| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident of sending erroneous speeding notices to drivers due to a coordination issue between software systems happened at the Maryland Transportation Authority. The incident occurred at the Hatem bridge toll plaza where the deactivation of software was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to the incorrect notices being sent to drivers [92428].
(b) There is no information in the provided article about a similar incident happening at other organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to a design issue. The problem arose from a lack of coordination between the deactivation of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza and the implementation of a new electronic cashless tolling system. This design flaw led to erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers who would have been considered speeding at the old toll between specific dates [92428].
(b) Additionally, there is an aspect of operation-related failure mentioned in the article. The operation-related failure can be attributed to the misuse of the system by sending out thousands of incorrect speeding notices to drivers, causing confusion and frustration among the recipients. This misuse of the system led to unnecessary costs incurred by the transportation authority [92428]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was within_system. The failure occurred due to a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza that was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers [92428]. The issue originated from within the system itself, where the lack of coordination between the old and new systems resulted in the incorrect notifications being generated. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident occurred because of a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza that was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers [92428]. The problem was a result of a lack of coordination between different software systems rather than direct human error.
(b) Human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The decision to deactivate the software at the toll plaza without proper coordination with the new electronic cashless tolling system was a human action that contributed to the failure [92428]. Additionally, the frustration expressed by drivers and the wastage of over $20,000 on sending out erroneous notices by mistake highlight the impact of human decisions on the incident. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to a hardware-related issue. The incident occurred because of a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza that was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system [92428]. This hardware-related issue led to the erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers who passed through the bridge.
(b) The software failure incident was also influenced by contributing factors originating in software. The failure was a result of the software deactivation at the toll plaza not being coordinated with the new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to the incorrect speeding notices being sent out to drivers [92428]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is categorized as non-malicious. The incident occurred due to a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza that was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers [Article 92428]. The failure was a result of a mistake in the system integration rather than any malicious intent to harm the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 92428 was primarily due to poor decisions. The incident occurred because a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to erroneous speeding notices being sent to 22,000 drivers [92428]. This poor decision resulted in confusion and frustration among customers, with one resident mentioning the constant speed trap around the bridge and another driver highlighting the bumper-to-bumper traffic, indicating the unlikelihood of speeding through the toll area [92428]. Additionally, the Maryland Transportation Authority's failure to turn off the system before going live with the cashless toll was criticized as a waste of over $20,000 in taxpayer dollars [92428]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to development incompetence. The incident occurred because a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers [Article 92428].
(b) Additionally, the incident can also be categorized as accidental, as the erroneous speeding notices were sent out mistakenly without proper coordination between the old and new tolling systems, causing confusion and frustration among the drivers [Article 92428]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles was temporary. The incident occurred due to a "deactivation" of software at the Hatem bridge toll plaza that was not coordinated with a new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to erroneous speeding notices being sent to drivers [Article 92428]. The problem was identified, acknowledged, and subsequently fixed by the Maryland Transportation Authority. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. The issue was related to erroneous speed warnings being sent to drivers due to a coordination problem between the software at the toll plaza and the new electronic cashless tolling system [Article 92428].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can be categorized under omission, as the system omitted to perform its intended functions correctly by sending out incorrect speed warnings to drivers who were not actually speeding on the bridge. This omission led to confusion and frustration among the recipients of the notices [Article 92428].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. Instead, the issue was about incorrect speed warnings being sent out to drivers due to a coordination problem between the software at the toll plaza and the new electronic cashless tolling system [Article 92428].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be attributed to a value failure, as the system performed its intended functions incorrectly by sending out erroneous speed warnings to drivers, causing confusion and frustration among the recipients of the notices [Article 92428].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaved erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The issue was more straightforward, involving the incorrect issuance of speed warnings due to a coordination problem between different components of the tolling system [Article 92428].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized under a coordination failure, where the deactivation of software at the toll plaza was not coordinated with the new electronic cashless tolling system, leading to the erroneous issuance of speed warnings to drivers who were not actually speeding on the bridge. This lack of coordination resulted in the system not functioning as intended and causing confusion among users [Article 92428]. |