Incident: Cyberattack on Mexican Banks' Interbank Transfer System: April 2018

Published Date: 2018-05-14

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident of the cyberattack on Mexican banks happened in late April 2018 as mentioned in Article 71472. 2. The article reporting the incident was published on May 15, 2018 [71472]. 3. Therefore, the software failure incident occurred in late April 2018.
System 1. Sistema de Pagos Electrónicos Interbancarios (SPEI) - The interbank transfer system in Mexico was compromised due to the software vulnerability that allowed unauthorized transfers to be made [71472, 71502]. 2. Software developed by institutions or third-party providers to connect to the payment system - The software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI system was exploited by hackers, leading to unauthorized transfers [71472, 71502].
Responsible Organization 1. Hackers infiltrated the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI, causing unauthorized transfers and financial losses [71472, 71502]. 2. The software developed by institutions or third-party providers to connect to the payment system was identified as the point of vulnerability that allowed the hackers to carry out the unauthorized transfers [71502].
Impacted Organization 1. Banks in Mexico [71472, 71502] 2. Sistema de Pagos Electrónicos Interbancarios (SPEI) [71472, 71502]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the vulnerability in the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI system, which was exploited by hackers to carry out unauthorized transfers [71472]. 2. The hackers were able to create phantom orders and wire funds to fake accounts due to a flaw in the software developed by institutions or third-party providers to connect to the payment system [71502].
Non-software Causes 1. The thieves had accomplices who promptly withdrew the money in cash withdrawals from branch offices, indicating potential internal collaboration within the banks [71502]. 2. There were concerns about the security of bank offices, suggesting a possible lack of physical security measures [71502].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident in Mexico's banking system led to unauthorized transfers of funds from multiple banks, resulting in losses estimated between 400 to 800 million pesos (around US$21 to US$42 million) [71472, 71502]. 2. Customers experienced delays in their electronic transfers, causing disruptions in receiving payments [71472]. 3. The incident affected the operations of the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI), leading to slower inter-bank transfers and concerns about the security of the banking system [71502]. 4. The software failure incident highlighted vulnerabilities in the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI, potentially involving insider help for large cash withdrawals [71502]. 5. While the central bank's SPEI system was not compromised, the incident raised concerns about the security of the software developed by institutions or third-party providers for connecting to the payment system [71502].
Preventions 1. Implementing stronger authentication measures and access controls to prevent unauthorized access to the banking systems [71472]. 2. Regularly updating and patching the software used by banks to communicate with the interbank transfer system to address any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [71472, 71502]. 3. Conducting thorough security audits and assessments of the software and systems used by financial institutions to identify and mitigate potential risks and weaknesses [71472, 71502]. 4. Enhancing employee training and awareness programs to recognize and report suspicious activities that could indicate a potential cyber attack [71502]. 5. Collaborating with cybersecurity experts and organizations to stay informed about the latest threats and best practices in cybersecurity to proactively defend against cyber attacks [71472, 71502].
Fixes 1. Enhancing cybersecurity measures to prevent future cyberattacks like the one experienced by Mexican banks, such as implementing stronger authentication protocols and continuous monitoring of network activities to detect any suspicious behavior [71472, 71502]. 2. Conducting thorough security audits and assessments of the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI system to identify and patch any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [71472, 71502]. 3. Implementing stricter controls and oversight on interbank transfers to prevent unauthorized transactions and ensure the integrity of the financial system [71472, 71502]. 4. Collaborating with cybersecurity experts and institutions to investigate the incident, identify the perpetrators, and take legal action against those responsible for the cyberattack [71472, 71502].
