| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to Rowhammer attacks targeting ECC memory is a concerning development that has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The researchers at the VUSec research group at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam have published details of a next-generation Rowhammer ambush that can target ECC memory, which was previously thought to be immune to such attacks [77852].
(b) The software failure incident related to Rowhammer attacks targeting ECC memory is also a concerning development that has happened at multiple organizations or with their products and services. ECC memory, which is increasingly found in a diverse array of Internet of Things devices, is vulnerable to these attacks, potentially compromising data and security protections in devices like servers, routers, and firewalls [77852]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
The software failure incident discussed in the article [77852] is related to the design phase. The failure is attributed to the discovery of a next-generation Rowhammer attack that can target "error-correcting code" memory, which was previously thought to preempt Rowhammer's data manipulations. The researchers found ways to finesse established Rowhammer methods to work against ECC memory, which is used in systems requiring exceptional reliability like financial platforms. This failure highlights the vulnerability of ECC memory to Rowhammer attacks, despite its built-in defenses and self-correcting mechanisms. The attack undermines the data integrity of ECC memory, posing a significant threat to systems using ECC, including servers, routers, and critical infrastructure. The complexity of the attack and the challenges in defending against it underscore the design-related failure in ensuring the security and reliability of ECC memory systems. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is within_system. The Rowhammer attack targets ECC memory, which was previously thought to preempt Rowhammer's data manipulations due to its redundancies and self-correcting mechanisms [77852]. The attack involves strategically executing a program on a "row" of transistors in a computer's memory chip to cause bit flips and gain system access. The researchers found ways to finesse established Rowhammer methods to work against ECC memory as well, indicating that the failure originates from within the system itself. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to non-human actions, specifically the Rowhammer attack technique. This technique involves strategically executing a program on a "row" of transistors in a computer's memory chip to cause a bit to flip, altering the data stored in memory. The attack is described as a combination of digital and physical hacking, with researchers finding ways to target critical devices like servers and routers, as well as ECC memory which was previously thought to be immune to such attacks [77852].
(b) The software failure incident in the article is also related to human actions, as it discusses the researchers at VUSec research group at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam who published details of a next-generation Rowhammer attack that can target ECC memory. The researchers refined the attack and found ways to exploit vulnerabilities in ECC memory, which was previously considered to have self-correcting mechanisms to deal with data corruption. The researchers had to reverse engineer examples of ECC memory to understand how it works and develop possible defenses against the attack [77852]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the article where researchers at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam published details of a next-generation Rowhammer attack that can target "error-correcting code" memory, which was previously thought to preempt Rowhammer's data manipulations due to its redundancies and self-correcting mechanisms [77852]. This hardware-related vulnerability undermines the data integrity of ECC memory, which is commonly used in systems requiring exceptional reliability, such as financial platforms and critical infrastructure.
(b) The software failure incident related to software can be observed in the same article where the Rowhammer attack involves strategically executing a program over and over on a "row" of transistors in a computer's memory chip to cause bits to flip and alter the data stored in memory. The researchers found ways to finesse established Rowhammer methods to work against ECC memory, which was previously considered immune to such attacks, highlighting a software vulnerability in the memory systems [77852]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The Rowhammer attack technique discussed in the article involves strategically manipulating data in memory chips to gain unauthorized system access. The attack is described as a sophisticated and technical method that can be used by skilled attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in memory systems, including ECC memory used in critical devices like servers and routers. The attack is not accidental but rather a deliberate attempt to compromise data integrity, undermine security protections, and potentially allow attackers to gain more access to targeted systems [77852]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
[a] The intent of the software failure incident described in the article is not related to poor decisions or intentional actions. Instead, it focuses on the technical aspects of the Rowhammer attack and the vulnerabilities it exploits in ECC memory chips. The failure is a result of the sophisticated techniques used by attackers to manipulate data in memory chips, rather than being caused by poor or intentional decisions [77852]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. Therefore, there is no information available to suggest that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced due to lack of professional competence by humans or the development organization.
(b) The software failure incident related to an accidental factor is evident in the article. The article discusses the Rowhammer attack technique, which involves strategically executing a program on a computer's memory chip to cause bits to flip and alter data stored in memory. The researchers at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam discovered a next-generation Rowhammer attack that can target error-correcting code (ECC) memory, which was previously thought to preempt Rowhammer's data manipulations. The unintended indicator of the vulnerability in ECC memory was discovered through a side channel signal, allowing attackers to map their target bits and potentially compromise data without physical access to the target system. This accidental vulnerability in ECC memory highlights a failure introduced accidentally [77852]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The article discusses a specific technique called "Rowhammer" that has been refined and expanded over time to target critical devices like servers and routers, including those with components previously thought to be immune [77852]. The researchers at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam published details of a next-generation Rowhammer attack that can target "error-correcting code" memory, which was previously considered to preempt Rowhammer's data manipulations [77852]. The attack on ECC memory was found to be difficult to defend against without redesigning and replacing memory chips, indicating a temporary failure that can be mitigated with specific defenses [77852]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The Rowhammer attack manipulates data stored in memory, causing bits to flip from one position to another, altering the data and potentially compromising data integrity and security protections [77852].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident is related to a sophisticated attack known as Rowhammer, which involves strategically executing a program on a "row" of transistors in a computer's memory chip to manipulate data and gain system access. This behavior falls under the category of a targeted and complex cyber attack rather than a simple software failure [77852]. |