Incident: Security Vulnerability in Dormakaba's Electronic Safe Locks.

Published Date: 2019-08-09

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the vulnerability in Dormakaba's electronic safe locks, as reported in Article 88373, happened over the last two and a half years, with the researcher Mike Davis presenting his findings at the Defcon hacker conference on a Friday [88373]. 2. Published on 2019-08-09, the incident likely occurred between early 2017 and mid-2019.
System 1. Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks, specifically the Cencon locks and Auditcon locks [88373] 2. X-08 and X-09 locks from the Kaba Mas X-0 series [88373]
Responsible Organization 1. The software failure incident was caused by a design flaw in the electronic safe locks manufactured by Switzerland-based lock giant Dormakaba, specifically the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks [88373].
Impacted Organization 1. Department of Defense facilities 2. ATM safes 3. Pharmacy drug cabinets 4. Government customers including the Pentagon, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force One, and US nuclear submarines [88373]
Software Causes 1. The software failure incident was caused by a design flaw in the electronic safe locks manufactured by Dormakaba, specifically in the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks used in ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and Department of Defense facilities [88373].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of hardware capable of encrypting the locks' combinations to prevent the attack [88373]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident allowed a security researcher to crack three different types of high-security electronic combination locks sold by Dormakaba, including locks used to secure ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and even Department of Defense facilities [88373]. 2. The vulnerability in the electronic safe locks allowed the researcher to open many ATM and pharmacy locks in as little as five minutes using an oscilloscope and a laptop, leaving no physical trace other than the safe's contents disappearing [88373]. 3. The incident exposed a design flaw in the electronic safe locks, allowing the researcher to leverage a pattern to generate a combination to unlock the safe, compromising the security of millions of locks worldwide [88373]. 4. The software failure incident revealed that the affected locks transferred their unique combination from EEPROM memory chips to their processor when turned on, enabling the researcher to deduce combinations by studying the lock's internal voltage changes during boot-up [88373]. 5. The incident highlighted that even locks intended for government customers, such as the X-0 series used in sensitive settings like the Pentagon, the National Security Agency, and Air Force One, were vulnerable to the voltage leaking attack, potentially compromising high-security locations [88373].
Preventions 1. Implementing hardware encryption for the locks' combinations to prevent attacks like the voltage leaking technique used by the hacker [88373]. 2. Regularly updating the software of the locks to patch any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [88373]. 3. Conducting thorough security assessments and testing on the locks to identify and address any potential weaknesses before they can be exploited [88373].
Fixes 1. Implementing hardware capable of encrypting the locks' combinations to prevent attacks like the one demonstrated by Mike Davis [88373]. 2. Developing and deploying software updates across millions of locks to prevent similar attacks [88373]. 3. Enhancing security measures and implementing multiple layers of security as a physical security best practice, as suggested by the General Services Administration [88373].
References 1. Security researcher Mike Davis at the Defcon hacker conference [88373] 2. Dormakaba, the Switzerland-based lock giant that sells the electronic safe locks [88373] 3. Dormakaba's marketing materials [88373] 4. General Services Administration (GSA) [88373]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to cracking electronic safe locks has happened again within the same organization, Dormakaba. Security researcher Mike Davis presented the results of his research into a family of electronic safe locks sold by Dormakaba at the Defcon hacker conference. Davis found techniques to crack three different types of the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks sold by Dormakaba, including those used for securing ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and Department of Defense facilities [88373]. (b) The software failure incident related to cracking electronic safe locks has also happened at multiple organizations. The vulnerability identified by Mike Davis affects millions of locks around the world, including those used by ATM manufacturers and in pharmacies. The General Services Administration, which handles the acquisition of technology like Dormakaba's locks for government agencies, has worked to address Davis' findings after he shared them. This indicates that the vulnerability is not limited to a single organization but has implications for various entities using similar electronic safe locks [88373].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. Security researcher Mike Davis identified a design flaw in a family of electronic safe locks sold by Dormakaba, specifically the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks used for securing ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and Department of Defense facilities. Davis found techniques to crack these locks by leveraging a design flaw in the locks' electronic components, allowing him to deduce combinations by studying internal voltage changes when the locks boot up. This design flaw enabled Davis to generate combinations to unlock the safes, highlighting a vulnerability introduced during the system development phase [88373]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also apparent in the article. Despite the locks being marketed as high-security electronic combination locks, Davis was able to open many of them in as little as five minutes with nothing more than an oscilloscope and a laptop. This operation failure was due to the vulnerability in the locks' operation, where Davis could easily access the locks' internal components and extract the necessary information to unlock the safes. Additionally, Davis demonstrated that even security settings like two-factor authentication could be bypassed, indicating a failure in the operation or misuse of the system [88373].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is primarily due to a design flaw within the electronic safe locks manufactured by Dormakaba. Security researcher Mike Davis identified a pattern in the design of the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks that allowed him to crack them using power analysis techniques. This flaw originates from within the system itself, as it involves vulnerabilities in the lock's electronic components and the way they handle and transfer combinations [88373]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident does not seem to be primarily caused by factors originating from outside the system. The vulnerability exploited by the security researcher was related to the design and implementation of the electronic safe locks themselves, rather than external factors such as cyberattacks or external interference [88373].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a design flaw in the electronic safe locks manufactured by Dormakaba. Security researcher Mike Davis discovered a vulnerability in the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks that allowed him to crack them using an oscilloscope and a laptop. By analyzing the voltage changes in the locks' electronic components, Davis was able to deduce the combinations and unlock the safes without leaving any physical trace [88373]. (b) On the other hand, human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. Davis, the security researcher, actively researched and developed techniques to exploit the design flaw in the electronic safe locks. He presented his findings at the Defcon hacker conference and shared details about how he could crack the locks, potentially exposing millions of locks around the world to security risks. Additionally, Davis informed Dormakaba about the vulnerabilities in their locks, prompting discussions about potential fixes and mitigation strategies [88373].