Incident: Security Flaws in 4G and 5G Networks Allow Intercepting Calls.

Published Date: 2019-02-25

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident of vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks, including Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, was reported on February 25, 2019, in Article 81139.
System 1. Cellular paging protocols in 4G and 5G networks [81139]
Responsible Organization 1. The vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks were caused by flaws in the cellular paging protocols, allowing attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations [81139].
Impacted Organization 1. Mobile carriers including AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile were impacted by the software failure incident [81139].
Software Causes 1. Vulnerabilities in the cellular paging protocols of both 4G and 5G networks allowed for the exploitation of flaws in the network's paging protocol, leading to the Torpedo attack, Piercer attack, and IMSI-Cracking attack [81139].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of robust security measures in cellular paging protocols allowing for vulnerabilities to be exploited [81139].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident allowed attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track the location of users on both 4G and 5G networks [81139]. 2. The vulnerabilities discovered in the networks could lead to privacy breaches and potential surveillance of individuals without their knowledge or consent [81139]. 3. The flaws exposed a significant security risk for users of major U.S. carriers, including AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile, potentially affecting a large number of individuals [81139]. 4. The incident highlighted the need for improved security measures in cellular networks, especially with the upcoming launch of 5G networks worldwide [81139].
Preventions 1. Implementing robust security measures during the design and development of the cellular paging protocols to prevent vulnerabilities like Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking [81139]. 2. Regularly conducting security audits and penetration testing on 4G and 5G networks to identify and address potential security flaws before they can be exploited by attackers [81139]. 3. Enhancing encryption techniques and authentication mechanisms to protect sensitive information such as IMSI and user locations from being compromised [81139]. 4. Collaborating with industry organizations like GSMA to establish and enforce security standards across all mobile carriers to ensure consistent protection against security threats [81139].
Fixes 1. The GSMA, which sets the telecom industry's cellular standards, is able to fix the Torpedo and IMSI-Cracking vulnerabilities [81139]. 2. Carriers affected by the Piercer flaw can fix this vulnerability [81139].
References 1. Researchers from Purdue University and University of Iowa [81139]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in 4G and 5G networks has affected multiple organizations. The vulnerabilities discovered by researchers from Purdue University and University of Iowa impact all four major U.S. carriers - AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile [81139]. These carriers are reportedly affected by the Torpedo flaw, which allows attackers to track the victim's location by exploiting a flaw in the network's paging protocol. Additionally, one major carrier is affected by the Piercer flaw, which enables attackers to associate a victim's phone number with their international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) [81139]. (b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in 4G and 5G networks has not been explicitly mentioned to have occurred at other organizations in the articles provided.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the discovery of three new vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks. These vulnerabilities could allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations. The vulnerabilities, named Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, exploit flaws in the network's paging protocol and the association of phone numbers with IMSI, enabling attackers to track users' locations and intercept communications [81139]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the fact that attackers can carry out these attacks with just a little knowledge of cellular paging protocols. The Torpedo attack, for example, takes advantage of a flaw in the network's paging protocol, allowing attackers to track victims' locations by placing and canceling a flurry of phone calls over a short time period. This flaw in the operation of the network's paging system enables the attack to go unnoticed by the phone owner [81139].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the article is primarily within the system. The vulnerabilities discovered in both 4G and 5G networks, such as Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, are inherent flaws within the cellular paging protocols and network systems themselves. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track users' locations by exploiting weaknesses in the network's paging protocol and encryption methods [81139].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: The software failure incident in this case is related to vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks that could allow interception of phone calls, fake text messages, and tracking of location. The vulnerabilities include the Torpedo attack, Piercer attack, and IMSI-Cracking attack. These vulnerabilities are due to flaws in the network's paging protocol and the ability to associate a phone number with the device's IMSI, as well as the ability to crack the device owner's IMSI on a 5G network. These vulnerabilities were discovered by researchers from Purdue University and University of Iowa [81139]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: The software failure incident in this case is not directly attributed to human actions but rather to vulnerabilities in the network protocols and encryption methods used in 4G and 5G networks. The vulnerabilities were discovered by researchers and were not intentionally introduced by human actions but rather existed as flaws in the system that could be exploited by attackers with knowledge of cellular paging protocols [81139].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The article does not mention any specific hardware-related issues contributing to the vulnerabilities in the 4G and 5G networks. It primarily focuses on the vulnerabilities in the network protocols and how attackers can exploit them to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations [81139]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks, such as Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, are primarily caused by flaws in the network protocols and cellular paging systems. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to exploit the software systems to intercept communications and track users' locations [81139].