| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) has happened again at the same organization, Supermicro. In October 2018, Bloomberg Businessweek alleged that many Supermicro motherboards worldwide had been compromised with a physical backdoor installed by the Chinese military, which was denied by Supermicro and other tech giants [89631].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in BMCs has also happened at multiple organizations. The researchers found more than 47,000 exposed BMCs in a recent sweep, indicating that this issue is not limited to a single organization but is a widespread concern across various entities that use Supermicro X9, X10, and X11 platforms [89631]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the vulnerabilities found in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) on server motherboards. Researchers from the security firm Eclypsium detailed flaws in BMCs on Supermicro X9, X10, and X11 platforms that could be exploited to exfiltrate data, replace a server's operating system with a malicious one, or even take the server down [89631].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the vulnerabilities in the authentication protections on the systems that run the remote management "virtual media" protocols. These vulnerabilities allowed for improper storage of legitimate administrator logins, potentially enabling unauthorized access by the next user entering any username and password [89631]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is within_system. The vulnerabilities in the Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) allowed attackers to exploit flaws within the system, enabling them to exfiltrate data, replace the server's operating system with a malicious one, or even take the server down [89631]. The flaws in the BMCs themselves, such as weak authentication protections and encryption, contributed to the software failure incident originating from within the system. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) that can be exploited by attackers to weaponize legitimate functions and gain unauthorized access to servers [89631].
(b) However, human actions also play a role in this incident as the vulnerabilities in the BMCs were identified and disclosed by researchers from the security firm Eclypsium, who then reported the flaws to Supermicro and prompted the issuance of firmware updates to address the vulnerabilities [89631]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to hardware, specifically vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) installed on server motherboards [89631].
(b) The software failure incident is also related to software, as the vulnerabilities in the BMCs allowed for exploitation of authentication protections and weaknesses in the virtual media protocols used for remote management [89631]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. It involves attackers exploiting vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) to gain unauthorized access and control over servers remotely. The attackers can exfiltrate data, replace the server's operating system with a malicious one, or even take the server down. The attack allows for the virtual connection of USB devices to servers, enabling attackers to trick employees into plugging in malicious devices without physical access. The vulnerabilities in the BMCs were identified by researchers from the security firm Eclypsium, who disclosed the flaws to Supermicro and highlighted the potential risks associated with BMCs being privileged devices intended for remote use [89631].
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities in the Supermicro BMCs were not intentionally introduced to harm the system. These flaws were identified by security researchers who responsibly disclosed them to the company, leading to the issuance of firmware updates to address the vulnerabilities. However, the slow adoption of firmware upgrades in enterprise devices like BMCs poses a challenge in mitigating the risks associated with these vulnerabilities. The incident highlights the importance of timely patching and secure configuration of devices to prevent potential exploitation by malicious actors [89631]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was poor_decisions as it was due to contributing factors introduced by poor decisions. The vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) allowed attackers to exploit flaws in the remote management devices, potentially exfiltrate data, replace server operating systems with malicious ones, or even take servers down [89631]. The flaws in the BMCs were exploited due to weaknesses in authentication protections, improper storage of legitimate administrator logins, and relatively weak encryption, making it easier for attackers to gain unauthorized access [89631]. Additionally, the incident highlighted the slow process of getting firmware upgrades for BMCs in practice, which further exacerbated the security risks [89631]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the article is related to development incompetence. The vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) were exploited due to flaws in the authentication protections on the systems running virtual media protocols. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to potentially exfiltrate data, replace a server's operating system with a malicious one, or take the server down [89631]. The incident highlights the importance of professional competence in developing secure software systems to prevent such exploits.
(b) The software failure incident can also be attributed to accidental factors. For example, the article mentions that the authentication protections on the systems running virtual media protocols were vulnerable to numerous types of attacks, indicating accidental flaws in the design or implementation of the software [89631]. Such accidental vulnerabilities can lead to serious security breaches if not identified and addressed promptly. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. This is evident from the fact that the vulnerabilities in the Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) were identified by researchers from the security firm Eclypsium, disclosed to Supermicro in June, and firmware updates were issued for all affected BMCs by the company [89631]. The temporary nature of the failure is further emphasized by the statement that it will likely take time for the patches to reach the vulnerable servers, indicating a period during which the vulnerability exists before being fully addressed. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, byzantine, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article involves the potential for a crash where an attacker could take down a server by exploiting vulnerabilities in Supermicro baseboard management controllers (BMCs) [89631].
(b) omission: The software failure incident could also involve omission as the flaws in the BMCs allowed attackers to potentially exfiltrate data, replace a server's operating system with a malicious one, or take the server down, indicating the system may omit performing its intended functions securely [89631].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident could be related to the fact that attackers could exploit the vulnerabilities remotely if organizations leave their BMCs accessible on the open internet, potentially causing harm at an unexpected time [89631].
(d) value: The software failure incident could involve a failure in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, such as allowing unauthorized access or manipulation of server operations due to the vulnerabilities in the BMCs [89631].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident may exhibit byzantine behavior as attackers could potentially gain deeper control by moving laterally onto a BMC, indicating inconsistent responses and interactions within the system [89631].
(f) other: The software failure incident could also involve a failure in the system's security model assumptions, where physical presence was considered a significant challenge, but the vulnerabilities in the BMCs allowed attackers to exploit the system remotely, bypassing traditional security measures [89631]. |