Incident: Prison Security System Glitch Leads to Maximum Security Wing Breach

Published Date: 2013-08-16

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident at the Florida prison occurred on the night of June 13, as reported in Article 20647.
System 1. Black Creek Integrated Systems' digital management system [20647] 2. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) used to control prison doors [20647]
Responsible Organization 1. A computer "glitch" may have been responsible for the software failure incident at the Florida prison [20647]. 2. There is a possibility that the doors were opened intentionally by a staff member or remotely by someone inside or outside the prison who triggered a "group release" button in the computerized system [20647]. 3. The incident is being investigated by the Miami-Dade police department to determine if it was due to operator error or other factors [20647]. 4. Security researchers suggest that vulnerabilities in prison systems can be exploited remotely by hackers or accomplices from inside or outside the prison [20647].
Impacted Organization 1. Inmates at the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center in Miami, Florida [20647] 2. Guards and staff at the correctional facility [20647]
Software Causes 1. The failure incident at the Florida prison was caused by a computer "glitch" that may have opened all the doors at a maximum security wing simultaneously, allowing prisoners to escape and engage in violent activities [20647]. 2. The incident was also attributed to a potential operator error in the computerized system that controls the doors, as indicated by an initial review of the computer logs [20647]. 3. The possibility of the system being vulnerable to remote exploitation by hackers or accomplices from inside or outside the prison was raised by security researchers, highlighting potential vulnerabilities in the architecture, configuration, and control systems of the prison [20647].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper physical security measures to prevent unauthorized access to the control panel and release button [20647]. 2. Potential human error or intentional actions by staff members or other individuals inside or outside the prison to trigger the group release button [20647]. 3. Insufficient surveillance and monitoring of the control room to detect unauthorized access or actions [20647]. 4. Vulnerabilities in the architecture and configuration of the control systems, including potential access to critical functions from non-essential parts of the prison [20647]. 5. Lack of secure design features in the control system, such as the absence of a key activation requirement for the all-release button [20647].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident at the Florida prison led to the simultaneous opening of all doors in a maximum-security wing, allowing gang members to pursue a rival with weapons and resulting in a violent altercation that caused one prisoner to leap from a second-floor balcony, suffering a broken ankle and fractured vertebrae [20647]. 2. The incident raised concerns about the security and safety of the prison facility, as it was the second time in two months that all doors in the wing had opened at once, indicating a potential vulnerability in the system [20647]. 3. The software failure incident exposed potential flaws in the electronic door control system installed by Black Creek Integrated Systems, leading to questions about the system's reliability and security measures [20647]. 4. The incident highlighted the possibility of intentional manipulation of the door control system by staff members or external parties, raising suspicions of insider involvement or potential hacking vulnerabilities in the system [20647]. 5. The failure incident also resulted in the confiscation of several shanks from inmates involved in the altercation, indicating a breach in security protocols within the prison facility [20647].
Preventions 1. Implementing a more secure access control mechanism for the group-release button, such as requiring a physical key possessed by a senior officer to activate the all-release function, could have prevented accidental or unauthorized door openings [20647]. 2. Conducting regular security audits and vulnerability assessments on the prison's electronic door control system to identify and address potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers or insiders [20647]. 3. Ensuring that critical systems, such as door control systems, are not connected to the internet to prevent remote hacking attempts or unauthorized access [20647]. 4. Enhancing staff training and awareness on cybersecurity best practices to prevent phishing attacks or malware installations that could compromise the prison's control systems [20647].
Fixes 1. Implement stricter access controls and authentication mechanisms for the control panel system to prevent unauthorized access and accidental activations [20647]. 2. Enhance the security features of the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) used to control the prison doors, surveillance cameras, and other systems to prevent potential vulnerabilities and unauthorized access [20647]. 3. Conduct a thorough security audit of the entire electronic system, including the network architecture, to identify and address any potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers or insiders [20647]. 4. Consider implementing physical security measures, such as requiring a key activation for critical functions like the all-release button, to ensure that certain actions can only be taken by authorized personnel [20647].
