| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in GSM encryption keys has happened again within the same organization, Blackberry. The researchers from Blackberry presented an attack at the DefCon security conference in Las Vegas that can intercept some GSM calls on 2G networks and decrypt them, revealing flaws in the encryption key exchange process [88041].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in GSM encryption keys has also happened at multiple organizations or with their products and services. The weaknesses found in GSM implementations up to 5G are not specific to one organization but are inherent in the GSM standard itself. The vulnerabilities exist in some 2G implementations and affect the encryption key exchange process used by various organizations utilizing GSM technology [88041]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the vulnerability found in GSM encryption key exchange, specifically in the error control mechanisms governing how the keys are encoded. The flaw in the encryption key exchange that establishes a secure connection between a phone and a nearby cell tower every time a call is initiated makes the keys vulnerable to a cracking attack [88041].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the ability of hackers to intercept call connections in a given area, capture key exchanges between phones and cellular base stations, digitally record calls in their encrypted form, crack the keys, and then decrypt the calls. This operation-based failure allows attackers to exploit weaknesses in the system's operation to compromise call privacy [88041]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is primarily within the system. The vulnerability in the GSM standard, specifically in the encryption key exchange process, is a flaw that exists within the GSM implementations themselves. The error control mechanisms governing how the keys are encoded were found to be flawed, making the keys vulnerable to a cracking attack [88041]. The weaknesses identified by the researchers are inherent to the GSM standard and its implementations, indicating an internal system issue.
(b) Additionally, the article mentions that there are already other known attacks against GSM that are easier to carry out in practice, such as using malicious base stations to intercept calls or track a cell phone's location. These attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities in the GSM protocol, can be considered as contributing factors originating from outside the system [88041]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to non-human actions. The vulnerability in the GSM standard that allows for intercepting and decrypting some GSM calls on 2G networks was identified by researchers from BlackBerry. This vulnerability has been present for decades and is attributed to flaws in the encryption key exchange process between phones and cellular base stations, making the keys vulnerable to cracking attacks [88041].
(b) The software failure incident is also related to human actions. The weaknesses in the GSM implementation, particularly in the error control mechanisms governing key encoding, were identified by researchers who analyzed the standards, implementations, and reverse-engineered the key exchange process. The researchers highlighted that the security engineering process behind the implementation failed, leading to the exploitation of the vulnerabilities by potential hackers [88041]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The vulnerability in GSM calls on 2G networks, allowing interception and decryption of calls, is a result of flaws in the encryption key exchange process between phones and cell towers [88041].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The weaknesses in the encryption key exchange process in GSM implementations, specifically in the error control mechanisms governing key encoding, led to the vulnerability that allowed hackers to intercept and decrypt calls [88041]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. Researchers from BlackBerry presented an attack at the DefCon security conference that can intercept some GSM calls on 2G networks, decrypt them, and listen to the conversations. The attack exploits vulnerabilities in the encryption key exchange process, allowing hackers to intercept call connections, capture key exchanges, crack the keys, and decrypt the calls with malicious intent [88041]. Additionally, the article mentions other known attacks against GSM, such as using malicious base stations to intercept calls or track cell phone locations, highlighting the malicious nature of the software failure incident. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
The intent of the software failure incident discussed in the article is related to poor_decisions. The vulnerability in the GSM standard, particularly in the encryption key exchange process, was identified as a result of flaws in the error control mechanisms governing how the keys are encoded. The article mentions that the security engineering process behind the implementation failed, leading to the exposure of vulnerabilities in GSM implementations [88041]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the vulnerability found in GSM implementations up to 5G. Researchers from BlackBerry discovered flaws in the encryption key exchange process in GSM calls, making the keys vulnerable to cracking attacks. This vulnerability has been around for decades, indicating a historical flaw in the design and implementation of the GSM standard [88041].
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is highlighted in the unintentional exposure of the vulnerabilities in GSM implementations. Despite efforts to create security measures, the security engineering process behind the implementation failed, leading to the discovery of weaknesses in the error control mechanisms governing key encoding. This unintentional exposure allowed hackers to intercept call connections, capture key exchanges, and decrypt calls [88041]. |
| Duration |
unknown |
The software failure incident described in the article does not directly align with the traditional definitions of permanent or temporary software failure incidents. The vulnerability in the GSM standard highlighted in the article is more related to a long-standing flaw in the encryption key exchange process rather than a specific incident with a defined duration. Therefore, the concept of permanent or temporary software failure incidents does not apply in this context. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The article does not mention any software crashes where the system loses state and does not perform its intended functions.
(b) omission: The vulnerability discussed in the article is related to the omission of proper encryption key exchange mechanisms in GSM implementations, leading to the omission of secure connections between phones and cell towers, allowing for interception and decryption of calls [88041].
(c) timing: The article does not mention any software failures related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early.
(d) value: The vulnerability discussed in the article is related to the incorrect performance of encryption algorithms in GSM implementations, leading to the incorrect encryption of calls and making them vulnerable to decryption by hackers [88041].
(e) byzantine: The article does not mention any software failures related to byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The other behavior described in the article is the flaw in the error control mechanisms governing how encryption keys are encoded in GSM implementations, making the keys vulnerable to cracking attacks, which is a specific type of vulnerability not covered by the options provided [88041]. |