| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability in emergency siren systems has happened again at the same organization. Balint Seeber, a security researcher, discovered vulnerabilities in emergency siren systems in San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city. These systems were sold by Boston-based ATI Systems. Seeber found that the siren equipment lacked basic encryption, allowing anyone with a laptop and a $35 radio to trigger the sirens and broadcast any audio they choose [70311].
(b) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability in emergency siren systems has also happened at multiple organizations. The article mentions that ATI's website references siren systems installed in many other sensitive locations, including 1 World Trade Center in New York, the Indian Point nuclear power plant, and campuses like UMass Amherst, Long Island University, and West Point. While it couldn't be confirmed if these locations had the same vulnerable setups, the potential for abuse of the sirens was highlighted by Bastille CEO Chris Risley, comparing it to the panic caused by a mistaken incoming-missile alert in Hawaii [70311]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the vulnerability discovered by Balint Seeber in the emergency siren systems in San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city. Seeber, through patient recording and reverse-engineering of radio communications, found that the emergency siren equipment lacked basic encryption, allowing anyone with a laptop and a $35 radio to trigger the sirens and broadcast any audio they choose [70311].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the misuse of the emergency siren systems. Seeber demonstrated that by replicating the exact transmissions of legitimate communications to the sirens, anyone with a simple radio could broadcast signals to all the sirens in the system, potentially causing mass panic or confusion [70311]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in this case was primarily within the system. The vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by ATI Systems in multiple cities, including San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city, was due to the lack of basic encryption in the system, allowing hackers to easily trigger the sirens and broadcast any audio they choose [70311].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involved factors originating from outside the system. The vulnerability was exploited by a hacker and security researcher, Balint Seeber, who reverse-engineered and spoofed the radio communications of the emergency sirens, demonstrating the potential for malicious actors to take advantage of the system's lack of encryption and security measures [70311]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to a vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by Boston-based ATI Systems. The vulnerability allowed for the system to be hijacked and controlled remotely through radio signals, enabling unauthorized individuals to trigger the sirens and broadcast any audio they choose [70311].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
Human actions played a role in the software failure incident as well. Balint Seeber, a security researcher, discovered and exploited the vulnerability in the emergency siren systems by reverse-engineering the radio communications over a period of two-and-a-half years. His intentional actions led to the identification of the security flaw that allowed for the potential hijacking of the sirens [70311]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by ATI Systems in multiple cities, including San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city, was due to a lack of basic encryption in the hardware, allowing for potential hijacking of the system [70311].
- The attack on the sirens involved replicating exact transmissions at the exact radio frequency of ATI's legitimate communications to its sirens, indicating a hardware vulnerability in the system that allowed for unauthorized commands to be accepted [70311].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by ATI Systems was primarily related to the lack of encryption in the software, making it susceptible to being hijacked by unauthorized individuals [70311].
- The software-defined radios used by the hacker, Balint Seeber, to scan for and decode the communications of the sirens played a crucial role in identifying the vulnerabilities in the system [70311]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. Balint Seeber, a security researcher, discovered a vulnerability in the emergency siren systems in San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city that could be exploited by hackers to trigger false warnings, play alarming sounds, or even broadcast music across entire cities [70311]. The vulnerability allowed for unauthorized individuals to take control of the sirens and potentially cause mass panic or chaos. The incident involved reverse-engineering radio communications to exploit the lack of encryption in the siren equipment sold by ATI Systems, demonstrating the potential for malicious actors to manipulate the systems for harmful purposes. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor decisions. The vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by ATI Systems in multiple cities was a result of lacking basic encryption, allowing any prankster or saboteur to easily hijack the system and trigger false warnings or alarming sounds [70311]. Additionally, the company initially responded that the vulnerability was largely theoretical and had not been seen in the field, indicating a lack of proactive measures to address the issue promptly [70311]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by ATI Systems in multiple cities, including San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city, was due to the lack of basic encryption necessary to prevent unauthorized access to the system. This allowed hackers like Balint Seeber to reverse-engineer and spoof the communications of the sirens, potentially triggering false warnings or alarming sounds across entire cities [70311]. The lack of proper encryption and security measures in the software used for the emergency sirens highlights a failure in professional competence by the development organization responsible for creating the system.
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental to some extent. While the vulnerability in the siren systems was exploited by hackers like Balint Seeber, the company ATI Systems initially responded that the vulnerability was largely theoretical and had not been seen in the field. They argued that Bastille had violated FCC regulations by intercepting and divulging government radio signals without authorization. However, ATI acknowledged that Bastille's findings were likely true and started testing a software update to address the issue. The accidental aspect comes from the fact that the vulnerability was discovered and exploited by researchers, leading to the need for a security update to prevent potential misuse of the system [70311]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The vulnerability in the emergency siren equipment sold by ATI Systems allowed for the potential hijacking of the sirens by hackers like Balint Seeber. Seeber was able to reverse-engineer and spoof the communications of the sirens in San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city, demonstrating the ability to trigger false warnings or play any audio through the sirens [70311].
Furthermore, the article mentions that after Bastille alerted ATI Systems to the vulnerability, there has been an observed increase in encrypted radio traffic from the sirens in San Francisco, indicating that security measures are being implemented to address the issue. This suggests that the software failure incident was not permanent but rather a temporary vulnerability that could be mitigated through security upgrades and encryption of radio protocols [70311]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved the emergency sirens in San Francisco, Wichita, and another unnamed city being vulnerable to hijacking by hackers, allowing them to trigger false alarms and broadcast any audio they choose through the sirens. This resulted in a situation where the system lost control and could potentially broadcast alarming or panic-inducing messages [70311].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be linked to omission. The vulnerability in the emergency siren systems sold by ATI Systems omitted basic encryption measures that could prevent unauthorized individuals from taking control of the system. This omission allowed hackers to exploit the system and potentially trigger false alarms or broadcast unauthorized messages [70311].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is crucial. The incident involved the emergency sirens being triggered at specific times, such as exactly noon on the first Tuesday after Balint Seeber moved to San Francisco. This timing was consistent and allowed the hacker to study and reverse-engineer the radio communications to exploit the system [70311].
(d) value: The software failure incident can also be associated with a failure in value. The vulnerability in the emergency siren systems allowed hackers to manipulate the system to broadcast false warnings of incoming tsunamis or missile strikes, potentially causing panic and confusion among the public. This incorrect broadcasting of alarming messages demonstrates a failure in the system's intended function [70311].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure, as there is no mention of inconsistent responses or interactions in the system behavior described in the articles [70311].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited in the software failure incident is the potential for unauthorized individuals to take control of the emergency siren systems and broadcast any audio they choose, including music or alarming messages. This unauthorized control and manipulation of the system's functionality represent a significant security flaw and a failure in the system's integrity [70311]. |