| Recurring |
one_organization |
a) The software failure incident related to the lack of authentication of e-passports by US border control has happened within the same organization, specifically the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The incident has been ongoing since at least 2010 when the Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted the gap in technology [68287].
b) There is no specific mention in the provided article about a similar incident happening at multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The failure occurred due to the lack of implementation of anti-forgery and anti-tamper security measures in e-passport smart chips because the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not have the right software to authenticate the machine-readable data in e-passports [68287]. This failure was a result of a gap in technology identified as far back as 2010, indicating a design flaw in the system's security measures. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the US e-passports not being verified for over a decade is primarily within the system. The failure is attributed to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) not possessing the technological capability to authenticate the machine-readable data in e-passports despite the requirement for anti-forgery and anti-tamper security measures to be built into e-passport smart chips [68287]. This failure originates from within the system's lack of the right software to perform the necessary authentication, leading to a significant security lapse in the verification process. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to non-human_actions. Specifically, the failure is due to the fact that US border control agents have not been using the right software to verify e-passports for more than a decade. This lack of proper software authentication has led to a security lapse where the anti-forgery and anti-tamper security measures required in e-passport smart chips have never been implemented [68287]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article mentions that US border control agents have not been using the right software to verify e-passports for more than a decade, leading to a failure in authenticating e-passports [68287].
- It is highlighted that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not possess the technological capability to authenticate the machine-readable data in e-passports, indicating a hardware-related issue [68287].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The failure to authenticate e-passports is directly attributed to the lack of the right software by US border control agents, indicating a software-related failure [68287].
- The article mentions that CBP has not been using the anti-forgery and anti-tamper security measures required to be built into e-passport smart chips due to the absence of the right software, emphasizing a software-related issue [68287]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the e-passports not being verified for over a decade can be categorized as non-malicious. The failure was not due to any malicious intent but rather due to the lack of proper software implementation and authentication procedures by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) [68287]. The senators highlighted that the CBP did not possess the technological capability to authenticate the machine-readable data in e-passports despite being aware of the security lapse since at least 2010 [68287].
(b) The failure to authenticate e-passports due to the lack of proper software and security measures can be considered a non-malicious software failure incident. The incident was a result of the CBP not using the right software to verify e-passports, leading to a gap in technology and security measures [68287]. The failure was not caused by any intentional malicious actions but rather by a lack of implementation of necessary security protocols. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the US e-passports not being verified for over a decade can be attributed to poor decisions. The failure was due to the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) not using the right software to authenticate e-passports, despite the requirement for anti-forgery and anti-tamper security measures to be built into e-passport smart chips. This failure was highlighted by senators Ron Wyden and Claire McCaskill, who pointed out that CBP has been aware of this security lapse since at least 2010 but still lacks the technological capability to authenticate the machine-readable data in e-passports [68287]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of US e-passports not being verified for over a decade. The article mentions that US border control agents have not been using the right software to verify e-passports since the technology was launched in 2007. It is highlighted that the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has been aware of this security lapse since at least 2010, indicating a lack of professional competence in addressing the issue despite being aware of it for years [68287].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident related to the US e-passports not being verified has been permanent in nature. The article mentions that US border control agents have not been using the right software to verify e-passports for more than a decade since the technology was launched in 2007 [68287]. The failure to authenticate e-passports due to the lack of proper software has persisted for a significant period, indicating a permanent software failure. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article is not described as a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [68287].
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article is related to omission, as US border control agents have not been using the right software to verify e-passports for more than a decade, leading to the omission of proper authentication of e-passports [68287].
(c) timing: The software failure incident in the article is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [68287].
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, specifically the failure to authenticate the data stored in e-passport smart chips, leading to security concerns and the potential for data tampering [68287].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident in the article is not related to a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [68287].
(f) other: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as an omission of critical security measures in the software system, specifically the failure to implement anti-forgery and anti-tamper security measures in e-passport smart chips due to the lack of the right software [68287]. |