References 1. Florida prison officials 2. Surveillance video 3. Miami Herald 4. Guards at the prison 5. Written account by one of the guards on duty 6. Miami-Dade Corrections Director Tim Ryan 7. J.C. Dugue, Williams’s attorney 8. Security researchers John Strauchs, Teague Newman, and Tiffany Rad 9. Black Creek Integrated Systems 10. Diagram and video posted on Black Creek’s website 11. Newman (security researcher)

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident at the Florida prison involving the doors opening unexpectedly had happened before at the same organization. A month earlier on May 20, the group-release feature also got mysteriously activated, and officers said they had not pressed the release button, raising the possibility of accidental activation [20647]. (b) The software failure incident involving the doors opening unexpectedly has also occurred at another organization. A correctional facility in Maryland experienced a similar problem when the locks on 500 cell doors disengaged simultaneously due to a computer malfunction [20647].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The incident at the Florida prison involved a computerized system controlling the doors at a maximum-security wing. The system had a group-release button that was not intended for use in maximum-security settings, where inmates are kept one-to-a-cell and are not allowed to interact with each other in common areas. The system experienced a glitch where the doors opened simultaneously, allowing prisoners to come out of their cells and engage in violent activities [20647]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also apparent in the article. The incident occurred during a shift change when a guard relieved another officer, and the control panel shutdown, causing all cell doors to open. This led to chaos as inmates came out of their cells, and guards had to corral them back in while trying to secure the area and lock the doors. The guards reported that they did not open the doors, indicating a failure in the operation of the system [20647].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) The software failure incident at the Florida prison involving the opening of all doors at a maximum security wing was primarily within the system. The incident was initially attributed to a computer "glitch" that caused the doors to open simultaneously [20647]. The control panel for the system featured a group-release button that allowed guards in minimum-security facilities to release inmates simultaneously for a head count, but it was not typically used in maximum-security settings [20647]. The incident was investigated to determine if any staff members were responsible for opening the doors or if there was a problem with the computerized system controlling the doors [20647]. (b) However, there were concerns raised by security researchers about potential vulnerabilities in prison systems that could be exploited remotely by hackers or accomplices from inside or outside the prison [20647]. The researchers highlighted vulnerabilities in the architecture and configuration of the systems, as well as in the programmable logic controllers used to control prison doors, surveillance cameras, and other systems [20647]. They also mentioned the possibility of malware being installed to gain control of prison computers, either through an infected USB stick or a phishing attack [20647]. These vulnerabilities suggest that external factors could have contributed to the software failure incident.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The incident at the Florida prison involving the opening of all doors at a maximum security wing was initially attributed to a computer "glitch" that may have caused the doors to open simultaneously [20647]. - The doors opening incident was not the first occurrence, as a similar problem with the release feature had occurred a month earlier, where the group-release feature mysteriously activated without any intentional human action [20647]. - The system had a security feature added to prevent accidental activation, but this did not prevent the doors from opening again a month later, indicating a potential flaw in the system itself [20647]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The surveillance video released raised the possibility that the doors may have been opened intentionally by a staff member or remotely by someone else inside or outside the prison who triggered a "group release" button in the computerized system [20647]. - Guards at the prison denied opening the doors, and there were suspicions that the incident involved human involvement, either from inside or outside the prison [20647]. - The correctional facility director acknowledged that the circumstances around the door-release were "suspicious," and officials were investigating whether any staff members were responsible for opening the doors or if the problem lay with the computerized system controlling the doors [20647].