Incident: GPS Timing Disruption Incident: January 25, 2016 - SVN-23 Software Bug.

Published Date: 2018-03-02

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the GPS satellite SVN-23 occurred on January 25, 2016 [Article 68916].
System 1. GPS satellite SVN-23 [68916]
Responsible Organization 1. Air Force engineers were responsible for causing the software failure incident by triggering a software bug when taking the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline, leading to timing issues with other GPS satellites [68916].
Impacted Organization 1. First-responders in Arizona, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Louisiana whose GPS devices wouldn’t lock with satellites [68916]. 2. FAA ground transceivers that received fault reports due to the software bug in the GPS satellite [68916]. 3. Spanish digital TV networks that experienced receiver issues [68916]. 4. BBC digital radio listeners whose broadcast got disrupted [68916].
Software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by a software bug that occurred when Air Force engineers took the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline, resulting in the timing of 15 remaining GPS satellites being off by 13.7 microseconds [68916].
Non-software Causes 1. The software bug that occurred when Air Force engineers took the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline triggered the timing issue with the remaining GPS satellites, leading to a 13.7-microsecond timing discrepancy [68916]. 2. The vulnerability of GPS satellites to attacks of cyber or corporeal nature, such as jamming and spoofing, which can disrupt the GPS signals [68916]. 3. The reliance on GPS signals for ultra-accurate timing measurements by utility grid operators, stock exchanges, data centers, and cell networks, making them vulnerable to disruptions [68916]. 4. The potential risks associated with GPS vulnerabilities, especially in scenarios where GPS signals can be easily disrupted or interfered with, leading to navigation and timing issues [68916].
Impacts 1. GPS devices in Arizona, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Louisiana failed to lock with satellites, affecting first responders in those areas [68916]. 2. FAA ground transceivers received fault reports due to the software bug in the GPS satellite [68916]. 3. Spanish digital TV networks experienced receiver issues as a result of the timing discrepancy caused by the software bug [68916]. 4. BBC digital radio listeners faced disruptions in their broadcast due to the glitch in the GPS satellite [68916].
Preventions 1. Implementing more secure and robust software testing procedures to identify and rectify bugs before deployment could have prevented the software failure incident [68916]. 2. Developing and implementing backup systems or redundancy measures to mitigate the impact of software glitches or bugs could have prevented the incident [68916]. 3. Enhancing the security measures of GPS satellites to protect against cyber attacks or spoofing attempts could have prevented the incident [68916].
Fixes 1. Implementing modern cryptographic techniques in satellite signals to make them unspoofable could help prevent similar incidents in the future [68916]. 2. Developing alternative systems like the Satellite Timing and Location (STL) using Iridium satellites as backups for GPS signals could provide redundancy and improve overall system reliability [68916]. 3. Exploring ground-based systems like pseudolites and Adaptable Navigation Systems that are harder to jam and easier to pick up in dense environments could offer additional layers of protection against software failures in satellite-based systems [68916].
References 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology [68916]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the GPS satellite glitch in 2016 was a one-time occurrence caused by a software bug during the decommissioning of the GPS satellite SVN-23 [68916]. There is no specific mention of a similar incident happening again within the same organization or with its products and services. (b) The articles discuss the broader vulnerabilities of GPS systems and the potential for similar incidents to occur at multiple organizations or with their products and services due to factors like jamming and spoofing of GPS signals [68916]. The military and private industry are both concerned about the vulnerabilities of GPS systems and are actively exploring alternative solutions to mitigate the risks associated with GPS signal disruptions.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article where engineers were scheduled to kill off a GPS satellite named SVN-23, the oldest in the navigation constellation. When engineers took it offline, its disappearance triggered a software bug that left the timing of some of the remaining GPS satellites off by 13.7 microseconds, causing issues for various users and systems relying on GPS services [68916]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted in the same article where the GPS glitch caused problems for first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, BBC digital radio listeners, and other users whose GPS devices wouldn't lock with satellites. This operational failure impacted the functionality and reliability of various systems and services dependent on GPS signals [68916].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system The software failure incident related to the GPS satellite glitch in Article 68916 can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system: (a) within_system: The software failure incident was caused by a software bug within the GPS satellite system itself. When engineers took the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline, a software bug triggered, leading to timing discrepancies in 15 other GPS satellites [68916]. (b) outside_system: The incident also had external impacts beyond the GPS satellite system. The glitch affected first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, and BBC digital radio listeners, highlighting the broader consequences of the software failure incident [68916].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: The incident described in the article was caused by a software bug that occurred when Air Force engineers took a GPS satellite named SVN-23 offline. This triggered a software bug that left the timing of some GPS satellites off by 13.7 microseconds, affecting various services and devices reliant on GPS signals [68916]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: The article mentions the potential threats posed by human actions such as jamming and spoofing of GPS signals. It highlights how individuals and organized hacking groups can disrupt GPS signals on a larger scale, impacting services and devices that rely on accurate GPS data [68916].