Incident: Tesla Model S Key Fob Vulnerability Exploited Twice.

Published Date: 2018-09-10

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident with the Tesla Model S key fobs happened in June 2018 as mentioned in <Article 75643>. 2. The incident was also reported to have happened again in August 2019 as mentioned in <Article 88435>.
System 1. Tesla's Model S key fob encryption system failed, specifically the Pektron key fobs used in the Model S vehicles [88370, 75643, 75698]. 2. The keyless entry system of Tesla's Model S vehicles was vulnerable to cloning attacks [88370, 75643, 75698].
Responsible Organization 1. Researchers at KU Leuven university in Belgium [75643, 75698, 88370] 2. Manufacturer Pektron [75643, 75698, 88370] 3. Tesla [75643, 75698, 88370]
Impacted Organization 1. Tesla [88370, 75643, 88435] 2. Key fob manufacturer Pektron [88370, 75643, 88435]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a vulnerability in the key fob encryption system used in Tesla's Model S vehicles, specifically related to a configuration bug that vastly reduced the time necessary to crack the encryption [88370, 75643, 75698]. 2. The vulnerability stemmed from the key fob encryption protocol, where the manufacturer, Pektron, initially used a weak 40-bit encryption protocol that was relatively easy to break [75643, 75698]. 3. Despite an upgrade to 80-bit encryption in the newer key fobs, the vulnerability allowed hackers to reduce the problem to cracking two 40-bit keys, making it easier to clone the key fobs [88370]. 4. The software fix for the vulnerability involved pushing out a security update over-the-air to Tesla dashboards, allowing certain Model S owners to update their key fobs inside their cars in less than two minutes [88370, 88435]. 5. Tesla also implemented additional security features like PIN to Drive, which required a PIN code to be entered before driving the car, as a measure to mitigate the vulnerability [75643, 88435].
Non-software Causes 1. The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system was due to a configuration bug that reduced the time necessary to crack the encryption, allowing hackers to clone the key fobs easily [88370]. 2. The key fobs used in Tesla Model S vehicles were manufactured by a company called Pektron, which initially used a weak 40-bit encryption protocol that made it vulnerable to cloning attacks [75643, 75698, 88435].
Impacts 1. The vulnerability in Tesla's key fob encryption allowed hackers to clone the key fob and steal the associated car without touching the owner's key, impacting the security of Tesla vehicles [#88370, #75643, #75698]. 2. The flaw in the key fob encryption system led to the need for software updates to address the vulnerability, with Tesla rolling out security enhancements and fixes to prevent potential thefts [#88370, #75643, #75698]. 3. The incident highlighted the importance of implementing security measures such as PIN to Drive feature to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access and theft of vehicles [#88370, #75643, #75698]. 4. The software failure incident raised concerns about the security of keyless entry systems not only in Tesla vehicles but also in other cars using similar technology, emphasizing the need for robust encryption and security measures [#88370, #75643, #75698].
Preventions 1. Implementing stronger encryption protocols for key fobs: The vulnerability in Tesla's key fobs was due to using a relatively unsophisticated 40-bit encryption protocol, which made it easy for hackers to clone the key fobs. Transitioning to more robust encryption, such as the 80-bit encryption, could have prevented the incident [Article 75698, Article 88435]. 2. Regular security audits and updates: Car manufacturers, including Tesla, should conduct regular security audits of their keyless entry systems and key fobs to identify and address any vulnerabilities. Implementing timely software updates and security enhancements can help prevent potential attacks [Article 75643, Article 88435]. 3. Enabling additional security features: Features like PIN to Drive, which requires entering a PIN code before driving the car, can add an extra layer of security and prevent unauthorized access even if key fobs are compromised. Enabling such features proactively could have mitigated the risk of key cloning attacks [Article 75643, Article 88435].
Fixes 1. Implementing a software fix that will be pushed out over-the-air to Tesla dashboards to address the vulnerability in the key fob encryption system [88370]. 2. Enabling a PIN to Drive feature that must be entered before driving the car, which adds an extra layer of security [75643, 88435]. 3. Rolling out a software update that allows certain Model S owners to update their key fobs inside their car in less than two minutes [88435].
