| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to potential hacking into medical devices used in NHS hospitals has happened before within the same organization. The article mentions that concerns over the security of NHS computer systems have been rife ever since more than a third of hospital trusts had their systems crippled in the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017 [85693].
(b) The software failure incident related to potential hacking into medical devices used in NHS hospitals has also happened at other organizations. The article mentions that the US-based cybersecurity firm CyberMDX identified security flaws in hospital wards' workstations connected to the internet, indicating a broader vulnerability across multiple organizations [85693]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the security flaws discovered in hospital workstations connected to the internet, which could allow cybercriminals to gain access to medical software controlling IV pumps and potentially harm patients by disrupting drug delivery [85693].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017, where the NHS systems were crippled due to the lack of basic security against cyber attackers, leading to the cancellation of thousands of hospital appointments and the disruption of essential healthcare services [85693]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily within the system. The security flaws in hospital workstations connected to the internet, the vulnerability of medical software to hacking, and the potential consequences such as disrupting the flow of electricity to care-critical infusion pumps and altering drug delivery all point to internal system vulnerabilities [85693]. Additionally, the previously disclosed error in the Microsoft Windows CE operating system, which contributed to the flawed system, is an internal factor [85693]. The slow installation of software updates to reduce the risk of hacking due to lack of understanding, insufficient resources, or the sheer number of devices that need to be updated also falls within the system [85693]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in the NHS hospitals was due to security flaws in hospital workstations connected to the internet, allowing cybercriminals to potentially hack into medical devices like IV pumps and disrupt the delivery of chemotherapy drugs or tamper with insulin doses [85693].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The risk of the software failure incident was exacerbated by the slow installation of software updates that could reduce the risk of hacking. This delay was attributed to factors like a lack of understanding, insufficient resources, or the sheer number of devices that needed to be updated [85693]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to a security flaw in hospital workstations connected to the internet, which are used in NHS hospitals. The flaw in the workstations, which are connected to IV pumps, could potentially allow cybercriminals to control and cut off IV pumps, leading to catastrophic consequences such as blocking the delivery of chemotherapy drugs or tampering with insulin doses [85693].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
The software failure incident is also attributed to a previously disclosed error in the Microsoft Windows CE operating system, which contributed to the flawed system in the workstations made by Becton Dickinson. The slow installation of software updates that could reduce the risk of hacking is mentioned as a contributing factor due to reasons like a lack of understanding, insufficient resources, or the sheer number of devices that need to be updated [85693]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the security flaws in hospital workstations connected to the internet, which could allow cybercriminals to hack into medical devices used in NHS hospitals, falls under the category of a malicious objective. The incident involves the potential for hackers to gain access to medical software controlling IV pumps, which could lead to catastrophic consequences such as blocking the delivery of chemotherapy drugs or tampering with insulin doses [85693].
(b) On the other hand, the software failure incident related to the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017, which affected a significant number of hospital trusts and led to the cancellation of thousands of appointments, falls under the category of a non-malicious objective. This incident was caused by the spread of the ransomware via email, locking staff out of their computers and demanding payment to release files, resulting in disruptions to hospital operations and patient care [85693]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the article where it mentions that concerns over the security of NHS computer systems have been rife ever since more than a third of hospital trusts had their systems crippled in the WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017. The report reveals that nearly 19,500 medical appointments were cancelled, including 139 potential cancer referrals, and five hospitals had to divert ambulances away at the peak of the crisis due to the failure to provide basic security against cyber attackers [85693]. Additionally, the article highlights that software updates that reduce the risk of hacking are often slow to be installed due to a lack of understanding, insufficient resources, or the sheer number of devices that need to be 'fixed' [85693]. These instances point towards poor decisions or negligence contributing to the software failure incident. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it highlights security flaws in hospital workstations connected to the internet, which could allow cybercriminals to gain access to medical software controlling IV pumps [85693]. The flaws in the system were attributed to a previously disclosed error in the Microsoft Windows CE operating system, indicating a lack of professional competence in addressing and mitigating known vulnerabilities. Additionally, the slow installation of software updates to reduce the risk of hacking was mentioned, pointing towards potential shortcomings in the development and maintenance processes.
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is also apparent in the article, particularly in the context of the WannaCry ransomware attack that affected NHS hospital trusts in 2017 [85693]. The attack, which spread via email and locked staff out of their computers, was described as ripping through the out-of-date defenses used by the NHS, indicating an accidental exposure to vulnerabilities due to inadequate security measures. The report also mentioned that the cyber-attack could have been easily prevented, suggesting that the incident was not intentional but rather a result of negligence or oversight in maintaining secure systems. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more likely to be temporary rather than permanent. The incident involves security flaws in hospital workstations connected to the internet, which could potentially allow cybercriminals to hack into medical devices and disrupt the delivery of medications to patients [85693]. The vulnerability in the system is attributed to a previously disclosed error in the Microsoft Windows CE operating system, indicating a specific contributing factor that can be addressed through software updates [85693]. Additionally, the articles mention that software updates to reduce the risk of hacking are often slow to be installed due to various reasons such as lack of understanding, insufficient resources, or the sheer number of devices that need to be updated [85693]. This suggests that the failure is not permanent but rather temporary and can be mitigated through appropriate measures. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles does not specifically describe a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [85693].
(b) omission: The incident does not mention a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [85693].
(c) timing: The incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early [85693].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [85693].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not describe a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [85693].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the articles can be categorized as a potential security vulnerability where cybercriminals could hack into medical devices used in NHS hospitals, gaining access to medical software that would enable them to control and cut off IV pumps, potentially leading to catastrophic consequences [85693]. |