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident at the Florida prison was potentially related to hardware issues. The incident involved a computer "glitch" that led to the simultaneous opening of all doors in a maximum-security wing, allowing prisoners to escape and engage in violent activities [20647]. (b) The software failure incident at the Florida prison was also potentially related to software issues. Officials mentioned an "operator error" in the computer logs as a possible cause of the incident, but they were unsure about the exact trigger for this error [20647]. Additionally, security researchers highlighted vulnerabilities in the software systems used in prisons, suggesting that hackers or insiders could exploit these weaknesses to gain control over critical functions like door control and surveillance systems [20647].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious, non-malicious (a) The software failure incident at the Florida prison involving the opening of all doors at a maximum security wing was suspected to be malicious in nature. There were concerns that the doors may have been opened intentionally by a staff member or remotely by someone inside or outside the prison, triggering a "group release" button in the computerized system [20647]. Additionally, security researchers highlighted vulnerabilities in prison systems that could be exploited remotely by hackers or accomplices, indicating the potential for malicious attacks on such systems [20647]. (b) The software failure incident at the Maryland correctional facility, where the locks on 500 cell doors disengaged simultaneously, was attributed to a computer malfunction [20647]. This incident was described as non-malicious, with officials stating that no inmates attempted to escape during the failure.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The software failure incident at the Florida prison involving the opening of all doors at a maximum security wing was suspected to be related to poor decisions rather than accidental decisions. There were concerns that the doors may have been opened intentionally by a staff member or remotely by someone triggering a "group release" button in the computerized system [20647]. Additionally, there were previous incidents where the group-release feature was mysteriously activated, and efforts were made to prevent accidental activations, but the problem recurred [20647]. (b) The incident also raised questions about whether the failure was due to accidental decisions, such as an operator error in the computer logs, which officials were investigating to understand better [20647]. The lack of clarity on what triggered the "operator error" indicated a potential accidental aspect to the failure.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of the Florida prison incident where a computer "glitch" led to the simultaneous opening of all doors in a maximum-security wing, allowing prisoners to escape and engage in violent activities [20647]. The incident raised questions about the security measures and competence of the system installed by Black Creek Integrated Systems. The article highlights issues such as the lack of proper surveillance in the control room, the activation of the group-release feature without intentional input, and the failure of security prompts to prevent accidental door openings. These factors point to potential shortcomings in the design and implementation of the software system, indicating a failure due to development incompetence. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also apparent in the Florida prison incident. The article mentions instances where the group-release feature was mysteriously activated without intentional input from guards, leading to the unintended opening of cell doors [20647]. Despite efforts to add security prompts to prevent accidental activations, the system still experienced the same issue a month later. This accidental activation of the door release function, coupled with the lack of clarity on what triggered the operator error in the system logs, suggests a failure caused by accidental factors rather than intentional actions.
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident at the Florida prison involved a computer "glitch" that caused all the doors in a maximum security wing to open simultaneously, allowing prisoners to come out of their cells and engage in violent activities [20647]. This temporary failure was attributed to a potential operator error or a problem with the computerized system controlling the doors. Additionally, a similar incident occurred at a correctional facility in Maryland where the locks on 500 cell doors disengaged simultaneously due to a computer malfunction [20647]. These incidents suggest that the software failures were temporary and not permanent, as they were caused by specific circumstances rather than inherent flaws in the system.