References 1. Researchers at KU Leuven university in Belgium [Article 75643, Article 75698] 2. Tesla spokesperson [Article 75643, Article 88435] 3. Wired [Article 75643, Article 75698, Article 88435] 4. Tesla [Article 88435] 5. Belgian university researchers [Article 88435]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident of key fob cloning affecting Tesla vehicles has happened again within the same organization. Researchers from KU Leuven university in Belgium discovered a new vulnerability in Tesla's Model S key fobs, even after Tesla had rolled out a fix for a previous vulnerability in 2018 [88370, 88435]. The new attack technique allows hackers to clone the keys and steal the car, similar to the previous incident. Tesla reacted quickly by rolling out a software update to address the new vulnerability, allowing users to update their key fobs inside their cars in just a couple of minutes [88435]. (b) The vulnerability of key fob cloning isn't limited to Tesla, as other car manufacturers have also been shown to be vulnerable to similar attacks. The key fob vulnerability, manufactured by a firm called Pektron, was exploited by researchers at KU Leuven university, and they believe the attack might also work against cars sold by McLaren and Karma, as well as motorcycles sold by Triumph, which also use Pektron's key fob system [75643]. These manufacturers may need to replace vulnerable key fobs and push out software updates to address the issue, similar to how Tesla responded to the vulnerability in their key fobs.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) In the software failure incident related to the Tesla Model S key fob vulnerability, the failure can be attributed to the design phase. Researchers from KU Leuven university in Belgium discovered a flaw in the encryption used in the wireless key fobs of Tesla's Model S luxury sedans, allowing them to clone the key fob and steal the associated car in seconds [75643]. The vulnerability stemmed from the key fob's encryption protocol, which was relatively weak at 40-bit encryption, making it susceptible to being cracked by computing all possible cryptographic keys [75643]. Despite Tesla upgrading the key fob encryption to 80-bit, the flaw persisted as hackers could still exploit a configuration bug to reduce the problem to cracking two 40-bit keys, making it easier to clone the key fob [88370]. (b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. Hackers were able to exploit the vulnerability in the key fob encryption by wirelessly reading signals from a nearby Tesla owner's fob and decoding the cryptographic key in less than two seconds, enabling them to steal the car without leaving a trace [75643]. The ease with which the key fob could be cloned and the car stolen highlights an operational flaw in the security system, as the theft could occur without any physical interaction with the owner's key [75643]. Tesla responded by rolling out software updates and introducing additional security features like PIN to Drive to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access to the vehicles [75643].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability in Tesla's key fobs can be categorized as within_system. Researchers from KU Leuven discovered a flaw in the encryption of Tesla's key fobs, allowing them to clone the key fob and steal the car wirelessly [88370]. The vulnerability was due to a configuration bug in the key fob's encryption, which reduced the time necessary to crack it, despite the upgrade from 40-bit to 80-bit encryption [88370]. Tesla responded by rolling out a software fix that could be pushed over-the-air to address the vulnerability in the key fobs [88370]. The fix involved changing the configuration of the key fobs wirelessly from the Tesla vehicles [88370]. This incident highlights a software vulnerability within Tesla's keyless entry system that could be exploited by hackers. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered as outside_system as it involved a flaw in the key fob encryption that was manufactured by a third-party supplier, Pektron [88370]. The vulnerability stemmed from the encryption protocol used by Pektron, which was relatively unsophisticated, making it easy for hackers to clone the key fobs [75698]. Tesla worked with Pektron to introduce more robust cryptography for the Model S key fobs in response to the research findings [75698]. Additionally, the vulnerability was not limited to Tesla vehicles, as other car manufacturers using similar keyless entry systems were also potentially at risk [75643]. This incident underscores the importance of third-party suppliers in ensuring the security of automotive systems.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - In the incident involving Tesla's key fobs, the vulnerability was due to a flaw in the encryption used in the wireless key fobs of Tesla's Model S luxury sedans. The encryption system used a weak 40-bit cipher, making it relatively easy for researchers to clone the key fobs and steal the associated cars [Article 75643]. - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption allowed hackers to clone the key fobs in a matter of seconds by wirelessly reading signals and decoding them, enabling them to steal the cars without leaving a trace [Article 75698]. - Despite Tesla upgrading the key fob encryption to 80-bit encryption, researchers found a way to exploit the system by breaking two 40-bit encryption keys, making it easier to clone the key fobs [Article 88435]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The vulnerability in Tesla's key fobs was discovered by researchers at KU Leuven university in Belgium, who presented their findings at a conference. They were able to clone the key fobs using radio and computing equipment, indicating that the vulnerability was introduced due to the encryption protocol chosen for the key fobs [Article 75643]. - Tesla acknowledged the researchers' findings and paid them a bug bounty for identifying the vulnerability. The company then worked with its supplier to enhance the key fob security by introducing more robust cryptography for the Model S in response to the research [Article 75698]. - Tesla reacted quickly to the new vulnerability discovered by the same researchers, rolling out a software update to address the issue. The company also implemented security enhancements like the PIN to Drive feature to mitigate the risk of unauthorized use of vehicles [Article 88435].