| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) experienced a software failure incident in 2012 due to a software update that resulted in millions of customers being locked out of their accounts [Article 75431]. This incident is reminiscent of the recent technical failures at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank in 2018, where customers were unable to access online and mobile accounts due to a firewall software upgrade that backfired [Article 75431].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
In addition to RBS, other banks like Barclays, Co-operative Bank, and Cashplus have also faced online disruptions and technical problems, leading to customer complaints and service outages [Article 75431]. The incident at Barclays involved customers being locked out of their accounts due to a technical problem, similar to the issues faced by RBS customers [Article 76240]. This indicates a broader trend of technical failures affecting multiple organizations in the banking sector. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank was attributed to an upgrade to firewall software at RBS that backfired, causing customers to be locked out of their online and mobile accounts [75431, 76240]. This failure was related to contributing factors introduced during the system development phase, specifically during the design phase when the firewall software upgrade was implemented to enhance security but resulted in unintended consequences.
(b) The software failure incident also involved issues with the operation of the system. Customers were unable to settle bills, pay rent, use cash cards in ATMs, or access their accounts, indicating operational failures that impacted users' ability to carry out essential banking activities [76240]. This aspect of the failure was related to contributing factors introduced during the operation phase, where the system's functionality was affected, leading to disruptions in customer services. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank was primarily caused by an upgrade to firewall software at RBS that backfired, leading to customers being locked out of their online and mobile accounts [75431, 76240]. Additionally, a firewall security update carried out overnight by RBS shut down their website and app, causing the systems failure that affected millions of customers [76240].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident was exacerbated by the fact that customers were unable to settle bills, pay rent, or access their accounts, indicating external consequences of the failure [75431, 76240]. Additionally, the incident led to demands for compensation for customers who suffered losses due to the failure, highlighting the impact on customers beyond just the technical issues [75431]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The incident at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank was caused by an upgrade to firewall software at RBS that backfired, leading to customers being locked out of their online and mobile accounts [75431].
- The outage at RBS was due to a firewall security update carried out overnight that shut down their website and app, causing the systems failure [76240].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The head of the Treasury Committee, Nicky Morgan MP, demanded answers from RBS and Barclays, highlighting the litany of failures of banking IT systems and questioning the banks' justifications for branch closures based on providing seamless online and mobile banking services [75431].
- RBS chief executive Ross McEwan initially couldn't say what the problem was, and customers criticized the bank for the lack of access to their accounts, inability to pay bills, and difficulties in withdrawing cash [76240]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The incident at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank was caused by an upgrade to firewall software at RBS that backfired, leading to customers being locked out of their accounts [75431].
- An overnight firewall security update at RBS shut down their website and app, causing the systems failure that locked out millions of customers [76240].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The failure at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank was primarily attributed to a software upgrade that was intended to enhance security but resulted in customers being unable to access their accounts [75431].
- The IT glitch at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank was caused by a firewall security update carried out overnight that led to the shutdown of their website and app, indicating a software-related issue [76240]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles appears to be non-malicious in nature. The incidents at RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank were attributed to technical issues resulting from a firewall software upgrade that backfired, causing customers to be locked out of their online and mobile banking accounts [75431, 76240]. The failures were described as unintended consequences of system upgrades rather than deliberate actions to harm the systems. Additionally, the apologies issued by the bank executives and the efforts to resolve the issues indicate a non-malicious intent behind the failures. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at RBS, Barclays, and other banks was primarily due to poor_decisions. The incident was caused by an upgrade to firewall software at RBS that backfired, leaving customers locked out of their accounts [75431]. Additionally, a firewall security update carried out overnight at RBS shut down their website and app, causing the nationwide outage [76240]. The failure was exacerbated by the closure of branches and the push towards online banking services, highlighting the poor decisions made in implementing and managing the IT systems of these banks. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence:
- The incident at RBS was caused by an upgrade to firewall software that backfired, leaving customers locked out of their accounts [Article 75431].
- RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank customers were locked out of online banking due to a firewall security update carried out overnight that shut down the website and app [Article 76240].
(b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally:
- RBS chief executive initially couldn't identify the problem causing the outage, indicating it was an accidental issue [Article 76240].
- Customers complained about being unable to access their accounts or cash from ATMs, suggesting an accidental failure in the system [Article 76240]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles was temporary. The incident caused millions of RBS, NatWest, and Ulster Bank customers to be locked out of their online banking for a period of five hours [Article 76240]. The outage was due to a firewall security update that was carried out overnight, which inadvertently shut down the website and app, leading to customers being unable to settle bills or access their accounts [Article 76240].
(b) The software failure incident was not permanent as it was resolved within the same day, and customers were eventually able to access their accounts once the issue was fixed [Article 76240]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, timing, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a crash. This is evident from the reports of customers being locked out of their online and mobile banking accounts, unable to access their money, settle bills, or pay rent due to the system failure [75431, 76240].
(b) omission: The incident also involved omission as customers complained about not being able to use their cash cards in ATMs, unable to access their accounts, and facing difficulties in paying bills or transferring money [76240].
(c) timing: Timing issues were present in the failure incident as well. Customers expressed frustration over not being able to access their accounts on payday, leading to concerns about paying bills and facing late payment charges [76240].
(d) value: The software failure incident also included value-related failures. Customers were unable to perform transactions correctly, such as transferring money, paying bills, and accessing their accounts for essential financial activities [76240].
(e) byzantine: There is no explicit mention of the software failure incident exhibiting byzantine behavior in the articles.
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized under the "other" behavior as well. This includes the system update intended to improve security backfiring and causing customers to be locked out of their accounts, leading to disruptions in online and mobile banking services [75431]. |