| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) occurred within the same organization. The audit revealed that US-CERT, which is responsible for monitoring intrusion-detection sensors and issuing alerts on software security holes, had failed to keep its own systems up to date with the latest software patches. The agency was found to have 1,085 instances of 202 high-risk security holes on its systems, including unpatched installs of software like Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and some Microsoft applications [2821]. This indicates a failure within the organization itself to maintain the security of its systems.
(b) There is no specific information in the article about the software failure incident happening at multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The incident occurred due to the failure of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to keep its own systems up to date with the latest software patches. Auditors found 1,085 instances of 202 high-risk security holes in US-CERT's systems, including unpatched installs of Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and some Microsoft applications. This failure was attributed to the lack of deploying timely system-security patches, finalizing system security documentation, and ensuring adherence to security policies and procedures during the development and maintenance of the system [2821].
(b) The software failure incident is not directly related to the operation phase or misuse of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 2821 is within_system. The failure was due to the federal agency in charge of protecting other agencies from computer intruders, US-CERT, having hundreds of high-risk security holes on its own systems. These security holes were related to unpatched installs of software such as Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and some Microsoft applications [2821]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 2821 was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the failure to keep the systems up to date with the latest software patches. The audit revealed that there were 1,085 instances of 202 high-risk security holes in the systems, with the majority of vulnerabilities related to application and operating system patches that had not been deployed on the computer systems [2821]. Additionally, the report highlighted unpatched installs of software such as Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and some Microsoft applications, indicating a lack of timely patch deployment [2821].
(b) While the software failure incident was mainly attributed to non-human actions, there is also a human element involved. The failure to deploy timely system-security patches and adhere to security policies and procedures was pointed out in the report as areas where human actions could have mitigated the risks to the cybersecurity program systems [2821]. The need for focusing on deploying timely system-security patches and ensuring adherence to security policies and procedures suggests that human actions, such as negligence or oversight, played a role in the software failure incident. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 2821 was primarily related to software issues rather than hardware. The article highlighted that the federal agency responsible for protecting government networks from intruders had numerous high-risk security holes in its systems, particularly related to unpatched software such as Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and Microsoft applications. The audit conducted using the vulnerability scanner Nessus revealed 1,085 instances of security holes, with the majority involving application and operating system patches that had not been deployed on the agency's computer systems located in Virginia. The focus was on deploying timely system-security patches to mitigate risks to the cybersecurity program systems [2821].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 2821 was primarily attributed to software issues. The audit results pointed out that the agency failed to keep its systems up to date with the latest software patches, leading to the discovery of numerous high-risk vulnerabilities related to software applications and security software patches that had not been deployed. The article emphasized the importance of deploying timely system-security patches to mitigate risks to the cybersecurity program systems, indicating a software-related failure rather than a hardware-related one [2821]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 2821 was non-malicious. The failure was attributed to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) failing to keep its own systems up to date with the latest software patches, resulting in the discovery of numerous high-risk security holes on its systems during an audit conducted by the DHS inspector general. The vulnerabilities were mainly related to unpatched installations of software such as Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and some Microsoft applications [2821]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) was primarily due to poor decisions related to software patch management. The audit revealed that US-CERT had failed to keep its own systems up to date with the latest software patches, leading to the discovery of 1,085 instances of 202 high-risk security holes on its systems. These high-risk vulnerabilities involved application and operating system and security software patches that had not been deployed on their computer systems located in Virginia. The report emphasized the importance of deploying timely system-security patches to mitigate risks to its cybersecurity program systems [2821]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 2821 was primarily due to development incompetence. The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) was found to have hundreds of high-risk security holes on its own systems, including unpatched installs of Adobe Acrobat, Sun's Java, and some Microsoft applications. The audit revealed 1,085 instances of 202 high-risk security holes, indicating a lack of professional competence in keeping the systems up to date with the latest software patches. The report highlighted the need for deploying timely system-security patches to mitigate risks to its cybersecurity program systems [2821]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was temporary. The article mentions that auditors found 1,085 instances of 202 high-risk security holes in the systems of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) during an audit. However, it is also noted that the division has patched its systems since the audit was conducted, indicating that the failure was not permanent but rather a result of specific circumstances such as the lack of timely deployment of security patches [2821]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The article does not mention a crash as the specific behavior of the software failure incident. [2821]
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article is related to the omission of deploying timely system-security patches, resulting in high-risk security holes on the agency's systems. This omission led to the system failing to perform its intended function of maintaining cybersecurity. [2821]
(c) timing: The article does not mention timing as the specific behavior of the software failure incident. [2821]
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly due to the lack of deployment of necessary security patches, leading to vulnerabilities. This incorrect performance can be considered a failure in terms of value. [2821]
(e) byzantine: The article does not mention the software failure incident exhibiting a byzantine behavior with inconsistent responses and interactions. [2821]
(f) other: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a failure due to negligence in maintaining system security, which resulted in leaving the systems vulnerable to cyber threats. This negligence can be considered as the "other" behavior of the software failure incident. [2821] |