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The vulnerability in Tesla's key fob encryption system, which allowed for key cloning and car theft, was attributed to a flaw in the hardware of the key fobs manufactured by Pektron. The key fobs used a weak 40-bit encryption protocol, making it relatively easy for hackers to clone the keys and steal the associated cars [Article 75643]. - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system was addressed by transitioning to a new key fob with 80-bit encryption, which was meant to be more secure. However, researchers at KU Leuven University found that the new key fobs were still vulnerable due to a hardware flaw in the configuration of the key fobs, which reduced the security of the encryption. This flaw allowed hackers to exploit the system by breaking two 40-bit keys instead of the 80-bit encryption, making it easier to clone the keys and steal the cars [Article 88435]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incident was primarily due to a vulnerability in the software of Tesla's keyless entry system, specifically in the encryption algorithm used in the key fobs. The flaw in the encryption algorithm allowed hackers to exploit the system and clone the key fobs wirelessly, enabling them to steal Tesla Model S cars without physical access to the keys [Article 75643]. - Tesla responded to the software vulnerability by rolling out software updates to address the encryption issue and enhance the security of the key fobs. The updates included introducing more robust cryptography for the Model S key fobs to mitigate the software vulnerability that allowed for key cloning and car theft [Article 75698].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious, non-malicious (a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability in Tesla's key fobs can be categorized as malicious. Researchers from KU Leuven university in Belgium discovered a serious flaw in the security of Tesla's vehicles, allowing them to wirelessly clone the key fob and steal the car without touching the owner's key [88370]. The vulnerability was due to a configuration bug in the key fob's encryption, which reduced the time necessary to crack the encryption, making it possible for hackers to exploit the system [88370]. The incident involved breaking the encryption on the key fob, allowing for unauthorized access to the vehicle, which aligns with a malicious intent to harm the system. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered non-malicious as it was a result of a flaw in the encryption system of the key fobs used in Tesla vehicles. The vulnerability was discovered by academic researchers at KU Leuven university, who found that the key fobs used a weak 40-bit cipher for encryption, making it susceptible to cloning attacks [75643]. Tesla acknowledged the vulnerability, paid a bug bounty to the researchers, and worked to fix the encryption issue by introducing more robust cryptography for the key fobs [75698]. The incident highlights a non-malicious failure in the design and implementation of the encryption system, rather than a deliberate attempt to harm the system.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerability in Tesla's key fobs can be attributed to poor decisions made in the encryption protocols and implementation. The key fobs initially used a weak 40-bit encryption protocol, which was relatively easy to break, allowing hackers to clone the key fobs and steal the associated cars [75643]. Despite upgrading to an 80-bit encryption protocol, a configuration bug in the new key fobs allowed hackers to reduce the problem to cracking two 40-bit keys, making it only twice as hard as before to clone the keys [88370]. This vulnerability showcases poor decisions in the encryption strategy and implementation of the key fobs, leading to a software failure incident.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The vulnerability in Tesla's key fob encryption system was due to a configuration bug that vastly reduced the time necessary to crack its encryption, despite the upgrade from 40-bit to 80-bit encryption (Article 88370). - The key fob system's weak encryption protocol was a result of a decision made by the manufacturer, Pektron, which used a relatively unsophisticated 40-bit encryption protocol to protect the key fobs (Article 75698). (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system was not intentional but rather a result of the weak encryption protocol used by the manufacturer, Pektron, which made it easy for hackers to clone the key fobs (Article 75698). - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system was discovered by researchers at KU Leuven university in Belgium, who found a technique to defeat the encryption used in the wireless key fobs of Tesla's Model S luxury sedans (Article 75643).
