Published Date: 2013-08-18
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident involving the Facebook vulnerability discovered by Khalil Shreateh and the subsequent response from Facebook occurred in August 2013. [20900, 20968, 20909] 2. The software failure incident related to the Facebook bug that allowed revealing the accounts behind Pages happened from Thursday evening until Friday morning, as per the article published on January 10, 2020. [94558] |
| System | 1. Facebook's security team failed to properly address the security reports and warnings about the vulnerability reported by Khalil Shreateh, leading to the exploitation of the bug [Article 20900, Article 20968, Article 20909]. 2. The bug bounty program's guidelines and terms of service failed to appropriately reward Khalil Shreateh for his discovery due to his violation of the terms by exploiting the bug to post on Mark Zuckerberg's page [Article 20900, Article 20968, Article 20909]. 3. The Facebook platform itself failed to prevent unauthorized posting on users' walls due to the vulnerability discovered by Khalil Shreateh [Article 20900, Article 20968, Article 20909]. 4. Facebook's edit history feature failed to properly display the accounts behind Pages, leading to a doxing vulnerability that allowed anyone to reveal the accounts running a Page [Article 94558]. |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Khalil Shreateh, a Palestinian security researcher, was responsible for causing the software failure incident by exploiting a vulnerability that allowed him to post on any user's page, including Mark Zuckerberg's, after Facebook's security team did not take his warnings seriously [20900, 20968, 20909]. 2. Facebook acknowledged that a bug in their system, which allowed anyone to easily reveal the accounts running a Facebook Page, was responsible for the software failure incident [94558]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook page [20900, 20968, 20909] 2. Facebook Pages of public figures, businesses, and other entities [94558] |
| Software Causes | 1. The software failure incident was caused by a vulnerability in Facebook's systems that allowed a researcher to post on any user's page, including users not on his Friends list [20900, 20968, 20909]. 2. Another software cause of the failure incident was a bug in Facebook's code that mistakenly displayed the account or accounts that made edits to each post on Facebook Pages, essentially doxing anyone who posted to a Page [94558]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Language barrier and volume of reports hindering Facebook's response to the security flaw reported by Khalil Shreateh [20900, 20900]. 2. Failure to provide enough technical information in the bug report submitted by Shreateh, leading to Facebook's inability to take immediate action [20968]. 3. Violation of Facebook's responsible disclosure policy by Shreateh when he posted about the vulnerability on Mark Zuckerberg's wall [20968]. 4. Facebook mistakenly displaying account information in the edit history of posts on Pages due to a bug caused by a code update [94558]. |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident involving a vulnerability that allowed anyone to post on a stranger's Facebook wall had the impact of exposing a serious security flaw in Facebook's system, potentially compromising the privacy and security of users [20909, 20968]. 2. The incident led to a breach of Facebook's responsible disclosure policy, as the researcher resorted to intrusive methods to highlight the vulnerability, resulting in the denial of the usual $500 bug bounty reward [20909, 20968]. 3. The incident highlighted communication challenges between the researcher and Facebook's security team due to a language barrier, potentially delaying the response to the reported vulnerability [20900]. 4. The incident showcased the importance of proper bug reporting procedures and adherence to terms of service in bug bounty programs to ensure eligibility for rewards and maintain ethical standards in security research [20909, 20968]. 5. The incident also demonstrated the potential financial implications for security researchers who may resort to selling discovered vulnerabilities on the black market if not properly acknowledged and rewarded by companies like Facebook [20900]. |
| Preventions | 1. Improved communication and response from Facebook's security team to take the reports of the vulnerability more seriously and investigate them thoroughly [20900, 20968, 20909]. 2. Providing clearer guidelines and instructions for reporting vulnerabilities to ensure that researchers like Khalil Shreateh provide sufficient technical information for the security team to take action [20968, 20909]. 3. Enforcing stricter adherence to responsible disclosure policies and terms of service to prevent researchers from resorting to unauthorized methods to demonstrate vulnerabilities [20968, 20909]. 4. Offering rewards or incentives for reporting vulnerabilities even if the initial report may not contain all the necessary technical details, to encourage researchers to come forward with their findings [20900, 20968, 20909]. 5. Enhancing the bug bounty program to cover a wider range of vulnerabilities and ensuring that security flaws are promptly addressed and fixed to prevent exploitation [94558]. |
