| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident of Intel releasing a patch that did not entirely fix the security vulnerabilities in their computer processors happened again within the same organization. The initial patch released by Intel in May was found to address only some of the issues, and it took another six months for a second patch to be publicly disclosed that fixed all the vulnerabilities as indicated by Intel [92251]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of Intel's patch for security vulnerabilities in their computer processors. The initial patch released by Intel to address the vulnerabilities was found to only address some of the issues identified by the Dutch researchers at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. This indicates a failure in the design phase where the patch did not effectively cover all the vulnerabilities that were reported [92251].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be inferred from the fact that the patch released by Intel was not able to fully address the vulnerabilities initially reported by the researchers. This failure in the operation phase could be attributed to the patch not being implemented correctly or the system not being operated as intended, leading to the vulnerabilities not being completely fixed until a second patch was publicly disclosed by the company [92251]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the article is related to a patch released by Intel to address security vulnerabilities in their computer processors. The initial patch released by Intel only addressed some of the issues identified by researchers at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, indicating a failure within the system in terms of the patch not fully resolving the vulnerabilities [92251].
(b) outside_system: The article does not provide information indicating that the software failure incident was due to contributing factors originating from outside the system. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a software patch released by Intel to address security vulnerabilities in their computer processors. The patch only addressed some of the issues initially reported by Dutch researchers, leading to the vulnerabilities not being fully fixed until a second patch was released [92251].
(b) The failure to fully address the vulnerabilities in the first patch can also be attributed to human actions, as Intel implied that all the problems were solved when the patch was released, even though it only addressed some of the issues. This miscommunication from Intel led to a delay in fully resolving the vulnerabilities [92251]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 92251 was related to hardware. The incident involved security vulnerabilities in Intel's computer processors, which required patches to address the issues. The initial patch released by Intel did not fully resolve all the problems identified by the Dutch researchers at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. It took another six months for a second patch to be publicly disclosed by the company to fix all the vulnerabilities that were indicated as fixed in the initial patch [92251].
(b) The software failure incident was also related to software. The initial software patch released by Intel to address the security vulnerabilities in their processors only addressed some of the issues identified by the researchers. This indicates a software failure in the sense that the patch did not fully resolve the software-related vulnerabilities [92251]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is non-malicious. It was a case where Intel released a patch for security vulnerabilities in their computer processors, but the patch only addressed some of the issues initially reported by researchers. The failure was due to the patch not fully fixing all the vulnerabilities as initially claimed by Intel, rather than any malicious intent [92251]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Intel processor vulnerabilities can be attributed to poor decisions made by Intel. The initial patch released by Intel to address the security vulnerabilities in their computer processors only addressed some of the issues identified by the Dutch researchers at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. This led to a misleading public message from Intel that implied all problems were fixed when in reality, they were not. It took another six months and a second patch to fully address all the vulnerabilities that were initially claimed to be fixed [92251]. This indicates a poor decision-making process in the handling of the software vulnerability issue. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. The article mentions that Intel released a patch for security vulnerabilities in their computer processors, implying that all problems were solved. However, Dutch researchers later discovered that the patch only addressed some of the issues they had found, indicating a lack of professional competence in fully addressing the vulnerabilities [92251].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental. Despite Intel's implication that all vulnerabilities were fixed with the initial patch, it was later revealed that not all issues were resolved. This miscommunication could be seen as an accidental oversight rather than intentional misinformation [92251]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in the article seems to have a temporary duration. Initially, Intel released a patch for security vulnerabilities in their computer processors, implying that all problems were solved. However, Dutch researchers later discovered that the patch only addressed some of the issues, leading to a second patch being released six months later to fix all the vulnerabilities [92251]. This indicates that the failure was not permanent but rather temporary until the complete fix was implemented. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [92251].
(b) omission: The software failure incident is related to an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The patch released by Intel to fix security vulnerabilities in their computer processors only addressed some of the issues discovered by researchers, leaving some vulnerabilities unresolved until a second patch was released [92251].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [92251].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to a value issue where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. The initial patch released by Intel did not fully fix all the vulnerabilities as claimed, leading to incorrect behavior in terms of security [92251].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident is not related to a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [92251].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as misleading communication or misrepresentation by Intel regarding the effectiveness of the initial patch in fixing all vulnerabilities. This could be seen as a form of miscommunication or lack of transparency in addressing the software issues [92251]. |