Incident: Body Cameras Vulnerable to Remote Digital Attacks and Manipulation

Published Date: 2018-08-11

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident regarding vulnerabilities in police body cameras happened around August 2018 [74622].
System 1. Vievu body cameras 2. Patrol Eyes body cameras 3. Fire Cam OnCall body cameras 4. Digital Ally body cameras 5. CeeSc WV-8 body cameras 6. Ecosystem of mobile apps, desktop software, and cloud platforms interacting with the body cameras [Cite: Article 74622]
Responsible Organization 1. Researchers at the security firm Nuix, specifically Josh Mitchell, who identified the vulnerabilities in the body cameras [74622].
Impacted Organization 1. Law enforcement groups around the US were impacted by the software failure incident involving vulnerable police body cameras [74622].
Software Causes 1. Lack of modern mitigations and defenses in the body cameras, leading to vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers [74622]. 2. Missing key access controls or relying on default credentials that were easy to determine, making it easier for attackers to gain unauthorized access [74622]. 3. Inadequate or missing authentication in features like generating a Wi-Fi access point, allowing anyone to connect to the camera's private network and access its data [74622]. 4. Lack of cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files, making it possible for attackers to introduce malicious software or manipulate recorded footage [74622]. 5. Issues with access control in desktop platforms and mobile apps used with the cameras, potentially exposing the footage to unauthorized modifications or replacements [74622].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper access controls and authentication mechanisms on the body cameras, allowing unauthorized access [74622]. 2. Inadequate or missing authentication in the models tested, enabling anyone to connect to the camera's private network and access its data [74622]. 3. Default credentials that were easy to determine, posing a security risk [74622]. 4. Missing key access controls on the body cameras and associated desktop platforms and mobile apps [74622]. 5. Vulnerabilities in the ecosystem of mobile apps, desktop software, and cloud platforms that the cameras interact with [74622].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident exposed vulnerabilities in police body cameras, allowing attackers to manipulate footage, delete footage, track locations, and remotely access live footage ([74622]). 2. The incident raised concerns about the safety risk posed to law enforcement due to the exposure of vulnerabilities in the body cameras ([74622]). 3. The lack of cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files raised doubts about the authenticity of the footage recorded by the body cameras ([74622]). 4. The incident highlighted issues with access controls, default credentials, and authentication in the body cameras and associated desktop platforms and mobile apps, potentially compromising the security of the data captured by the cameras ([74622]). 5. The software failure incident could potentially lead to nightmare scenarios such as planting malware on the cameras, gaining remote access to police networks, spreading ransomware, deleting evidence servers, or mining cryptocurrency using police computing resources ([74622]).
Preventions 1. Implementing strong access controls and authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the body cameras [74622]. 2. Using cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files recorded by the body cameras [74622]. 3. Regularly updating default credentials to stronger passwords and ensuring they are not easily guessable [74622]. 4. Conducting thorough security assessments and testing of the software and devices to identify and address vulnerabilities before deployment [74622]. 5. Employing industry-standard security practices such as encryption, secure coding, and secure communication protocols to protect the data and footage captured by the body cameras [74622].
Fixes 1. Implementing cryptographic signing to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files recorded by the body cameras [74622]. 2. Enhancing access controls and authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the cameras' data [74622]. 3. Patching vulnerabilities identified by security researchers and continuously updating the devices with security fixes [74622].
References 1. Josh Mitchell, a consultant at the security firm Nuix [74622] 2. Axon spokesperson Steve Tuttle [74622] 3. Patrol Eyes spokesperson [74622] 4. Fire Cam president Rob Schield [74622] 5. Chinese manufacturer Advanced Plus Group [74622]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to vulnerable body cameras has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The article mentions that the market leader Axon, which acquired Vievu, is in the process of patching the vulnerabilities identified by the researcher. Axon spokesperson Steve Tuttle mentioned that they are pushing a fix out to all Vievu customers to resolve the issue impacting users who have not reset their default Wi-Fi password. Additionally, Axon is planning to push several security updates next quarter based on the items identified by the security researcher [74622]. (b) The software failure incident related to vulnerable body cameras has also happened with products from multiple organizations. The article mentions that the researcher, Josh Mitchell, analyzed body camera models from five different companies: Vievu, Patrol Eyes, Fire Cam, Digital Ally, and CeeSc. Mitchell found security issues in all the devices he tested, including vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to manipulate footage, track device locations, and remotely access live footage. The article highlights that Mitchell disclosed his findings to the vendors, and some companies like Advanced Plus Group, which makes the CeeSc WV-8, have patched the vulnerabilities identified [74622].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the vulnerability of police body cameras to remote digital attacks, allowing for the manipulation of footage. The article mentions that researcher Josh Mitchell found security issues in body camera models from various companies, including vulnerabilities that could enable an attacker to download, edit, or delete footage without leaving any indication of the change [74622]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the inadequate or missing authentication in higher-end body camera models, allowing anyone to connect to the camera's private network and access its data. Additionally, the lack of key access controls or reliance on default credentials that are easy to determine poses a risk during the operation of these devices [74622].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is primarily within the system. The vulnerabilities identified in the police body cameras by the researcher, Josh Mitchell, were related to the devices themselves and the software they run. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to remotely access, manipulate, and potentially delete footage from the cameras. Issues such as lack of cryptographic mechanisms for validating firmware updates and video files, missing access controls, and default credentials made the devices susceptible to hacking and unauthorized access [74622]. (b) Additionally, the article mentions that the vulnerabilities in the body cameras could pose a safety risk to law enforcement as attackers could track the location of the cameras, potentially compromising police operations. The predictable formats used in broadcasting identifying information and the lack of proper authentication in features like generating a Wi-Fi access point also contributed to the security risks faced by the devices [74622].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the articles is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of the body cameras themselves. The vulnerabilities identified by the researcher, Josh Mitchell, allowed for remote digital attacks that could result in the manipulation of footage, tracking of location, and unauthorized access to data stored on the devices [74622]. (b) However, human actions also play a role in this software failure incident as the lack of proper security measures, such as cryptographic signing for firmware updates and video files, inadequate authentication for Wi-Fi access points, and reliance on default credentials, were identified as key issues. Additionally, the failure to implement strong security standards in the design and deployment of the body cameras contributed to the vulnerability of the devices [74622].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: The article discusses vulnerabilities in police body cameras that could lead to remote digital attacks, including manipulation of footage. These vulnerabilities stem from hardware issues such as lack of proper security measures in the devices themselves. For example, the body cameras have predictable formats for broadcasting identifying information, making it possible for attackers to track their location. Additionally, some models have inadequate or missing authentication for features like generating a Wi-Fi access point, allowing unauthorized access to camera data [74622]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: The same software failure incident also highlights software-related issues contributing to the vulnerabilities in police body cameras. The article mentions that the devices have security issues in the ecosystem of mobile apps, desktop software, and cloud platforms they interact with. Furthermore, the body cameras lack cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the validity of firmware updates and video files, leaving them susceptible to malicious software delivery and unauthorized access. Issues with access controls in desktop platforms and mobile apps used with the cameras also contribute to the software failure incident [74622].