| Recurring |
unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to the ship-tracking technology being hacked to spoof the size and location of boats has not been specifically mentioned to have happened again within the same organization or with its products and services in the provided article [72575].
(b) The article does not mention any specific instances of similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services related to the ship-tracking technology hack discussed in the article [72575]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it is mentioned that a vulnerability was discovered in a commonly used ship-tracking technology that could be exploited to spoof the size and location of boats, potentially triggering collision alarms on other vessels [72575].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it is highlighted that many ships never changed their satellite communications equipment's default username and password, making it relatively easy to gain remote access and reconfigure a ship's Electronic Chart Display software to misidentify the location of its GPS receiver, potentially leading to accidents [72575]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the article is primarily within the system. The vulnerability exploited by the researcher, Ken Munro, involves targeting a computer-powered navigation system called the Electronic Chart Display (Ecdis) on ships. By reconfiguring the ship's Ecdis software, the location of the GPS receiver can be misidentified, potentially leading to collisions. Additionally, the incident involves manipulating the software to make the boat appear much larger than its actual size, triggering collision alarms on other vessels [72575]. These actions demonstrate how the software itself can be manipulated to create chaos and disrupt the normal functioning of the ships.
(b) outside_system: The potential consequences of the software failure incident extend beyond the system itself. While the vulnerability lies within the software system used for ship navigation, the impact of exploiting this vulnerability could lead to significant disruptions in the English Channel's shipping lanes. The article mentions that the attack could effectively shut down the Channel's shipping lanes by causing AIS collision alarms to go off on numerous ships, leading them to avoid the area completely. This external impact highlights how a software failure within the system can have broader consequences on the overall maritime traffic and safety in the English Channel [72575]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to non-human actions. The incident involves a vulnerability in ship-tracking technology that can be hacked to spoof the size and location of boats, potentially triggering collision alarms on other vessels without direct human involvement. The attack targets the Electronic Chart Display (Ecdis) system, manipulating the GPS receiver's location and boat size to create false information that could lead to accidents [72575].
(b) The software failure incident also involves human actions. The vulnerability exploited in the incident was initially demonstrated by a French researcher who found that many ships never changed their satellite communications equipment's default username and password, making it relatively easy for hackers to gain remote access. Additionally, the researcher Ken Munro highlighted the lack of security measures on board ships, emphasizing the importance of ship owners taking basic steps to prevent such incidents [72575]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The incident reported in the article is related to a ship-tracking technology that can be hacked to spoof the size and location of boats, potentially triggering collision alarms on other vessels [72575].
- The vulnerability exploited in this incident involves the manipulation of a ship's Electronic Chart Display (Ecdis) software, which is a computer-powered navigation system found on ships [72575].
- The hack involves reconfiguring the ship's Ecdis software to misidentify the location of its GPS receiver, which is a hardware component crucial for accurate positioning information [72575].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident primarily originates from the manipulation and exploitation of the ship's Ecdis software, which is a software system used for navigation on ships [72575].
- The hack demonstrated by the researcher involves altering the software to misidentify the GPS receiver's location and spoof the size of the boat, leading to potential collision risks [72575].
- The vulnerability exploited in this incident highlights the importance of software security on board ships and the need for software patches and secure configurations to prevent such attacks [72575]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involves a ship-tracking technology being hacked to spoof the size and location of boats in order to trigger collision alarms on other vessels, potentially leading to accidents and chaos in the English Channel [72575]. The vulnerability was exploited by manipulating the ship's Electronic Chart Display (Ecdis) software to misidentify the GPS receiver's location and make the boat appear much larger than its true size, which could lead to collisions and disruptions [72575]. The attack was demonstrated by researchers to show the potential risks and consequences of such malicious actions, highlighting the need for ship owners to protect their vessels against such threats [72575]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was related to poor_decisions. The incident involved a vulnerability in a commonly used ship-tracking technology that could be exploited to spoof the size and location of boats, potentially triggering collision alarms on other vessels. The vulnerability was identified by a researcher, Ken Munro, who demonstrated how the Electronic Chart Display (Ecdis) software on ships could be manipulated to misidentify GPS locations and make boats appear larger than they actually were. This could lead to chaos and potential accidents in the English Channel [72575]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to development incompetence. The vulnerability in the ship-tracking technology that allowed for spoofing the size and location of boats was discovered by a researcher, Ken Munro, who highlighted the lack of basic security measures on board ships. He mentioned that security on ships is often dire and emphasized the need for ship owners to take simple steps to prevent such incidents [72575].
(b) The incident also involved accidental factors, such as ships not changing their satellite communications equipment's default username and password, making it relatively easy for unauthorized access. The ability to reconfigure a ship's Ecdis software to misidentify the GPS location was a result of these accidental vulnerabilities that were exploited by the researcher [72575]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as both temporary and permanent.
Temporary: The vulnerability in the ship-tracking technology that allowed for spoofing the size and location of boats to trigger collision alarms was a temporary failure. This vulnerability could be exploited to cause chaos and potentially shut down the English Channel temporarily [72575].
Permanent: The underlying issue of poor security on board ships and the potential for hackers to exploit various vulnerabilities in ship systems, including the Electronic Chart Display (Ecdis) software, can be considered a permanent failure. The lack of proper security measures and the presence of easily exploitable weaknesses in the systems indicate a long-term risk of software failure incidents [72575]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident involves a vulnerability in ship-tracking technology that could be exploited to spoof the size and location of boats to trigger collision alarms [72575].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, it focuses on the manipulation of ship navigation systems to misidentify locations and sizes of vessels, potentially leading to accidents [72575].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. It revolves around the manipulation of ship navigation systems to deceive other vessels about their location and size, potentially causing accidents [72575].
(d) value: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Instead, it highlights a vulnerability in ship navigation systems that could be exploited to misidentify vessel locations and sizes, leading to potential accidents [72575].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. It focuses on the exploitation of a vulnerability in ship navigation systems to deceive other vessels about their locations and sizes, potentially causing chaos in the English Channel [72575].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability that allows for the manipulation of ship navigation systems to spoof vessel locations and sizes, potentially triggering collision alarms and causing chaos in the English Channel. The incident highlights the importance of addressing cybersecurity vulnerabilities in maritime systems to prevent potential accidents [72575]. |