fatalities [Article 68957]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - The attackers targeted the Triconex safety systems, which are crucial for ensuring safety in industrial plants, potentially putting people at risk of physical harm [Article 66006]. - The attackers were likely trying to cause an explosion that could have resulted in physical harm to individuals [Article 68957]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The attackers in the Triton incident aimed to cause physical damage to industrial equipment, which could have led to property damage [Article 66006]. - The attack in August was intended to sabotage the firm’s operations, which could have caused significant property damage [Article 68957]. |
| Domain | manufacturing, utilities, unknown | (a) The failed system was intended to support the production and distribution of information. - The attack targeted the Triconex industrial safety technology used in nuclear facilities, oil and gas plants, and other industrial plants [Article 66006]. - The malware Triton targeted Schneider's Triconex products, which are safety-instrumented systems used by human operators to monitor industrial processes [Article 65915]. - The malware Triton was designed to tamper with or disable Schneider's Triconex safety measures, which are failsafes to shut down equipment in hazardous conditions [Article 65915]. (b) No information available in the articles. (c) No information available in the articles. (d) No information available in the articles. (e) No information available in the articles. (f) The failed system was intended to support the manufacturing industry. - The Triton malware targeted industrial control systems used in manufacturing plants [Article 66006]. - The attack halted operations at an industrial facility, impacting manufacturing processes [Article 67368]. (g) The failed system was intended to support the utilities industry. - The Triconex technology targeted by the hackers is used in oil and gas plants, nuclear facilities, and water treatment facilities [Article 66006]. - The Triton malware targeted industrial control systems used in utilities, such as oil and gas plants [Article 66006]. (h) No information available in the articles. (i) No information available in the articles. (j) No information available in the articles. (k) No information available in the articles. (l) No information available in the articles. (m) No information available in the articles. |
Article ID: 67136
Article ID: 65915
Article ID: 67190
Article ID: 66084
Article ID: 68957
Article ID: 67368
Article ID: 66006