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The vulnerabilities discovered in both 4G and 5G networks allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, track locations, associate phone numbers with IMSI, crack encrypted data, and conduct various forms of snooping. These attacks were identified by researchers from Purdue University and University of Iowa, and they highlighted the potential for malicious actors to exploit these vulnerabilities for harmful purposes [81139].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) unknown (a) The software failure incident described in the article is primarily related to poor_decisions. The vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks that allowed for intercepting phone calls, faking text messages, and tracking locations were a result of flaws in the network's paging protocol and the association of phone numbers with IMSI. These vulnerabilities were exploited due to inherent weaknesses in the cellular paging protocols and the ability to crack encrypted data through brute force attacks. The flaws were reported to the GSMA for resolution [81139].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the discovery of three new vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks. The vulnerabilities, named Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, were identified by researchers from Purdue University and University of Iowa [81139]. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track the location of users. The flaws were reported to the GSMA for resolution, indicating that the security weaknesses were a result of development incompetence leading to the exploitation of cellular paging protocols and encryption methods. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is demonstrated by the unintended consequences of the vulnerabilities discovered in the 4G and 5G networks. For example, the Torpedo attack took advantage of a flaw in the network's paging protocol, allowing attackers to track the victim's location by sending paging messages without alerting the phone owner to an incoming call [81139]. This unintended consequence of the flaw highlights how accidental factors, such as overlooked vulnerabilities in network protocols, can lead to security breaches and exploitation by malicious actors.
Duration temporary The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The vulnerabilities discovered in the 4G and 5G networks, such as Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, are specific weaknesses that can be exploited under certain circumstances by attackers. These vulnerabilities were identified by researchers from Purdue University and the University of Iowa, and they have been reported to the GSMA for potential fixes [81139].
Behaviour value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The vulnerabilities discovered in the 4G and 5G networks allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations, indicating that the systems are still operational despite the security flaws [81139]. (b) omission: The vulnerabilities in the 4G and 5G networks allow attackers to perform actions such as intercepting phone calls, faking text messages, and tracking locations. These actions indicate that the systems are not omitting their intended functions but rather being exploited to perform unauthorized actions [81139]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not involve a timing issue where the system performs its intended functions but at the wrong time. The vulnerabilities discovered in the networks allow attackers to carry out unauthorized actions, indicating that the system is responding to these actions but not in the intended manner [81139]. (d) value: The vulnerabilities in the 4G and 5G networks allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations. These actions indicate that the systems are performing their intended functions incorrectly by allowing unauthorized access and manipulation of data [81139]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerabilities discovered in the networks allow attackers to exploit specific flaws to intercept communications and track locations consistently, indicating a systematic vulnerability rather than erratic behavior [81139]. (f) other: The software failure incident involves security vulnerabilities in the 4G and 5G networks that enable attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations. This behavior can be categorized as a security breach or exploitation of weaknesses rather than a specific failure mode like crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine behavior [81139].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception sensor, network_communication (a) sensor: The software failure incident reported in Article 81139 is related to vulnerabilities in 4G and 5G networks that could allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations. The vulnerabilities discovered by researchers involve flaws in the network's paging protocol, which is responsible for notifying phones of incoming calls and texts. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to exploit the paging protocol to track victims' locations. This indicates a failure related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system, specifically involving sensor-related issues in the network's communication protocols [81139].
Communication connectivity_level The software failure incident reported in Article 81139 is related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed at the connectivity_level. The vulnerabilities discovered in both 4G and 5G networks allowed attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations by exploiting flaws in the network's paging protocol and associating phone numbers with IMSI identifiers. These vulnerabilities were present at the network or transport layer, indicating a failure related to the connectivity level of the cyber physical system [81139].
Application FALSE The software failure incident described in the article [81139] is related to vulnerabilities in both 4G and 5G networks that could allow attackers to intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track locations. These vulnerabilities were discovered by researchers from Purdue University and University of Iowa. The attacks mentioned in the article, such as Torpedo, Piercer, and IMSI-Cracking, target the network's paging protocol and the device's IMSI, enabling attackers to carry out various malicious activities. This failure is not specifically related to the application layer of the cyber physical system but rather involves flaws in the network protocols and system design.

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence harm, property, theoretical_consequence (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure The software failure incident described in the articles led to physical harm as attackers could intercept phone calls, fake text messages, and track individuals' locations. This vulnerability allowed for potential harm to individuals as their privacy and security were compromised [81139].
Domain unknown (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is related to the telecommunications industry, specifically affecting 4G and 5G networks. The vulnerabilities discovered by researchers could potentially compromise phone calls, text messages, and location tracking within these networks [81139].

Sources

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