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is malicious in nature. The vulnerability in police body cameras discovered by researcher Josh Mitchell at the DefCon security conference in Las Vegas allowed for remote digital attacks that could result in the manipulation of footage, such as downloading, editing, or deleting footage without leaving any indication of the change [74622]. Mitchell found security issues that could allow an attacker to track the location of the cameras, manipulate the software they run, remotely stream live footage, and access data stored on the devices [74622]. Additionally, the vulnerabilities in the body cameras could potentially allow for planting malware on the cameras, leading to various malicious outcomes when the cameras connect to a PC for syncing [74622]. (b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities and security issues discovered in the body cameras were not intentionally introduced to harm the system. The vulnerabilities were likely due to oversight or lack of proper security measures during the development of the devices. Mitchell disclosed his findings to the vendors, who are working to fix the issues [74622]. The companies are in the process of patching the vulnerabilities, with some already taking steps to address the security flaws identified by Mitchell [74622].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability of police body cameras to remote digital attacks, including the manipulation of footage, can be attributed to poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the devices. The vulnerabilities discovered by researcher Josh Mitchell, such as the lack of cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files, the use of predictable formats for identifying information, and missing key access controls, highlight the poor decisions made in ensuring the security of these critical devices [74622]. (b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be linked to accidental decisions or unintended consequences, as highlighted by the lack of proper access controls in the desktop platforms and mobile apps used with the body cameras, which could potentially allow unauthorized access to sensitive footage. The presence of default credentials that are easy to determine and inadequate authentication in features like generating a Wi-Fi access point further emphasize the accidental decisions or mistakes made in the development and deployment of these devices [74622].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. The vulnerabilities found in the police body cameras were a result of security issues introduced during the development process. The article mentions that the body cameras had security issues that could allow an attacker to track their location, manipulate the software they run, download footage, edit footage, delete footage, and even remotely stream live footage off the cameras [74622]. (b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be categorized as accidental. The vulnerabilities discovered in the body cameras were not intentional but were accidental flaws introduced during the development process. These flaws could potentially lead to serious consequences such as compromising law enforcement operations, safety risks to officers, and the integrity of recorded footage [74622].
Duration permanent The software failure incident discussed in the article [74622] is more aligned with a permanent failure scenario. The vulnerabilities identified in the body cameras by the researcher, Josh Mitchell, indicate fundamental flaws in the design and implementation of the devices, making them susceptible to remote digital attacks that could compromise the integrity of the footage they capture. These vulnerabilities include the ability for attackers to download, edit, delete, or manipulate footage without leaving any trace, track the location of the cameras, remotely stream live footage, and even plant malware on the devices. The lack of proper security measures such as cryptographic signing for firmware updates and video files, inadequate authentication for Wi-Fi access points, and reliance on default credentials all contribute to the severity and permanence of the software failure incident. Additionally, the article highlights that Mitchell has been working with the vendors to address these issues, indicating that the software failure incident is being treated as a serious and ongoing concern that requires significant efforts to rectify.
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article involves vulnerabilities in police body cameras that could lead to remote digital attacks, including the manipulation of footage. The vulnerabilities identified by the researcher, Josh Mitchell, could allow an attacker to download footage, edit it, delete footage, or even remotely stream live footage off the cameras. These vulnerabilities could potentially lead to a crash of the system, where the body cameras lose their integrity and fail to perform their primary function of recording and protecting footage [74622]. (b) omission: The vulnerabilities in the body cameras could also result in the omission of performing their intended functions. For example, an attacker could delete footage they don't want law enforcement to have, which is an omission of the camera's function to securely store and protect recorded footage [74622]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not directly relate to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions but at the wrong time. (d) value: The vulnerabilities identified in the body cameras could lead to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. For instance, attackers could manipulate footage, edit media, modify file structures, and potentially make intricate modifications to the recorded videos. This incorrect behavior compromises the integrity and trustworthiness of the footage captured by the cameras [74622]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The other behavior exhibited in this software failure incident is the lack of proper security measures and defenses in the body cameras. The vulnerabilities identified by the researcher highlight issues such as inadequate access controls, missing authentication, default credentials, and the absence of cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files. These security shortcomings expose the body cameras to potential hacking, manipulation, and unauthorized access, posing significant risks to law enforcement and the integrity of recorded evidence [74622].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception embedded_software The software failure incident reported in the article [74622] is related to the embedded software layer of the cyber physical system. The vulnerabilities identified in the body cameras were due to flaws in the software they run, allowing attackers to manipulate footage, track locations, remotely stream live footage, and access data without proper authentication. The issues included lack of cryptographic mechanisms for validating firmware updates and video files, missing access controls, default credentials, and inadequate authentication for Wi-Fi access points generated by the cameras. These vulnerabilities highlight the critical importance of secure embedded software in ensuring the integrity and trustworthiness of devices like body cameras.
Communication link_level, connectivity_level The software failure incident discussed in the article [74622] is related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed at both the link_level and connectivity_level. 1. **Link Level**: The vulnerabilities identified in the body cameras allowed attackers to exploit weaknesses in the communication at the physical layer. For example, the devices broadcast identifying information about themselves, such as MAC addresses, in predictable formats that could be used to track their location. This lack of randomization in MAC addresses could lead to potential tracking of law enforcement officers [74622]. 2. **Connectivity Level**: The vulnerabilities also extended to the network and transport layers of communication. The body cameras had issues with Wi-Fi connectivity, including the ability to generate a Wi-Fi access point with inadequate authentication. This allowed unauthorized devices to connect to the camera's network and access its data, indicating weaknesses in network-level security [74622]. Therefore, the software failure incident in this case involved failures at both the link_level and connectivity_level of the cyber physical system's communication layer.
Application TRUE The software failure incident described in the article [74622] is related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The failure was due to vulnerabilities in the body cameras' software that allowed for remote digital attacks, manipulation of footage, tracking of location, and unauthorized access to data. These vulnerabilities included issues with security, authentication, access controls, and lack of cryptographic mechanisms to confirm the integrity of firmware updates and video files. The flaws in the software of the body cameras exposed them to potential hacking, malware planting, and unauthorized access, highlighting significant weaknesses in the application layer of the devices.