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident in the articles is considered temporary. Researchers discovered vulnerabilities in Tesla's key fob encryption system that allowed for key cloning and car theft. Tesla responded by rolling out software updates to address the vulnerabilities and enhance security measures [88370, 75643, 75698, 88435].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: - The software failure incident related to the Tesla Model S key fob vulnerability can be considered a crash as it led to the system losing its intended security state, allowing hackers to clone the key fob and drive away with the car [75643, 75698, 88435]. (b) omission: - The vulnerability in the Tesla Model S key fob encryption can be seen as an omission failure as the system omitted to adequately protect the key fob signals, leading to the cloning of the key fob and unauthorized access to the vehicle [75643, 75698, 88435]. (c) timing: - The software failure incident does not align with a timing failure as the system did not perform its intended functions too late or too early [unknown]. (d) value: - The vulnerability in the Tesla Model S key fob encryption can be categorized as a value failure as the system failed to encrypt the key fob signals effectively, allowing hackers to clone the key fob and steal the car [75643, 75698, 88435]. (e) byzantine: - The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure as there were no mentions of inconsistent responses or interactions within the system [unknown]. (f) other: - The behavior of the software failure incident can be described as a security vulnerability leading to unauthorized access to the vehicle, which could be classified as a security breach [75643, 75698, 88435].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception processing_unit, embedded_software (a) sensor: The software failure incident related to the Tesla Model S key fob vulnerability was not directly related to a sensor error. The vulnerability allowed hackers to clone the key fob's encrypted signal wirelessly, bypassing the security measures [Article 75643]. (b) actuator: The software failure incident was not directly related to an actuator error. The vulnerability allowed hackers to clone the key fob's signal and drive away with the car without physically interacting with the key fob [Article 75643]. (c) processing_unit: The software failure incident was related to a processing error in the encryption used in the key fobs of Tesla Model S cars. The vulnerability stemmed from a weak encryption protocol used in the key fobs, making it easy for hackers to clone the key fob's signal and steal the car [Article 75643]. (d) network_communication: The software failure incident was not directly related to a network communication error. The vulnerability allowed hackers to wirelessly intercept and clone the key fob's signal, bypassing the need for network communication [Article 75643]. (e) embedded_software: The software failure incident was related to an embedded software error in the encryption implementation of the key fobs for Tesla Model S cars. The vulnerability was due to a weak encryption protocol used in the key fobs, allowing hackers to clone the key fob's signal and gain unauthorized access to the vehicle [Article 75643].
Communication link_level [a88370] The software failure incident related to the Tesla Model S key fob vulnerability was primarily related to the link_level, as researchers were able to defeat the encryption on the keyless entry system of the Model S using radio equipment to wirelessly clone the key fob and steal the car without physical access to the key. The vulnerability was due to a flaw in the encryption of the key fob system, allowing hackers to exploit the communication between the key fob and the car's radios.
Application TRUE The software failure incident related to the Tesla Model S key fob vulnerability can be considered as a failure related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. This failure was due to a flaw in the encryption used in the key fobs, which allowed hackers to clone the key fobs and steal the cars [Article 75643, Article 75698]. The vulnerability stemmed from the weak encryption protocol (40-bit encryption) used in the key fobs, making it relatively easy for hackers to decode the signals and clone the key fobs in a matter of seconds [Article 75643, Article 75698]. Despite efforts to upgrade the encryption to 80-bit, the flaw still existed as hackers only needed to break two 40-bit encryption keys, which was not significantly more secure [Article 75643, Article 75698]. Tesla responded to this vulnerability by rolling out software updates to address the issue and introducing additional security features like PIN to Drive [Article 75643, Article 75698].

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident involving Tesla's key fobs allowed hackers to clone the key fobs, enabling them to steal the associated cars without a trace [75643]. - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system could potentially lead to car thefts using key cloning or relay attacks, impacting the property of the vehicle owners [75643]. - Tesla acknowledged the vulnerability and rolled out security enhancements, such as PIN to Drive feature and software updates, to address the issue and prevent unauthorized use of vehicles [75643]. - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system could affect not only Tesla vehicles but also cars from other manufacturers using similar keyless entry systems [75643]. - The software fix for the vulnerability was implemented through over-the-air updates, demonstrating the impact on the security of the key fobs and the need for software patches to mitigate the risk of theft [88370]. - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system required Tesla to push out a software fix that would be delivered over-the-air to Tesla dashboards, highlighting the importance of software updates in addressing security flaws [88370]. - The software fix for the vulnerability allowed Tesla to update the key fobs wirelessly, changing their configuration via radio, showcasing the impact of software updates in enhancing the security of the keyless entry system [88370]. - The vulnerability in the key fob encryption system prompted Tesla to release an over-the-air software update to address the researchers' findings and improve the functionality and security of the cars and key fobs [88370]. - The software fix for the vulnerability involved implementing security updates to keyless entry modules and key fobs, demonstrating the impact of software patches in enhancing the security of the vehicles [88370].
Domain transportation, health (a) The failed system was related to the transportation industry, specifically affecting Tesla's vehicles by exploiting vulnerabilities in the keyless entry system of the Model S cars [88370, 75643, 75698]. (j) The incident also has implications for the health industry as it involves the security of vehicles that are used for transportation, potentially impacting the safety of individuals using the vehicles [88370, 75643, 75698]. (m) The incident is not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options provided.

Sources

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