| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in weapon systems being developed by the US military has happened again within the same organization, the Department of Defense. The Government Accountability Office's report highlighted that from 2012 to 2017, testers routinely found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems under development by the Department of Defense [76740].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in weapon systems is not explicitly mentioned to have happened at other organizations in the provided article. Therefore, there is no information available to suggest a similar incident occurring at multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article [76740]. The report by the Government Accountability Office highlighted that during the development of Pentagon weapons systems from 2012 to 2017, testers routinely found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems under development. One significant issue was that some weapon systems used commercial or open-source software but did not change the default password when the software was installed, making it easy for test teams to gain administrator privileges by looking up the password on the internet. This design flaw introduced a vulnerability that could be exploited by hackers.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the same article [76740]. Testers were able to hack into some of the complex weapons systems and take control over them using relatively simple tools and techniques. In one case, a two-person test team managed to gain initial access to a weapon system within one hour and full control within one day. This indicates that the operation or misuse of the systems could lead to significant vulnerabilities and potential cyber-attacks. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in the Pentagon weapons systems was primarily due to vulnerabilities originating from within the systems themselves. The report by the Government Accountability Office highlighted that testers were able to hack into the weapons systems and take control over them using relatively simple tools and techniques. One significant issue was the use of commercial or open source software without changing default passwords, which allowed testers to easily gain administrator privileges [76740].
(b) outside_system: The connectivity of the weapons systems to other systems was a contributing factor to the software failure incident. The interconnected nature of the systems made them vulnerable to cyber-attacks, as hackers could potentially access one system and then move on to others through the connecting networks. This external factor of connectivity increased the overall vulnerability of the weapons systems to cyber-attacks [76740]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incidents mentioned in the article are primarily attributed to vulnerabilities in the weapon systems themselves, such as using default passwords for commercial or open source software without changing them, which allowed testers to easily gain access and control over the systems [76740].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The article highlights that one of the reasons for the vulnerability of the Pentagon weapons systems to cyber-attacks is the lack of emphasis on cybersecurity during the development of these systems. The report mentions that cyber-security has only recently been emphasized when developing requirements for these systems, indicating a human factor contributing to the software failure incidents [76740]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
The article mentions that the vulnerability of the Pentagon weapons systems to cyber-attacks is partly due to their connectivity to other systems, which is seen as an advantage but also makes them vulnerable. The connectivity allows for information exchanges and sharing critical military information, but it also creates a pathway for potential hackers to gain access to multiple systems by penetrating just one connected system [76740].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
The article highlights that the vulnerability of the weapons systems was attributed to mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities found in nearly all weapon systems under development from 2012 to 2017. Testers were able to hack into these systems using relatively simple tools and techniques, such as exploiting default passwords that were not changed during software installation. The use of commercial or open-source software without changing default passwords allowed testers to gain administrator privileges, indicating a software-related vulnerability [76740]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident mentioned in the article is related to malicious intent. The article discusses how Pentagon weapons systems were found to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks, with testers being able to hack into these systems and take control using relatively simple tools and techniques. The vulnerabilities were exploited by testers who gained access to weapon systems by exploiting default passwords and other security weaknesses. This indicates that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced by humans with the intent to harm the system [76740]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to poor decisions is evident in the article as it highlights that the weapons systems developed by the US military from 2012 to 2017 were vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to various factors introduced by poor decisions. For example, the article mentions that testers found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems under development during that period. One of the reasons for the vulnerability was the use of commercial or open source software without changing default passwords, which allowed testers to easily gain access and control over the systems [76740]. Additionally, the article points out that the emphasis on cybersecurity in the development of these systems was lacking until recently, indicating a poor decision-making process in prioritizing cybersecurity measures [76740].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental decisions or mistakes is also evident in the article. Testers were able to hack into complex weapons systems and take control over them using relatively simple tools and techniques, indicating vulnerabilities introduced unintentionally due to oversight or lack of proper security measures [76740]. Furthermore, the article mentions that the connectivity of the weapons systems to other systems, although seen as an advantage, made them vulnerable to potential hackers who could exploit these connections to gain access to multiple systems. This unintended consequence of connectivity highlights the accidental decisions or oversights that contributed to the vulnerability of the systems [76740]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the report by the Government Accountability Office, which found that from 2012 to 2017, testers routinely discovered mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems under development by the Department of Defense [76740]. Testers were able to hack into these complex weapons systems using relatively simple tools and techniques, indicating a lack of robust security measures during the development phase. Additionally, the report highlighted instances where default passwords were not changed during the installation of commercial or open-source software, allowing testers to easily gain administrator privileges by looking up the passwords online [76740].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is demonstrated by the Pentagon's emphasis on strengthening its defensive posture through network hardening and improved cybersecurity in response to the vulnerabilities discovered in the weapon systems [76740]. The report also mentioned that the connectivity of these systems to other networks, although advantageous for information exchange, inadvertently increased their vulnerability to cyber-attacks. This accidental exposure to potential hackers due to interconnected systems highlights the unintended consequences of the design and development choices made during the creation of these weapons systems [76740]. |
| Duration |
unknown |
The articles do not provide specific information about the duration of the software failure incident in terms of being permanent or temporary. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The article mentions that during tests, testers were able to hack into some complex weapons systems and take control over them, indicating a potential crash of the system's intended functions [76740].
(b) omission: The article highlights that in some cases, weapon systems used commercial or open source software but did not change the default password, allowing testers to gain administrator privileges. This omission to change the default password led to a vulnerability in the system [76740].
(c) timing: The article does not specifically mention any failures related to timing issues.
(d) value: The article does not provide information about failures due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The article does not mention any failures related to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident could also be categorized as a vulnerability due to the system's susceptibility to cyber-attacks, as highlighted in the article [76740]. |