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the Florida prison resulted in a crash where the computerized system controlling the doors experienced a glitch that caused all the doors in the maximum security wing to open simultaneously, leading to chaos and allowing inmates to engage in violent activities [20647]. (b) omission: The system omitted to perform its intended function of keeping the cell doors closed and secure, as it failed to prevent the unauthorized opening of all doors in the maximum security wing, leading to a security breach and violent incident among the inmates [20647]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was crucial, as it occurred just after a shift change at 7:04 p.m., causing all cell doors to open and inmates to come out of their cells, leading to a violent confrontation among the prisoners [20647]. (d) value: The software failure incident resulted in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly by opening all the cell doors in the maximum security wing simultaneously, contrary to the normal operation where inmates are kept in their cells and not allowed to interact with each other in common areas [20647]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident exhibited elements of a byzantine failure, as there were suspicions raised about the possibility of intentional actions by staff members or external parties triggering the group release button in the computerized system to open the doors, leading to a complex and potentially orchestrated security breach [20647]. (f) other: The software failure incident also showcased a potential vulnerability in the system's design and configuration, allowing for the possibility of remote exploitation by hackers or accomplices from inside or outside the prison, highlighting a broader issue of security risks associated with electronic control systems in correctional facilities [20647].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception actuator, processing_unit, embedded_software (a) sensor: The incident at the Florida prison involved a computerized system controlling the doors. The doors were opened either intentionally or due to a computer "glitch," allowing prisoners to leave their cells. The system had a group-release button that was not typically used in maximum-security settings, where inmates are kept one-to-a-cell. The incident raised questions about whether the doors were opened by a staff member or remotely by someone triggering the system [20647]. (b) actuator: The failure at the Florida prison involved the doors of a maximum-security wing opening simultaneously, allowing prisoners to leave their cells. The incident raised suspicions about whether the doors were opened intentionally by a staff member or remotely by someone triggering the system. Guards reported that they did not open the doors, indicating a failure in the actuator component of the system [20647]. (c) processing_unit: The incident at the Florida prison involved a computerized system controlling the doors of a maximum-security wing. The doors opened simultaneously, allowing prisoners to leave their cells. The system had a group-release button that was not typically used in maximum-security settings. An initial review of the computer logs indicated that an "operator error" had occurred, but the exact cause of this error was unknown at the time of the investigation [20647]. (d) network_communication: The incident at the Florida prison involved a computerized system controlling the doors of a maximum-security wing. The doors opened simultaneously, allowing prisoners to leave their cells. The system had a group-release button that was not typically used in maximum-security settings. The incident raised questions about whether the doors were opened by a staff member or remotely by someone triggering the system, indicating a potential failure in network communication protocols [20647]. (e) embedded_software: The incident at the Florida prison involved a computerized system controlling the doors of a maximum-security wing. The doors opened simultaneously, allowing prisoners to leave their cells. An initial review of the computer logs indicated that an "operator error" had occurred, but the exact cause of this error was unknown at the time of the investigation. The system had a group-release button that was not typically used in maximum-security settings, suggesting a potential issue with the embedded software controlling the door system [20647].
Communication unknown The software failure incident at the Florida prison involving the opening of all doors at a maximum security wing was not explicitly attributed to a specific communication layer of the cyber physical system. However, the incident raised concerns about potential vulnerabilities in the system that could be exploited remotely by hackers or accomplices from inside or outside the prison [20647]. Security researchers highlighted vulnerabilities in the architecture and configuration of prison systems, including the use of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that control various functions like door locks, surveillance cameras, and other systems. These vulnerabilities could potentially allow unauthorized access and control of critical functions within the prison [20647]. While the specific communication layer responsible for the failure was not identified in the articles, the incident underscored the importance of securing all components of the cyber physical system to prevent unauthorized access and potential breaches.
Application FALSE The software failure incident described in the articles does not directly point to a failure related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The incident primarily revolves around a potential glitch or intentional manipulation in the control system that manages the opening and closing of cell doors in a prison facility. The failure is attributed to a computer "glitch" or potential operator error triggering the simultaneous opening of all cell doors in a maximum-security wing, allowing inmates to leave their cells and engage in violent activities [20647]. The focus is on the control system, security vulnerabilities, potential hacking risks, and the actions taken by the company responsible for the system installation. There is no explicit mention of bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, or incorrect usage at the application layer as the primary cause of the failure.

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence no_consequence (a) death: The software failure incident did not result in any deaths as per the information provided in the articles [20647].
Domain government The software failure incident described in the news article [20647] is related to the industry of **government**. The incident occurred at a correctional facility in Florida, specifically the Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center in Miami. This facility experienced a software glitch that led to the simultaneous opening of all doors in a maximum-security wing, allowing prisoners to roam freely and engage in violent activities. The system involved in this incident was a digital management system installed by a company named Black Creek Integrated Systems, which specializes in providing security solutions for corrections facilities. The system controlled door locks, card readers, surveillance cameras, and other security features within the prison [20647].

Sources

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