Incident: Tesla's Cloud Computing Platform Compromised by Crypto-Jacking Hackers

Published Date: 2018-02-21

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident of Tesla's cloud computing platform being compromised by hackers, leading to crypto-jacking, happened in February 2018 as reported in [Article 68200].
System 1. Tesla's cloud computing platform [68200]
Responsible Organization 1. Hackers compromised Tesla's cloud computing platform, leading to the software failure incident [68200].
Impacted Organization 1. Tesla (internal engineering test cars) [68200]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the lack of password protection on Tesla's log-in credentials stored on a system within their cloud computing platform, which allowed hackers to compromise the system and engage in crypto-jacking [68200].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of password protection on the system storing Tesla's log-in credentials [68200] 2. Failure to secure Tesla's Amazon Web Services environment on a Kubernetes console [68200]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident led to Tesla's cloud computing platform being compromised by hackers, potentially for the purpose of crypto-jacking [68200]. 2. The attackers were able to access Tesla's log-in credentials stored on a system that was not password-protected, indicating a security vulnerability [68200]. 3. The effects of the hack seemed to be limited to internally used engineering test cars, suggesting that the breach did not directly impact customer data or vehicle safety and security [68200]. 4. Tesla paid RedLock $3,133.70 for uncovering the security flaw, indicating a financial impact due to the incident [68200].
Preventions 1. Implementing proper password protection for systems storing sensitive information like log-in credentials could have prevented the software failure incident [68200]. 2. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments could have helped identify and address the security flaw before it was exploited by hackers [68200]. 3. Utilizing multi-factor authentication for accessing critical systems could have added an extra layer of security to prevent unauthorized access [68200].
Fixes 1. Implementing proper password protection for systems storing sensitive information like log-in credentials [68200] 2. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and address potential weaknesses in the system [68200] 3. Enhancing monitoring and detection capabilities to quickly identify unauthorized access or suspicious activities within the system [68200]
References 1. RedLock 2. Tesla 3. Fortune

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to crypto-jacking at Tesla's cloud computing platform is a unique incident reported in the provided article [68200]. There is no mention of a similar incident happening before within Tesla or with its products and services. (b) The article mentions that crypto-jacking incidents have occurred at other organizations as well. For example, hackers have compromised services offered by Starbucks, YouTube, and the UK's Information Commissioner's Office. Additionally, the article highlights that 53% of organizations using cloud storage services like Amazon had accidentally exposed their services to the public, with "hundreds" leaking credentials through services such as Kubernetes.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be attributed to the fact that Tesla's log-in credentials were stored on a system that was not password-protected, as reported by RedLock. This design flaw allowed hackers to access Tesla's cloud computing platform and potentially mine crypto-currency without authorization [68200]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be linked to the misuse of Tesla's Amazon Web Services environment. The hackers discovered log-in details on a Kubernetes console that was reportedly not password-protected, indicating a failure in the operation or management of access controls within the system [68200].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the article is related to a crypto-currency hack on Tesla's cloud computing platform. The breach occurred due to Tesla's log-in credentials being stored on a system that was not password-protected, allowing hackers to access the system and mine crypto-currency using Tesla's computing power [68200]. This indicates that the failure originated from within the system itself, specifically due to a security vulnerability in how Tesla managed its log-in credentials and cloud computing environment.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident in Article 68200 occurred due to non-human_actions. The incident involved a crypto-currency hack on Tesla's cloud computing platform by hackers who exploited a vulnerability in the system to mine crypto-currency without authorization. The attackers accessed Tesla's log-in credentials stored on a system that was not password-protected, allowing them to use the company's computing power for mining digital coins. This incident was a result of a security flaw in the system rather than direct human actions [68200].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The article reports that Tesla's cloud computing platform was compromised by hackers, indicating a security breach that originated in the hardware infrastructure [68200]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to software-related factors, such as the vulnerability in Tesla's cloud computing platform that allowed hackers to access the system and exploit it for crypto-mining [68200].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 68200 is malicious in nature. Hackers compromised Tesla's cloud computing platform with the objective of mining cryptocurrency without authorization, a practice known as crypto-jacking. The attackers exploited vulnerabilities in Tesla's system, including finding login credentials stored on an unprotected system, to carry out their malicious activities. The incident involved intentional actions by the hackers to exploit the system for personal gain, indicating a malicious intent [68200].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 68200 was primarily due to poor decisions. The incident involved a crypto-currency hack on Tesla's cloud computing platform, where hackers compromised Tesla's log-in credentials that were stored on a system not password-protected. This poor security practice allowed the attackers to mine crypto-currency using Tesla's computing power without authorization. Additionally, the hackers used sophisticated evasion measures to avoid detection, indicating a deliberate and calculated approach to exploiting the vulnerability. Tesla paid a security firm, RedLock, to uncover the security flaw, highlighting the consequences of poor decisions in managing cybersecurity [68200].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it mentions that Tesla's log-in credentials were stored on a system that was not password-protected, leading to the compromise by hackers [68200]. This lack of professional competence in securing sensitive information contributed to the vulnerability exploited by the attackers. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is highlighted in the article when it mentions that 53% of organizations using cloud storage services accidentally exposed their data to the public, with "hundreds" leaking credentials through services such as Kubernetes [68200]. This accidental exposure of sensitive information demonstrates how unintentional actions or oversights can lead to software failures.
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in Article 68200 was temporary. The incident involved a breach of Tesla's cloud computing platform by hackers for the purpose of crypto-jacking. Tesla confirmed the compromise but stated that they addressed the vulnerability "within hours" and that no customer data had been stolen. The effects of the hack were limited to internally used engineering test cars, and there was no indication that customer privacy or vehicle safety or security was compromised. Additionally, Tesla paid RedLock for uncovering the security flaw, indicating that the incident was temporary and resolved promptly [68200].
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident reported in the article is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [68200]. (b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance [68200]. (c) timing: The failure is not attributed to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [68200]. (d) value: The software failure incident is not due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [68200]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [68200]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article is related to a security breach caused by hackers exploiting vulnerabilities in Tesla's cloud computing platform for crypto-jacking, rather than fitting into the specified categories of failure behaviors [68200].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? The articles do not mention any consequences related to death, harm, basic needs, or physical property damage resulting from the software failure incident. The incident primarily focused on the compromise of Tesla's cloud computing platform by hackers for crypto-jacking purposes. The consequence was related to potential financial loss and unauthorized use of computing resources rather than direct harm to individuals or physical entities.
Domain information (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is related to the production and distribution of information. The incident involved a hack on Tesla's cloud computing platform, which was compromised by hackers aiming to mine cryptocurrency [68200].

Sources

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