| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the breach of traveler photos at U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) involved a subcontractor named Perceptics. The breach occurred when copies of "license plate images and traveler images collected by CBP" were transferred to the subcontractor's company network, violating CBP's security and privacy rules. The subcontractor's network was then attacked and breached [85795].
(b) The incident involving the breach of traveler photos at CBP raises concerns about the security and privacy of sensitive information collected by government agencies and their contractors. This incident highlights the risks associated with the government's expanding database of identifying imagery, making it an alluring target for hackers and cybercriminals. The breach at CBP comes at a time when the government is seeking to expand its face recognition apparatus and collection of sensitive information from travelers, including license plate information and social media identifiers [85795]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The breach of traveler photos and license plates was a result of a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor, Perceptics, which was involved in refining algorithms to match license plates with the faces of car occupants. This activity was outside of CBP's sanctioned use, indicating a failure due to contributing factors introduced by system development and procedures to operate the system [85795].
(b) The software failure incident is also related to the operation phase. The breach occurred because copies of license plate images and traveler images collected by CBP were transferred to the subcontractor's company network, violating the agency's security and privacy rules. This breach was a result of the operation or misuse of the system, where the subcontractor's network was attacked and breached, leading to the compromise of sensitive information [85795]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as both within_system and outside_system:
(a) within_system: The breach involving the compromise of photos of travelers' faces and license plates was a result of a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor, which led to the theft of image data transferred to the subcontractor's company network, violating CBP's security and privacy rules [85795].
(b) outside_system: The breach was facilitated by the subcontractor, Perceptics, attempting to use the stolen data to refine its algorithms to match license plates with the faces of a car's occupants, which was outside of CBP's sanctioned use. This indicates that the breach was also influenced by factors originating from outside the system, involving the actions of the subcontractor [85795]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor that compromised photos of travelers, including faces and license plates, used by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for their facial recognition program [85795].
(b) Human actions also played a role in the incident as it was mentioned that the subcontractor's network was attacked and breached after copies of license plate and traveler images collected by CBP were transferred to the subcontractor's company network, violating the agency's security and privacy rules [85795]. Additionally, there were concerns raised about the subcontractor, Perceptics, attempting to use the stolen data to refine its algorithms for matching license plates with faces, which was outside of CBP's sanctioned use [85795]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily related to a breach in security and privacy due to a cyberattack on a federal subcontractor, leading to the compromise of photos of travelers, including their faces and license plates [85795]. This breach was a result of a malicious cyberattack on the subcontractor's network, violating the agency's security and privacy rules [85795].
(b) The incident also involves software-related factors as the breach occurred through the transfer of "license plate images and traveler images collected by CBP" to the subcontractor's company network, which violated the agency's security and privacy rules [85795]. Additionally, the breach involved the misuse of data by the subcontractor to refine algorithms for matching license plates with the faces of car occupants, which was outside of CBP's sanctioned use [85795]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 85795 was malicious in nature. The incident involved a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor that compromised photos of travelers, including their faces and license plates. The breach was described as a "major incident" and involved the theft of data by a third party with the intent to refine algorithms for unauthorized purposes, such as matching license plates with the faces of car occupants. The breach was not attributed to a foreign nation but was a deliberate attack on the system [85795]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
The intent of the software failure incident can be categorized as both poor_decisions and accidental_decisions based on the information provided in the articles.
1. Poor Decisions:
The incident involved a breach of photos of travelers due to a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor, leading to the compromise of images including faces and license plates [85795]. The breach occurred as the subcontractor's network was attacked and breached after copies of license plate and traveler images collected by CBP were transferred to the subcontractor's company network, violating security and privacy rules [85795]. Additionally, there were concerns that the subcontractor, Perceptics, was attempting to use the stolen data to refine its algorithms to match license plates with the faces of a car's occupants, which was outside of CBP's sanctioned use [85795].
2. Accidental Decisions:
The breach was not intentional but resulted from the subcontractor's network being attacked after the transfer of images, violating security and privacy rules [85795]. The breach was described as a "major incident" within CBP, indicating that it was not a planned event [85795]. Additionally, the breach did not involve a foreign nation but was a result of the subcontractor's actions [85795].
Therefore, the software failure incident involved poor decisions in terms of data handling and potential misuse of the stolen data by the subcontractor, as well as accidental decisions leading to the breach due to inadequate security measures and violations of privacy rules. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was not directly attributed to development incompetence. The breach of traveler photos and license plates was a result of a malicious cyberattack on a federal subcontractor, leading to the compromise of sensitive information. The incident involved the transfer of "license plate images and traveler images collected by CBP" to the subcontractor's company network, which violated the agency's security and privacy rules [85795].
(b) The software failure incident in the article was accidental in nature. The breach of traveler photos and license plates occurred as a result of a cyberattack on a federal subcontractor's network, which was not intended or caused by the development incompetence of individuals or organizations. The breach was described as a "major incident" within CBP, and the stolen information was not identified on the Dark Web or Internet initially [85795]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in the articles is temporary. The breach of photos of travelers, including faces and license plates, was a result of a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor [85795]. The breach was discovered on May 31, and the stolen information did not include other identifying information beyond the compromised photos. Additionally, the breach did not involve a foreign nation and was not a permanent failure but rather a specific incident caused by the cyberattack on the subcontractor's network. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The breach involved the compromise of photos of travelers due to a "malicious cyberattack" on a federal subcontractor's network, resulting in the system losing its state and not performing its intended function of securely storing and protecting the images [Article 85795].
(b) omission: The incident can also be categorized as an omission. The breach occurred because copies of "license plate images and traveler images collected by CBP" were transferred to the subcontractor's company network, violating security and privacy rules, which led to the system omitting its intended function of safeguarding the sensitive data [Article 85795].
(c) timing: There is no indication in the article that the software failure incident was related to timing issues.
(d) value: The incident does not align with a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The incident does not align with a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article can be further described as a breach of security protocols leading to unauthorized access and compromise of sensitive data, which is a critical aspect of the incident not covered by the options provided. |