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence harm, property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) unknown (b) harm: The software failure incident could potentially pose a safety risk to law enforcement as attackers could track their location or manipulate the software running on the body cameras, potentially leading to physical harm [74622]. (c) unknown (d) property: The software failure incident could result in the manipulation of footage captured by body cameras, potentially impacting the integrity of evidence and leading to property loss or legal consequences [74622]. (e) unknown (f) non-human: The software failure incident impacted the vulnerability of body cameras used by law enforcement, potentially allowing attackers to remotely access, manipulate, or delete footage stored on the devices [74622]. (g) unknown (h) theoretical_consequence: The software failure incident discussed potential nightmare scenarios where law enforcement evidence-collecting devices could be hacked, leading to various malicious activities such as gaining remote access to police networks, spreading ransomware, deleting evidence servers, or mining cryptocurrency using police computing resources [74622]. (i) unknown
Domain government The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to the industry of **government**. The failed system in question is the body cameras used by law enforcement agencies, which are crucial for recording events and ensuring transparency in police operations [74622]. The vulnerabilities in these body cameras, as highlighted by the researcher Josh Mitchell, pose significant risks such as remote digital attacks, manipulation of footage, tracking of location, and unauthorized access to data [74622]. These security issues not only compromise the integrity of the recorded footage but also raise concerns about the safety of law enforcement personnel and the potential misuse of the captured information [74622]. Mitchell's findings underscore the importance of addressing security flaws in devices that play a vital role in public safety and social justice within the government sector [74622].

Sources

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