| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident has happened again at one_organization:
The article mentions that Carphone Warehouse, part of the same group as Dixons Carphone, was fined £400,000 for similar security vulnerabilities in the past [94319].
(b) The software failure incident has happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that British Airways was fined £183m for a data breach incident, and the Marriott hotel group received a near-£100m censure for a similar incident, indicating that similar incidents have occurred at other organizations as well [94319]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to design-related factors introduced during system development and maintenance. The cyber-attack on Dixons Carphone's tills was a result of malicious software being installed on the tills in its shops, which went undetected for a nine-month period. The attacker harvested a significant amount of data, including payment card details and personal information, due to systemic failures in how Dixons Carphone handled customer data [94319].
(b) The software failure incident can also be linked to operational factors, specifically the operation and misuse of the system. The rogue software installed on the tills collected data over a prolonged period, indicating a failure in the operation and monitoring of the systems in place to detect such breaches. The incident left customers vulnerable to financial theft and identity fraud, highlighting operational weaknesses in safeguarding customer data [94319]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at Dixons Carphone was primarily due to systemic failures within the company's handling of customer data. The rogue software that compromised the tills in its shops went undetected for a significant period, allowing the attacker to collect a vast amount of sensitive data from millions of customers. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) found that Dixons Carphone had poor security arrangements and inadequate steps to protect data, leading to the breach. The ICO director mentioned "systemic failures" in how Dixons Carphone managed customer data, indicating internal issues within the system [94319].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident at Dixons Carphone was also influenced by external factors, specifically the cyber-attack that targeted the tills in its shops. The attacker installed malicious software on the tills, compromising the system and collecting data from millions of customers. This external cyber-attack was a significant contributing factor to the software failure incident [94319]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident at Dixons Carphone was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a cyber-attack where malicious software was installed on tills in their shops, compromising the data of millions of customers [94319].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the failure as the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) found systemic failures in the way Dixons Carphone looked after its customer data, indicating inadequate steps taken to protect data and poor security arrangements by the company [94319]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 94319 was primarily due to contributing factors originating in software. The incident involved a cyber-attack where malicious software was installed on tills in Dixons Carphone's shops, compromising the data of millions of customers. The rogue software collected a significant amount of data over a nine-month period, leading to a massive data breach affecting 14 million people. The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) found systemic failures in how Dixons Carphone handled customer data, indicating a software-related vulnerability [94319].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 94319 was also related to contributing factors originating in software. The cyber-attack involved the installation of malicious software on tills in Dixons Carphone's shops, which went undetected for a prolonged period, allowing the attacker to harvest payment card details and personal information of millions of customers. The ICO highlighted Dixon Carphone's poor security arrangements and inadequate data protection measures as breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998, indicating software-related weaknesses in their security systems [94319]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 94319 was malicious in nature. The incident involved a cyber-attack where malicious software was installed on tills in Dixons Carphone shops, compromising the data of millions of customers. The attacker harvested payment card details and personal information, leaving customers vulnerable to financial theft and identity fraud. The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) found systemic failures in how Dixons Carphone protected customer data, indicating that the breach was intentional and aimed at causing harm ([94319]). |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at Dixons Carphone was primarily due to poor decisions and poor security arrangements. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) found "systemic failures" in the way Dixons Carphone looked after its customer data, leading to a massive data breach affecting millions of customers [94319]. The ICO stated that Dixon Carphone’s poor security arrangements and inadequate steps taken to protect data had breached the Data Protection Act 1998, indicating poor decisions in handling customer data security. Additionally, the group chief executive of Dixons Carphone mentioned that the company had made significant investments in information security systems and processes after the incident was discovered, implying that there were shortcomings in their security measures prior to the breach [94319]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident at Dixons Carphone was primarily due to development incompetence. The incident involved a cyber-attack where malicious software was installed on tills in their shops, compromising the data of millions of customers. The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) found "systemic failures" in the way Dixons Carphone handled customer data, indicating a lack of professional competence in safeguarding sensitive information [94319].
(b) Additionally, the incident could also be categorized as accidental as the rogue software went undetected for a nine-month period, allowing the attacker to collect a significant amount of data. The company's CEO mentioned that there was no confirmed evidence of customers suffering fraud or financial loss, indicating that the breach was not intentional but rather accidental in nature [94319]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident at Dixons Carphone, where the tills in its shops were compromised by a cyber-attack, can be categorized as a temporary failure. The rogue software installed on the tills went undetected over a nine-month period between July 2017 and April 2018 [94319]. This indicates that the failure was not permanent but rather occurred due to specific circumstances during that time frame. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, timing, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash as the malicious software installed on the tills in Dixons Carphone's shops compromised the system, leading to a massive data breach affecting millions of customers. This crash resulted in the system losing its state and not performing its intended functions, allowing the attacker to collect a huge amount of data over a nine-month period without detection [94319].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission as the compromised system omitted to perform its intended functions of protecting customer data and preventing unauthorized access. The rogue software went undetected for a significant period, allowing the attacker to harvest payment card details and personal information of millions of individuals, leaving them vulnerable to financial theft and identity fraud [94319].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident can be considered a factor in the breach. The attacker was able to exploit the system over a nine-month period between July 2017 and April 2018, indicating that the system performed its intended functions incorrectly by allowing unauthorized access for an extended duration [94319].
(d) value: The software failure incident can also be attributed to a failure in value as the compromised system performed its intended functions incorrectly by failing to protect customer data adequately. The breach resulted in the theft of payment card details and personal information of millions of individuals, exposing them to the risk of fraud and financial loss [94319].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions within a distributed system. The incident in the article primarily revolves around a cyber-attack compromising the tills and collecting sensitive customer data, rather than displaying erratic or inconsistent behavior within the system [94319].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be further categorized as a failure in terms of systemic failures in data protection and security arrangements. The incident highlights a failure in the company's overall approach to safeguarding customer data, leading to a significant breach that exposed millions of individuals to potential fraud and financial risks [94319]. |