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where engineers were scheduled to kill off a GPS satellite named SVN-23, the oldest in the navigation constellation. When engineers took it offline, its disappearance triggered a software bug that left the timing of some of the remaining GPS satellites off by 13.7 microseconds. This incident caused issues for first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, and BBC digital radio listeners [68916]. (b) The software failure incident related to software itself is evident in the same article where a software bug was triggered when engineers took the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline, leading to timing discrepancies in other GPS satellites. This software bug caused disruptions for various users and services relying on GPS signals [68916].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was non-malicious. The incident was caused by a software bug that occurred when Air Force engineers took a GPS satellite offline, resulting in timing discrepancies for some GPS satellites and causing disruptions for various services and devices relying on GPS signals [68916]. The incident was described as an accidental glitch with an easily identifiable cause, rather than a deliberate act of sabotage or attack.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the GPS satellite SVN-23 in 2016 was primarily due to poor decisions made by Air Force engineers. When the engineers took the satellite offline, it triggered a software bug that caused timing discrepancies in 15 other GPS satellites, leading to disruptions for various users such as first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, and BBC digital radio listeners [68916]. This incident highlights the consequences of vulnerabilities in the GPS system and the potential impact of software glitches resulting from poor decisions. (b) Additionally, the article mentions that the 2016 event with SVN-23 was described as an accidental glitch with an easily identifiable cause, indicating that the failure was more related to accidental decisions or mistakes rather than intentional actions [68916].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. Therefore, it is unknown if the incident was caused by factors introduced due to lack of professional competence by humans or the development organization. (b) The software failure incident mentioned in the article is described as an accidental glitch with an easily identifiable cause, referred to as an "oops" [68916]. This indicates that the incident was a result of accidental factors rather than intentional actions or incompetence.
Duration temporary The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The incident caused about 12 hours of problems, affecting various services and devices such as GPS devices, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, and BBC digital radio listeners [Article 68916]. This temporary disruption was due to a software bug triggered when engineers took the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline, leading to timing issues with other GPS satellites.
Behaviour crash, timing, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article is related to a crash. When engineers took the GPS satellite SVN-23 offline, a software bug caused the timing of some of the remaining GPS satellites to be off, leading to issues for various users such as first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, and BBC digital radio listeners [68916]. (b) omission: The incident did not involve a failure due to omission where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [68916]. (c) timing: The software failure incident was related to a timing issue. The software bug caused the timing of some GPS satellites to be off by 13.7 microseconds, leading to disruptions for users relying on accurate timing measurements from the GPS satellites [68916]. (d) value: The incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [68916]. (e) byzantine: The incident did not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [68916]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident was mainly related to a crash caused by a software bug affecting the timing of GPS satellites, leading to disruptions for various users and services [68916].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, delay, non-human The consequence of the software failure incident described in the article was mainly related to property and delay: - Property: The software bug in the GPS satellite caused issues for various entities such as first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, and BBC digital radio listeners. These entities experienced faults and disruptions due to the timing discrepancies caused by the software bug [68916]. - Delay: The software bug led to approximately 12 hours of problems for various users, although not catastrophic, it was described as annoying. For example, first-responders in certain states faced difficulties with their GPS devices, and the FAA ground transceivers received fault reports due to the software bug [68916].
Domain information (a) The failed system was intended to support the industry of information production and distribution. The incident involved a software bug in a GPS satellite that caused timing issues for various services and devices, including first-responders, FAA ground transceivers, Spanish digital TV networks, BBC digital radio listeners, utility grid operators, stock exchanges, data centers, and cell networks [Article 68916]. (b) The incident did not directly involve the transportation industry. (c) The incident did not directly involve the natural resources industry. (d) The incident did not directly involve the sales industry. (e) The incident did not directly involve the construction industry. (f) The incident did not directly involve the manufacturing industry. (g) The incident did not directly involve the utilities industry. (h) The incident did not directly involve the finance industry. (i) The incident did not directly involve the knowledge industry. (j) The incident did not directly involve the health industry. (k) The incident did not directly involve the entertainment industry. (l) The incident did not directly involve the government industry. (m) The incident did not directly involve any other specific industry.

Sources

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