| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to compromised credit card readers at Barnes & Noble is an example of a similar incident happening again within the same organization. The incident involved hackers compromising the point-of-sale (POS) card readers by installing malware to sniff card data and PINs as customers typed them in [15112]. This type of attack on POS terminals has been seen before, as mentioned in the article where Canadian police busted a carding ring that tampered with POS terminals to steal millions of dollars [15112].
(b) The incident at Barnes & Noble is also an example of a software failure incident that has happened at multiple organizations. The article mentions how security researchers at a Black Hat security conference demonstrated how they were able to install malware onto POS terminals made by one vendor by exploiting vulnerabilities in the terminals [15112]. Additionally, the article describes a separate incident where a carding ring in Montreal tampered with POS terminals in restaurants and retailers to steal millions of dollars by remotely siphoning card data using Bluetooth [15112]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 15112 was primarily due to design-related factors introduced during system development and operation. The hackers compromised credit card readers in Barnes & Noble stores by installing malware on the point-of-sale (POS) card readers to sniff card data and PINs as customers typed them in. This indicates a vulnerability in the design or development of the POS terminals that allowed for such an attack [15112].
(b) Additionally, the operation of the compromised POS terminals played a significant role in the failure incident. The thieves tampered with the POS terminals in a sophisticated manner, seizing them from businesses to install sniffers on them before returning them. They hacked into the processors and rigged them so that card data could be siphoned remotely using Bluetooth. This operation-related manipulation of the POS terminals contributed to the successful theft of millions of dollars [15112]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at Barnes & Noble was caused by hackers compromising the point-of-sale (POS) card readers by installing malware on them to sniff card data and PINs [15112]. This indicates that the failure originated from within the system itself, as the attackers were able to exploit vulnerabilities in the POS terminals to carry out the breach. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the Barnes & Noble stores was due to non-human actions, specifically the actions of hackers who compromised the credit card readers by installing malware on the point-of-sale (POS) card readers to sniff card data and PINs as customers typed them in. This was done without human participation from the store employees. The attackers cast a wide net, installing malware on POS terminals in 63 stores in nine states [15112].
(b) The software failure incident also involved human actions, as the Canadian police mentioned in the article busted 40 people involved in a sophisticated carding ring that tampered with POS terminals to steal money. The group seized point-of-sale machines from restaurants and retailers, hacked into the processors, and rigged them so that card data could be siphoned remotely using Bluetooth. The ring is believed to have had inside help from employees who took bribes to look the other way [15112]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The incident at Barnes & Noble involved thieves compromising credit card readers by installing malware on the point-of-sale (POS) card readers to sniff card data and PINs as customers typed them in [15112].
- In a separate incident mentioned in the article, a carding ring in Canada tampered with POS terminals by seizing them from businesses, hacking into the processors, and rigging them so that card data could be siphoned remotely using Bluetooth [15112].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure at Barnes & Noble was caused by hackers installing malware on the POS terminals to capture card data and PINs [15112].
- Security researchers at the Black Hat security conference demonstrated how they were able to install malware onto POS terminals by exploiting vulnerabilities in the terminals' operating system, allowing them to capture card data and cardholder signatures [15112]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident at Barnes & Noble was malicious in nature. Hackers compromised credit card readers by installing malware on the point-of-sale (POS) card readers to sniff card data and PINs as customers typed them in. This was done with the intent to steal customer information and conduct fraudulent transactions [15112].
(b) There is no information in the articles to suggest that the software failure incident was non-malicious. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The software failure incident at Barnes & Noble involving compromised credit card readers was not due to accidental decisions but rather poor decisions. The incident was caused by a band of thieves who installed malware on the point-of-sale (POS) card readers to sniff card data and PINs as customers typed them in. This was a deliberate and malicious act carried out by the attackers to steal customer information [15112]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident at Barnes & Noble was not attributed to development incompetence. Instead, it was a result of a band of thieves compromising credit card readers by installing malware on the point-of-sale (POS) terminals to sniff card data and PINs [15112].
(b) The software failure incident at Barnes & Noble was accidental in nature, as it was caused by hackers installing malware on the POS terminals to steal customer data. This was not a failure introduced accidentally by the development team but rather a deliberate act by external attackers [15112]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in the Barnes & Noble stores where credit card readers were compromised by hackers can be considered a permanent failure. The incident involved the installation of malware on the point-of-sale (POS) card readers, which allowed the attackers to sniff card data and PINs as customers entered them [15112]. This type of compromise indicates a significant security breach that required the removal of all POS terminals from the stores for examination. Additionally, the incident prompted the company to change its procedures, instructing customers to hand their bank cards to cashiers for scanning via readers embedded in the cash registers, indicating a long-term impact on the store's operations.
(b) The software failure incident can also be seen as a temporary failure in the sense that the breach was discovered and addressed within a certain timeframe. Barnes & Noble discovered the compromised readers around September 14 and took action by removing all the readers from its stores for investigation [15112]. This proactive response suggests that the immediate threat posed by the compromised POS terminals was mitigated, indicating a temporary aspect to the failure incident. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in this case does not align with a crash as the system did not lose state and stop performing its intended functions. The compromised credit card readers continued to operate, but the failure was due to the installation of malware that allowed hackers to capture card data and PINs without the customers' knowledge [15112].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can be categorized as an omission as the compromised POS terminals omitted to perform their intended functions of securely processing credit card transactions without unauthorized access to card data and PINs. The malware installed by hackers allowed for the omission of secure processing, leading to the compromise of customer information [15112].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident does not align with this category as the system did not perform its intended functions too late or too early. The failure was more related to the omission of secure processing due to the installation of malware on the POS terminals [15112].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be classified under the value category as the system performed its intended functions incorrectly. The compromised POS terminals processed credit card transactions but did so in a way that allowed hackers to capture sensitive card data and PINs, leading to fraudulent transactions and compromising customer accounts [15112].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident involved a deliberate compromise of the POS terminals through the installation of malware to capture specific data without the system showing inconsistent behavior [15112].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited in this software failure incident is a security breach due to external malicious intervention. The compromise of the POS terminals by hackers through the installation of malware represents a significant security breach rather than a typical system failure [15112]. |