| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in satellite communication systems has happened again at the same organization, IOActive. Ruben Santamarta, a researcher for IOActive, presented research in 2014 on vulnerabilities in satellite communication systems and then carried out further research on the same topic in 2018, indicating a recurrence of the issue within the organization [74402, 74796].
(b) The incident has also occurred with other organizations or their products and services. The vulnerabilities in satellite systems were found to affect systems used on aircraft, ships, and by the military, indicating a broader impact across multiple organizations and sectors [74402, 74796]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the articles. Ruben Santamarta, a researcher for IOActive, discovered vulnerabilities in popular satellite communication systems that could be exploited by hackers to carry out cyber-physical attacks [74402, 74796]. These vulnerabilities were found to be due to security weaknesses in the software that operates the satellite antennas, allowing attackers to seize control and potentially disrupt, intercept, or modify communications passing through the antennas. The vulnerabilities were not maliciously inserted backdoors but were likely added during software development, indicating a design flaw in the system.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the articles. The vulnerabilities discovered by IOActive could potentially allow attackers to take control of satellite systems used on aircraft, ships, and military bases [74402, 74796]. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to overcharge satellite antennas, betray the exact location of military forces, or even damage the equipment or harm operators. These issues point to failures in the operation or misuse of the systems, as attackers could potentially gain control over satellite receivers on ships to aid eavesdropping or damage the antenna by increasing its power output. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system:
- The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily due to vulnerabilities and bugs within the satellite communication systems used on aircraft, ships, and by the military [74402, 74796].
- The vulnerabilities in the software that operates the satellite antennas allow attackers to seize control, disrupt, intercept, or modify communications passed through the antenna [74402].
- The attack works by connecting to the satellite antenna from the ground through the internet and exploiting security weaknesses in the software [74402].
- The vulnerabilities include backdoors in the controlling code of the satellite communication systems, which were likely added during software development [74796].
- The software failure incident involves flaws in the satellite systems that could potentially lead to cyber-physical attacks, such as repositioning the antenna and launching high-intensity radio frequency attacks [74402].
- IOActive, the firm that discovered the vulnerabilities, is working with manufacturers to address the bugs and harden the devices against attacks [74796].
(b) outside_system:
- The software failure incident also involves external factors such as the potential for hackers to exploit the vulnerabilities in the satellite communication systems [74402, 74796].
- Attackers can take advantage of the vulnerabilities to carry out cyber-physical attacks, turning satellite antennas into weapons that operate like microwave ovens [74402].
- The safety risk posed by the software failure incident is higher for military and maritime users compared to the aviation sector [74402].
- The vulnerabilities could allow attackers to betray the exact location of military forces in crisis zones, indicating a potential external threat to the system [74796].
- IOActive delayed publishing details of its findings to allow manufacturers to address the vulnerabilities and mitigate the risks posed by external attackers [74796]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The vulnerability in satellite communication systems that could lead to cyber-physical attacks, turning satellite antennas into weapons, was identified as a non-human action software failure incident [74402, 74796].
- The attack works by exploiting security weaknesses in the software that operates the antenna to seize control, allowing for disruption, interception, or modification of communications passed through the antenna [74402].
- The vulnerabilities in satellite systems were found to be due to bugs that could be exploited by hackers to take control of the systems, potentially causing harm or damage [74796].
- Some vulnerabilities could betray the exact location of military forces in crisis zones, indicating a failure introduced without human participation [74796].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The backdoors found in the controlling code of satellite communication systems were not inserted maliciously but were likely added during software development, suggesting a failure introduced by human actions [74796].
- Manufacturers were working to harden devices against attacks and were acting to negate the bugs identified by IOActive, indicating a response to failures introduced by human actions [74796]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The vulnerability in satellite communication systems could allow hackers to overcharge satellite antennas to damage the equipment or harm operators, essentially turning them into weapons that operate like microwave ovens [Article 74796].
- In the case of military and maritime users, the attack exposes the location of the satellite antenna, as they usually need an attached GPS device to function, posing a safety risk [Article 74402].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The attack works by exploiting security weaknesses in the software that operates the satellite antenna to seize control, allowing attackers to disrupt, intercept, or modify communications passed through the antenna [Article 74402].
- The vulnerabilities found in satellite systems were due to bugs in the software that could let hackers take control of the systems, betraying the exact location of military forces and potentially causing harm [Article 74796]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The vulnerabilities in satellite communication systems were exploited by hackers to potentially carry out "cyber-physical attacks" that could turn satellite antennas into weapons, leak information, hack connected devices, disrupt communications, intercept or modify data, and even launch high-intensity radio frequency attacks [74402, 74796]. The attacks were aimed at causing harm, gaining unauthorized control, and potentially endangering military and maritime users.
(b) The software failure incident is also non-malicious to some extent as the vulnerabilities were not inserted maliciously but were likely added during software development as backdoors. These backdoors could have been unintentionally left in the code, making the systems vulnerable to exploitation [74796]. Additionally, the article mentions that manufacturers are working to harden devices against attacks, indicating efforts to address the vulnerabilities without malicious intent. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is more aligned with poor_decisions. The vulnerabilities in satellite communication systems were due to security weaknesses in the software that operates the antenna, allowing hackers to seize control and potentially carry out cyber-physical attacks [74402]. The backdoors in the controlling code of the satellite communication systems were not inserted maliciously but were likely added during software development, indicating poor decisions in the software development process [74796]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The vulnerabilities in satellite communication systems were identified as being due to security weaknesses in the software that operates the antenna, allowing attackers to seize control [74402]. Additionally, backdoors were found in the controlling code of the satellite communication systems, which were likely added during software development and could not be updated with secure software, indicating a lack of professional competence in software development practices [74796]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles is more likely to be temporary rather than permanent. The vulnerabilities in the satellite communication systems, as highlighted by the research conducted by Ruben Santamarta from IOActive, were due to security weaknesses in the software that operates the antenna [74402]. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to potentially take control of the satellite systems, overcharge satellite antennas, betray the location of military forces, and even launch cyber-physical attacks [74796]. IOActive was working with manufacturers to address these vulnerabilities and harden the devices against such attacks, indicating that the issue was not a permanent failure but rather a temporary one that could be mitigated through appropriate measures. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention any instances of a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions.
(b) omission: The vulnerability in the satellite communication systems could lead to the omission of performing intended functions. For example, attackers could disrupt, intercept, or modify communications passed through the antenna, potentially omitting the proper transmission of data [74402].
(c) timing: There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incident was related to timing issues where the system performed its intended functions but at the wrong time.
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. For instance, attackers could take control of the satellite antenna, leak information, hack connected devices, and potentially cause physical damage to electrical systems [74402, 74796].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit behaviors of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited in the software failure incident is the potential for the system to be used as a weapon by attackers. The vulnerability could allow attackers to turn satellite antennas into weapons that operate like microwave ovens, posing safety risks for military and maritime users [74402]. |