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware (a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to hardware. The security researcher, Mike Davis, discovered a vulnerability in electronic safe locks manufactured by Dormakaba, specifically the Kaba Mas high-security electronic combination locks used in various settings such as ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and government facilities [88373]. Davis found that by using an oscilloscope and probing the electronic components of the locks, he could extract the lock's combination by studying the internal voltage changes when the lock boots up. This hardware vulnerability allowed him to obtain the combinations and unlock the safes without leaving any physical trace [88373]. (b) The software failure incident is not directly related to software issues but rather to a hardware vulnerability in the electronic safe locks. Davis exploited a design flaw in the locks that allowed him to extract the lock's combination by analyzing the voltage leakage from the lock's electronic components when it boots up. This vulnerability in the hardware design of the locks enabled Davis to crack the locks and open them without the correct combination, showcasing a weakness in the security of the electronic locks [88373].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. Security researcher Mike Davis discovered a design flaw in electronic safe locks sold by Dormakaba, allowing him to crack the locks and open them in as little as five minutes using an oscilloscope and a laptop. By analyzing voltage changes in the locks' internal components, Davis was able to deduce the combinations and unlock the safes without leaving any physical trace. This incident demonstrates how vulnerabilities in the software were exploited by a human with the intent to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized access to the safes [88373]. (b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by unintentional errors or faults in the software itself. Instead, the failure was a result of a deliberate discovery of a flaw in the design of the electronic safe locks, which was then exploited by the security researcher to demonstrate the vulnerability of the locks. The incident was not a random occurrence but rather a targeted effort to expose the weaknesses in the security mechanisms of the locks [88373].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) unknown (a) The intent of the software failure incident: The software failure incident described in the article was not due to poor decisions but rather due to vulnerabilities and design flaws in the electronic safe locks manufactured by Dormakaba. The security researcher, Mike Davis, identified a design flaw in the electronic safe locks that allowed him to crack the locks and obtain their combinations using power analysis techniques with oscilloscope probes. This incident was not a result of poor decisions but rather a flaw in the design and implementation of the locks by the manufacturer [88373].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, unknown (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as security researcher Mike Davis discovered a design flaw in the electronic safe locks sold by Dormakaba. Davis found techniques to crack three different types of high-security electronic combination locks, including those used to secure ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and even Department of Defense facilities. He was able to open many of these locks in as little as five minutes using an oscilloscope and a laptop, exploiting a vulnerability in the locks' electronic components [88373]. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article.
Duration permanent The software failure incident described in the article is more likely to be categorized as a permanent failure. This is because the security researcher, Mike Davis, identified a design flaw in the electronic safe locks manufactured by Dormakaba, which allowed him to crack the locks and open them in as little as five minutes using specific techniques involving oscilloscope probes and power analysis. Davis was able to extract the lock's combination by studying the lock's internal voltage changes when it boots up, indicating a fundamental flaw in the design of the locks [88373]. Additionally, Davis found vulnerabilities in different models of the electronic safe locks, including the Cencon locks used on ATMs and the Auditcon locks used in pharmacies, as well as the X-0 series intended for government customers. Despite some locks using AES encryption to protect the combination, Davis was able to develop techniques to extract the lock's data, indicating a systemic issue in the security of the locks [88373]. Therefore, based on the information provided in the article, the software failure incident can be considered a permanent failure due to inherent design flaws and vulnerabilities in the electronic safe locks that compromise their security.
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident involves a security researcher, Mike Davis, demonstrating how he could crack electronic safe locks by exploiting a design flaw in the locks' electronic components [88373]. (b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the incident revolves around the exploitation of a vulnerability in the electronic safe locks to extract their combinations without physical trace [88373]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident is centered around the security researcher's ability to extract lock combinations by analyzing voltage changes in the locks' electronic components during boot-up [88373]. (d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The incident is about exploiting a design flaw in the electronic safe locks to obtain their combinations without authorization [88373]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident is focused on the security researcher's successful exploitation of a vulnerability in the electronic safe locks to bypass their security mechanisms [88373]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability exploit. The incident involves the security researcher, Mike Davis, leveraging a design flaw in electronic safe locks to extract their combinations without physical trace, potentially compromising the security of the locks [88373].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The consequence of the software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to property. The vulnerability in the electronic safe locks allowed a security researcher, Mike Davis, to crack the locks and open them in a matter of minutes using an oscilloscope and a laptop. This flaw in the locks' design enabled unauthorized access to safes securing ATM vaults, pharmacy drug cabinets, and even Department of Defense facilities, potentially leading to the loss of valuable contents stored in these safes [88373].
Domain information, finance, government (a) The failed system was intended to support the information industry as it involved electronic safe locks used for securing ATM safes, pharmacy drug cabinets, and even Department of Defense facilities [88373]. (h) The failed system also had implications for the finance industry as it involved cracking electronic safe locks used in ATMs, which are crucial for manipulating and moving money for profit [88373]. (l) Additionally, the failed system was related to the government industry as it involved electronic safe locks used in sensitive government settings such as the Pentagon, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force One, and even to protect launch codes on US nuclear submarines [88373].

Sources

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