| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in the MyCar system made by Canadian company Automobility has happened within the same organization or with its products and services. The vulnerabilities in the MyCar system, including hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities, were discovered by the hacker Jmaxxz. He reported these vulnerabilities to Automobility and the US Computer Emergency Response Team in February of the same year. Some of the vulnerabilities were fixed over the next few months, but Jmaxxz continued to find and report lingering SQL injection vulnerabilities in MyCar's code, with some fixes being implemented just days before his DefCon talk [88368].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in the MyCar system made by Canadian company Automobility has not been explicitly mentioned to have happened at other organizations or with their products and services in the provided article. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to design flaws introduced during the development phase. The vulnerabilities in the MyCar system, made by Automobility, were a result of security flaws in the software that allowed any hacker to fully hijack the remote unlock and ignition device, potentially leading to car thefts [88368].
(b) Additionally, the operation of the system could have contributed to the failure as well. For example, remotely starting a car without the owner's knowledge could lead to dangerous carbon monoxide leaks, highlighting the potential risks associated with the operation of the system [88368]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within_system. The vulnerabilities and flaws in the MyCar system, such as hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities, were identified by the hacker Jmaxxz within the system itself [88368]. These internal system weaknesses allowed for potential remote hacking, car theft, and unauthorized access to sensitive data within the MyCar application and database. The incident highlights the importance of thorough security testing and practices within the system to prevent such vulnerabilities from being exploited. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in the MyCar system's software that allowed for remote hacking and potential car theft. The vulnerabilities were identified by a security-minded software engineer, Jmaxxz, who found flaws in the MyCar system made by Canadian company Automobility. These vulnerabilities included hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities, which could be exploited to access the company's backend data and send commands to vehicles [88368].
(b) Human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The software engineer, Jmaxxz, initially had misgivings about the security risks of the remote starter system he installed for his girlfriend's car. Despite his concerns, he decided to proceed with the installation, which ultimately led to the discovery of the vulnerabilities in the MyCar system. Additionally, Jmaxxz reported these vulnerabilities to Automobility and the US Computer Emergency Response Team, prompting the company to address and fix the security flaws over the following months [88368]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the article is primarily related to software vulnerabilities in the MyCar system made by Canadian company Automobility. The vulnerabilities allowed hackers to fully hijack the remote unlock and ignition device, potentially leading to theft of tens of thousands of vehicles. The vulnerabilities included hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities, which could be exploited to access the company's backend data and send commands to users' vehicles [88368].
(b) The software failure incident was caused by software vulnerabilities in the MyCar system, indicating that the contributing factors originated in the software itself. The vulnerabilities in the system allowed for potential theft of vehicles and unauthorized access to sensitive data. The flaws in the software, such as hard-coded administrator credentials and SQL injection bugs, were identified and reported by a security-minded software engineer, leading to subsequent fixes by the company [88368]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was malicious. The failure was due to vulnerabilities in the MyCar system, which allowed any hacker to fully hijack the remote unlock and ignition device, potentially leading to theft of tens of thousands of vehicles. The hacker, Jmaxxz, discovered security flaws in the system that could be exploited to locate cars, unlock them, start the car, trigger the alarm, and even access the company's backend data. These vulnerabilities were exploited by Jmaxxz with the intent to demonstrate the risks associated with the system and to prompt the company to address the issues [88368].
(b) The software failure incident was also non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities were not intentionally introduced to harm the system. The flaws in the MyCar system were a result of poor security practices and oversight during the development and testing phases. Jmaxxz, as a security-minded software engineer, initially had misgivings about the security risks associated with the system but decided to investigate further, leading to the discovery of the vulnerabilities. The company, Automobility, was made aware of the vulnerabilities and took steps to address them, indicating a lack of malicious intent in the initial deployment of the software [88368]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor decisions made during the development and deployment of the software. The vulnerabilities that allowed for potential car theft and other malicious activities were a result of poor security practices and decisions made by the company Automobility. The presence of hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities were clear indicators of poor security measures in the software [88368].
(b) The software failure incident also involved accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The hacker Jmaxxz initially had misgivings about the security risks associated with the remote starter system he installed for his girlfriend's car. Despite his concerns, he decided to investigate further and discovered the vulnerabilities that could potentially lead to car theft and other dangerous scenarios. This accidental discovery of security flaws highlights the unintended consequences of overlooking potential risks in software systems [88368]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. The hacker Jmaxxz discovered vulnerabilities in the MyCar system made by Automobility, which allowed for remote hacking of vehicles connected to the system. These vulnerabilities included hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities, which could have been exploited to access the company's backend data and send commands to users' vehicles [88368]. The fact that these vulnerabilities were present in the software and shipped in the first place highlights a lack of basic security practices during the development process.
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental as the vulnerabilities in the MyCar system were discovered by Jmaxxz while he was installing a remote starter for his girlfriend's car. Initially, he had misgivings about the security risks of connecting the car to the internet but decided to investigate further. This accidental discovery led to the identification of vulnerabilities that could have been exploited by hackers to locate, unlock, start, and even steal cars connected to the MyCar app [88368]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The vulnerabilities in the MyCar system, discovered by Jmaxxz, were due to specific contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances, such as hard-coded administrator credentials, SQL injection bugs, and direct object references vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities allowed for potential remote hijacking of the system, accessing the company's backend data, and sending commands to other users' vehicles. Jmaxxz reported these vulnerabilities to the company and the US Computer Emergency Response Team, and they were fixed over the next few months [88368]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the vulnerabilities discovered by the hacker allowed for unauthorized access and control over the connected vehicles, indicating that the system was still operational but compromised [88368].
(b) omission: The software failure incident did not involve omission where the system failed to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The vulnerabilities discovered in the MyCar system allowed for unauthorized access and control, rather than the system omitting its functions [88368].
(c) timing: The software failure incident did not involve timing issues where the system performed its intended functions too late or too early. The vulnerabilities discovered by the hacker allowed for immediate unauthorized access and control over the connected vehicles, indicating that the system was responsive but insecure [88368].
(d) value: The software failure incident did involve a failure in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The vulnerabilities discovered in the MyCar system allowed for unauthorized access, control, and potential theft of vehicles connected to the app, indicating a critical flaw in the system's intended functionality [88368].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaved erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerabilities discovered by the hacker allowed for consistent unauthorized access and control over the connected vehicles, rather than erratic or inconsistent behavior [88368].
(f) other: The software failure incident involved a critical security flaw that allowed for unauthorized access, control, and potential theft of vehicles connected to the MyCar system. The incident highlighted the lack of basic security practices in Internet of Things companies and the potential dangers of remotely starting vehicles without the owner's knowledge, including the risk of carbon monoxide leaks [88368]. |