| Fixes | 1. Improving communication and response processes within the Facebook security team to ensure that reports from researchers are properly evaluated and addressed in a timely manner [20900, 20968, 20909]. 2. Enhancing the bug reporting system to provide clearer guidelines for researchers on what information is required for a valid bug report [20968, 20909]. 3. Implementing a more structured approach to handling bug reports, especially those that involve potential security vulnerabilities, to prevent similar incidents in the future [20900, 20968, 20909]. 4. Reviewing and updating the terms of service and guidelines for the White Hat program to ensure that researchers are incentivized to report bugs responsibly and are rewarded appropriately for their findings [20900, 20968, 20909]. 5. Conducting regular security audits and testing to proactively identify and address potential vulnerabilities in the Facebook platform [94558]. | References | 1. Khalil Shreateh's blog [20900, 20968, 20909] 2. Facebook security team [20900, 20968, 20909] 3. Hacker News website [20900, 20968] 4. Matt Jones from Facebook's security team [20900, 20909] 5. RT [20968] 6. WIRED [94558] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - The incident of a software vulnerability being exploited to post on someone's Facebook wall happened again within Facebook itself. Khalil Shreateh discovered a glitch that allowed him to post on a stranger's Facebook wall, and after Facebook initially ignored his warnings, he took the issue to Mark Zuckerberg's wall to get a response [Article 20909]. - Another incident within Facebook involved a bug that allowed anyone to easily reveal the accounts running a Facebook Page, essentially doxing anyone who posted to that Page. This bug was live for a short period before being fixed, and it was caused by a code update pushed by Facebook [Article 94558]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - There is no specific mention in the provided articles about the same software failure incident happening at other organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: - The incident involved a vulnerability discovered by a Palestinian researcher that allowed posting on any user's page on Facebook, including users not on the Friends list, due to a hole in Facebook's systems [20900]. - The vulnerability was initially reported to Facebook's security team, but they dismissed it as not a bug [20968]. - The incident highlighted a flaw in Facebook's system that allowed anyone to post on a stranger's Facebook wall, leading to a breach in privacy and security [20909]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: - The incident involved a bug on Facebook that allowed revealing the accounts running a Page, essentially doxing anyone who posted to one, due to a code update pushed by Facebook [94558]. - The bug allowed anyone to easily reveal the accounts behind Facebook Pages by checking the edit history of a post, leading to potential privacy and security concerns [94558]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily within_system. The incident involved a vulnerability within Facebook's system that allowed a Palestinian researcher, Khalil Shreateh, to post on Mark Zuckerberg's page and other users' pages without being friends with them. Shreateh discovered a security flaw that allowed him to exploit the system, which was not initially recognized by Facebook's security team [Article 20900, Article 20968, Article 20909]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - Article 94558 reports a software failure incident where a bug in Facebook's code allowed anyone to easily reveal the accounts running a Page, essentially doxing anyone who posted to one. This bug was the result of a code update pushed by Facebook, and it mistakenly displayed the account or accounts that made edits to each post, rather than just the edits themselves. This issue was fixed by Facebook after it was brought to their attention by a security researcher [94558]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - Articles 20900, 20968, and 20909 describe a software failure incident where a Palestinian researcher, Khalil Shreateh, discovered a vulnerability in Facebook's systems that allowed him to post to any user's page, including users not on his Friends list. Despite Shreateh reporting the vulnerability to Facebook's security team, they did not take his warnings seriously initially. Shreateh then resorted to posting on Mark Zuckerberg's page to demonstrate the issue, leading to a response from Facebook. However, due to the methods Shreateh used to demonstrate the vulnerability, Facebook denied him the usual bug bounty reward and disabled his account as a precaution [20900, 20968, 20909]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | software | (a) The articles do not mention any hardware-related failures that contributed to the software failure incidents. (b) The software failure incidents reported in the articles were primarily due to contributing factors originating in software. For example, in Article 20900, a Palestinian researcher discovered a vulnerability in Facebook's systems that allowed him to post on any user's page, including users not on his Friends list. This software flaw could have been exploited by spammers and scam artists [20900]. Additionally, in Article 94558, a bug in Facebook's code update allowed anyone to reveal the accounts running a Page, essentially doxing anyone who posted to one. This software bug led to the exposure of account information that should not have been visible [94558]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious, non-malicious | (a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious: - The incident involved a Palestinian researcher who discovered a security flaw in Facebook that allowed him to post on any user's page, including Mark Zuckerberg's, without being friends with them [Article 20900]. - The researcher tried to warn Facebook's security team about the vulnerability but was ignored, leading him to post on Zuckerberg's page to demonstrate the flaw [Article 20968]. - Despite the researcher's intentions to report the vulnerability, Facebook disabled his account as a precaution and did not reward him due to violating the site's terms of service [Article 20968]. - The incident involved exploiting a bug in Facebook's system to post on Mark Zuckerberg's wall, which was considered a violation of privacy and security [Article 20909]. (b) The objective of the software failure incident