References 1. Banco de México Governor, Alejandro Díaz de León [Article 71472] 2. President of the Asociación de Bancos de México (AMB), Marcos Martínez [Article 71472] 3. Daily newspaper El Financiero [Article 71502] 4. Lorenza Martinez, head of Banxico's payment system [Article 71502]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: The software failure incident involving unauthorized transfers from Mexican banks through the SPEI system was a unique and unprecedented event according to the governor of the Bank of Mexico, Alejandro Díaz de León. He mentioned that there were no previous instances of such a cyberattack on the payment system [71472]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: The incident in Mexico where thieves siphoned money out of banks by creating phantom orders and wiring funds to fake accounts is similar to previous cyberattacks involving unauthorized transfers. This incident raised concerns about the security of interbank transfers and the potential for cyber attacks affecting financial institutions globally [71502].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in Mexico's banking system was primarily due to design-related factors introduced during system development and operation. The hackers were able to exploit vulnerabilities in the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI system, which allowed them to carry out unauthorized transfers and withdraw funds from fake accounts [71472, 71502]. This indicates a failure in the design and development phases of the software, as the intruders were able to manipulate the system by exploiting weaknesses in the software's communication protocols. (b) Additionally, the operation of the system also played a role in the software failure incident. The thieves were able to promptly withdraw the stolen funds in cash from branch offices, indicating a failure in the operation or misuse of the system. There were concerns about potential insider help within bank branches facilitating the large cash withdrawals, highlighting operational vulnerabilities that were exploited during the incident [71502]. This suggests that both design and operational factors contributed to the software failure incident in Mexico's banking system.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the cyberattack on Mexican banks can be categorized as a failure that had contributing factors both within and outside the system. 1. **Within System (Inside the System):** - The intrusion affected the System of Pagos Electrónicos Interbancarios (SPEI), which is the system used for processing interbank electronic transfers [71472]. - The software vulnerability that was exploited by the hackers was the software used by the banks to communicate with the SPEI [71472]. - The central bank's SPEI interbank transfer system was not compromised, but the issue was related to the software developed by institutions or third-party providers to connect to the payment system [71502]. 2. **Outside System (Outside the System):** - The cyberattack involved thieves creating phantom orders to wire funds to fake accounts and then promptly withdrawing the money, indicating an external intrusion into the system [71502]. - There were suspicions that the hackers may have had help inside bank branches, suggesting a potential insider involvement in the attack [71502]. Therefore, the software failure incident involved a combination of factors both within and outside the system.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in Mexico's banking system was primarily due to non-human actions. Hackers were able to siphon off money from Mexican banks by creating phantom orders and transferring funds to fake accounts through the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI) [71472, 71502]. The intrusion affected the SPEI system, which processes hundreds of thousands of money transfers between banks daily. The hackers exploited vulnerabilities in the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI, allowing them to make unauthorized transfers and withdraw the money quickly [71472, 71502]. (b) The software failure incident also involved human actions. It was reported that the thieves may have had help inside bank branches to carry out the cash withdrawals from the fake accounts, as such large cash withdrawals were uncommon and raised suspicions [71502]. Additionally, the software vulnerability that was exploited by the hackers was related to the software developed by institutions or third-party providers to connect to the payment system, indicating a potential human factor in the software's design or implementation [71502].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily attributed to software-related factors. The incident involved a cyberattack on the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI) in Mexican banks, where hackers exploited vulnerabilities in the software used by banks to communicate with the SPEI [71472, 71502]. The intruders targeted the software of three providers that banks use to connect to the SPEI, allowing them to carry out unauthorized transfers and withdraw funds from fake accounts created within the system [71472]. The central bank clarified that the SPEI system itself was not compromised, but the issue stemmed from the software developed by institutions or third-party providers for connecting to the payment system [71502]. (b) The software failure incident was not attributed to hardware-related factors in the articles.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was malicious. Hackers infiltrated the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI) in Mexican banks by creating phantom orders to wire funds to fake accounts and then promptly withdrawing the money. The intruders made unauthorized transfers from multiple banks, including Banorte, and stole hundreds of millions of pesos in a well-orchestrated operation [71472, 71502]. The attack was described as a cyberattack by the governor of the Bank of Mexico, and it impacted various participants in the electronic payment chain [71472]. (b) The software failure incident was not non-malicious. There is no indication in the articles that the failure was due to unintentional factors or errors. The incident was a deliberate and coordinated attack on the banking system, resulting in financial losses and disruptions to electronic transfers [71472, 71502].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was primarily due to poor_decisions. The incident involved thieves siphoning hundreds of millions of pesos out of Mexican banks by creating phantom orders that wired funds to fake accounts and promptly withdrawing the money [71502]. The intruders exploited the software used by banks to communicate with the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI), managed by the central bank of Mexico. The breach occurred through the software of three providers that the cyber intruders managed to compromise, allowing them to make unauthorized transfers from bank accounts [71472]. This indicates that the failure was a result of poor decisions in terms of software security and vulnerability management within the banking system.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) unknown (a) The software failure incident in the Mexican banks was not due to development incompetence but rather a sophisticated cyberattack. The hackers targeted the software used by the banks to communicate with the SPEI system, which is managed by the central bank of Mexico. The intruders were able to exploit vulnerabilities in the software provided by three different vendors, allowing them to make unauthorized transfers from bank accounts. This incident highlights the importance of cybersecurity measures in protecting financial systems from such attacks [71472]. (b) The software failure incident in the Mexican banks was not accidental but a deliberate cyberattack orchestrated with precision. The hackers created phantom orders to transfer funds to fake accounts and promptly withdrew the money, resulting in the theft of hundreds of millions of pesos from multiple banks. The attack involved sending false orders to move varying amounts of money from different banks to fake accounts, indicating a well-planned operation rather than an accidental occurrence [71502].