was non-malicious: - The incident involved a bug in Facebook that allowed anyone to easily reveal the accounts running a Page, essentially doxing anyone who posted to one [Article 94558]. - Facebook quickly pushed a fix for the bug once it was discovered, indicating that the issue was unintentional and promptly addressed [Article 94558]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions, accidental_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident: - The incident involving the Palestinian researcher hacking into Mark Zuckerberg's Facebook page was due to poor decisions made by Facebook's security team. The security team initially dismissed the researcher's warnings about a security flaw, leading him to take drastic action by posting on Zuckerberg's page to get their attention [20900, 20968]. - The incident where a bug allowed anyone to reveal the accounts running a Facebook Page was also a result of poor decisions. Facebook mistakenly displayed the accounts behind the pages, essentially doxing them, due to a code update that introduced the bug. This led to sensitive information being exposed, causing alarm among users running sensitive Pages [94558]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The incident involving the Facebook vulnerability was due to the security team not taking the warnings about the security flaw seriously, despite the researcher's efforts to report it multiple times [20900]. - The security team initially dismissed the bug report as not being a bug, showing a lack of understanding or competence in assessing the severity of the reported issue [20968]. - The security team acknowledged that they should have asked for more information from the researcher, indicating a gap in their handling of bug reports [20968]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The incident where a bug allowed revealing the accounts behind Facebook Pages was a result of a code update pushed by Facebook, leading to unintended consequences [94558]. - Facebook quickly fixed the issue once it was brought to their attention, indicating that the exposure of account information was unintentional [94558]. |
| Duration | temporary | (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was temporary. The incident involved a bug that allowed anyone to easily reveal the accounts running a Facebook Page, essentially doxing anyone who posted to one. This bug was live from Thursday evening until Friday morning before Facebook pushed a fix for it [Article 94558]. (b) The incident was temporary as it was a specific bug that occurred within a certain timeframe and was not a permanent failure [Article 94558]. |
| Behaviour | omission, other | (a) crash: The articles do not mention any instance of a system crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. (b) omission: The software failure incident in the articles relates to omission. Khalil Shreateh discovered a vulnerability that allowed anyone to post on a stranger's Facebook wall, even if they were not friends. Despite reporting the bug to Facebook's security team, he was initially ignored, leading him to post about the issue on Mark Zuckerberg's wall to get attention [20900, 20968, 20909]. (c) timing: The articles do not mention any instance where the system performed its intended functions correctly but at the wrong time. (d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a case of security vulnerability exploitation by a user to demonstrate a flaw in the system's security measures, leading to unauthorized posting on Facebook walls [20900, 20968, 20909]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incidents reported in the articles [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of any physical harm to individuals resulting from the software failure incidents reported in the articles [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incidents reported in the articles [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incidents in the articles primarily revolve around security vulnerabilities and breaches, impacting data security and privacy [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incidents reported in the articles [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failures mentioned in the articles primarily affected Facebook's platform and security systems, with no specific mention of non-human entities being impacted [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failures reported in the articles had observable consequences related to security vulnerabilities, unauthorized access, and breaches [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss potential consequences such as the risk of spammers and scammers exploiting the security flaw, as well as the exposure of account administrators on Facebook pages due to a bug [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The articles primarily focus on the consequences related to data security, privacy breaches, and the potential misuse of the identified vulnerabilities, with no other specific consequences mentioned [20900, 20968, 20909, 94558]. |
| Domain | information, finance | (a) The failed system in the articles is related to the information industry, specifically social media platforms like Facebook that involve the production and distribution of information. The incident involved a security flaw that allowed unauthorized posting on users' pages, including high-profile individuals like Mark Zuckerberg [20900, 20968, 20909]. (h) The incident also has implications for the finance industry as it involves the handling of bug reports and rewards related to security vulnerabilities on the Facebook platform [20900, 20968, 20909]. (m) The incident could also be related to the technology industry, given that it involves a software vulnerability on a widely used social media platform like Facebook [20900, 20968, 20909]. |
Article ID: 20900
Article ID: 20968
Article ID: 20909
Article ID: 94558