Duration temporary From the provided articles, the software failure incident related to the cyberattack on Mexican banks' interbank transfer system (SPEI) was temporary. The incident was temporary because it involved unauthorized transfers and withdrawals of funds due to the exploitation of software vulnerabilities in the communication software used by banks to connect to the SPEI system. The incident caused delays in interbank transfers and financial transactions, impacting the normal operations of the banking system. However, the central bank clarified that the SPEI system itself was not compromised, indicating that the failure was temporary and specific to the software vulnerabilities exploited by the hackers [71472, 71502].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved a hack on the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI) in Mexican banks, leading to unauthorized transfers and withdrawals of funds. This resulted in the system losing its state and not performing its intended functions as expected [71472, 71502]. (b) omission: The incident can also be linked to omission. Thieves created phantom orders that wired funds to fake accounts, leading to the omission of the system to perform its intended functions of verifying and authorizing legitimate transactions [71502]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident is not directly related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. The focus of the incident was more on unauthorized transfers and withdrawals rather than timing issues [71472, 71502]. (d) value: The software failure incident can be associated with a failure in value. Thieves siphoned off hundreds of millions of pesos from Mexican banks through unauthorized transfers, indicating a failure in the system performing its intended functions correctly in terms of protecting the financial value within the system [71472, 71502]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not align with a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The primary issue was unauthorized transfers and withdrawals rather than inconsistent behavior [71472, 71502]. (f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is a security breach. The incident involved a sophisticated hack on the SPEI system through vulnerabilities in the software used by banks to communicate with the system. This security breach led to unauthorized access and transfers, highlighting a critical failure in system security [71472, 71502].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, delay (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident in Mexico involving a cyberattack on the banks resulted in unauthorized transfers of money from bank accounts. Thieves siphoned hundreds of millions of pesos out of Mexican banks by creating phantom orders that wired funds to fake accounts and promptly withdrew the money [71502]. The intruders managed to transfer money from the banks to these fake accounts within minutes, preventing the banks from blocking the outflow of resources. This incident led to financial losses estimated to be between 400 to 800 million pesos (approximately US$21 to US$42 million) [71472]. The impact was felt by the banks and financial institutions, causing disruptions in the payment system and delays in processing electronic transfers, affecting both the institutions and their clients [71472].
Domain finance The software failure incident reported in the news articles is related to the finance industry (h). The incident involved a cyberattack on the System of Electronic Interbank Payments (SPEI) in Mexico, affecting the transfer of funds between banks and resulting in unauthorized transfers of money from bank accounts [Article 71472] [Article 71502]. The attack targeted the financial institutions and their communication software with the SPEI, leading to the theft of millions of pesos from the banks [Article 71472]. The incident caused delays in electronic transfers and impacted the operations of multiple banks in Mexico [Article 71472]. The central bank confirmed that the SPEI system itself was not compromised but rather the software used by the banks to connect to the payment system [Article 71502].

Sources

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