Published Date: 2020-01-09
Postmortem Analysis | |
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Timeline | 1. The software failure incident with faulty brakes and engines on Mazda 3 vehicles in Australia occurred between March 26 and December 24, 2019 [Article 94789]. |
System | 1. Smart Brake Support (SBS) system in Mazda 3 (BP) MY2019 vehicles [94789] 2. Start/stop function software programming in Mazda 3 MY2019 vehicles [94789] |
Responsible Organization | 1. Mazda - Mazda was responsible for causing the software failure incident in the Mazda 3 (BP) MY2019 vehicles due to faulty brakes and engines, as reported in Article 94789. [94789] |
Impacted Organization | 1. Mazda 3 (BP) MY2019 vehicle owners in Australia [94789] 2. Mazda Australia as the manufacturer and responsible party for the recalls [94789] |
Software Causes | 1. The first software cause of the failure incident was a faulty Smart Brake Support (SBS) system that falsely detected objects in front of the vehicle, leading to potential accidents and injuries [94789]. 2. The second software cause of the failure incident was a software programming fault with the start/stop function, which prevented the engine from restarting after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle was manually restarted using the start/stop button [94789]. |
Non-software Causes | 1. Faulty brakes in the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system [94789] 2. Engine issue related to a software programming fault with the start/stop function [94789] |
Impacts | 1. The first impact of the software failure incident was an increased risk of accidents and injuries to the driver, occupants, and other cars on the road due to the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system falsely detecting objects in front of the vehicle, potentially causing the SBS to activate [94789]. 2. The second impact was the risk of accidents and injuries caused by the software programming fault related to the start/stop function, where the engine may not restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is manually restarted using the start/stop button [94789]. |
Preventions | 1. Implementing thorough software testing procedures during the development phase to identify and rectify any programming faults before the vehicles are released to the market [94789]. 2. Conducting regular software quality assurance checks and audits to ensure the proper functioning of critical systems like the Smart Brake Support (SBS) and start/stop function [94789]. 3. Implementing robust software update mechanisms to quickly address any identified software programming faults or bugs post-release to prevent potential safety hazards [94789]. |
Fixes | 1. Updating the software programming to address the faulty Smart Brake Support (SBS) system [94789]. 2. Updating the software programming to rectify the start/stop function fault that prevents the engine from restarting after being in idle stop mode [94789]. | References | 1. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [94789] 2. Mazda Australia [94789] |
Category | Option | Rationale |
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Recurring | one_organization | (a) The software failure incident has happened again at one_organization: Since the car went on sale in April, there have been a total of five recalls related to software and other faults for the Mazda 3 model [94789]. (b) The software failure incident has happened again at multiple_organization: There is no specific mention in the provided article about the software failure incident happening again at other organizations or with their products and services. |
Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the second recall affecting 14,583 Mazda 3 vehicles due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function. The article mentions that the engine may not restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button, indicating a design flaw in the software programming [94789]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is seen in the first recall affecting 13,768 vehicles with issues in the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system. The article highlights that the system may falsely detect an object in front of the vehicle, causing the SBS to go off. This issue poses an increased risk of accidents and injury due to the operation of the faulty system [94789]. |
Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) The software failure incident related to the Mazda recalls falls under the within_system boundary. The recalls were issued due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function in the Mazda 3 vehicles sold between March 26 and December 24, 2019 in Australia [94789]. This fault originates from within the system itself, specifically in the software programming that controls the start/stop function of the engine. |
Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions | (a) The software failure incident related to non-human_actions: - The second recall affecting 14,583 vehicles was due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function, which caused the engine not to restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle was restarted using the start/stop button [Article 94789]. (b) The software failure incident related to human_actions: - There is no specific mention in the articles about the software failure incident being directly caused by human actions. |
Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The first recall affects 13,768 Mazda 3 vehicles with issues in the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system, which is a hardware component [94789]. - The second recall affects 14,583 vehicles due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function, indicating a hardware-related issue with the engine not restarting properly [94789]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The second recall affecting 14,583 vehicles is specifically due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function, highlighting a software-related issue [94789]. |
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) The software failure incident related to the Mazda recalls does not appear to be malicious. The faults in the Smart Brake Support system and the start/stop function were due to software programming faults and issues in the system's detection capabilities, leading to potential safety risks for drivers and other road users. There is no indication in the articles that these faults were introduced with intent to harm the system ([94789]). |
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) The software failure incident related to the Mazda recalls can be attributed to poor decisions made during the software programming. The article mentions a software programming fault with the start/stop function in 14,583 vehicles, where the engine may not restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button. This indicates a flaw in the software design or implementation that led to this issue [94789]. |
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it mentions a software programming fault with the start/stop function in Mazda 3 vehicles sold between March 26 and December 24, 2019 in Australia [94789]. This fault led to the engine not restarting after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button. Such a programming error indicates a lack of professional competence in the development process, resulting in a critical functionality issue that poses risks to drivers and other road users. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the article, particularly in the case of the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system issue affecting 13,768 Mazda 3 vehicles sold during the same period in Australia [94789]. The article mentions that the system may falsely detect an object in front of the vehicle, causing the SBS to activate erroneously. This accidental detection error can lead to an increased risk of accidents and injuries, indicating a failure introduced accidentally during the software development or implementation process. |
Duration | temporary | The software failure incident related to the Mazda recalls can be categorized as a temporary failure. The article mentions that the second recall affecting 14,583 vehicles is due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function, which causes the engine not to restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button. This indicates that the failure is temporary and can be resolved by restarting the vehicle using the button [Article 94789]. |
Behaviour | crash, omission, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the Mazda vehicles involved a crash behavior where the engine may not restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button [Article 94789]. (b) omission: The software failure incident also involved an omission behavior where the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system may falsely detect an object in front of the vehicle, causing the SBS to go off [Article 94789]. (c) timing: There is no specific information in the articles indicating a timing-related software failure incident. (d) value: The software failure incident related to the Mazda vehicles did not involve a value-related failure. (e) byzantine: There is no specific information in the articles indicating a byzantine-related software failure incident. (f) other: The software failure incident also included a software programming fault with the start/stop function, which could be categorized as an "other" behavior as it does not fit precisely into the provided options [Article 94789]. |
Layer | Option | Rationale |
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Perception | sensor, embedded_software | (a) The failure related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed was due to contributing factors introduced by sensor error. The article mentions that the first recall affects 13,768 vehicles with issues in the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system, where the system may falsely detect an object in front of the vehicle, causing the SBS to go off [94789]. (b) The failure related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed was not specifically mentioned in the articles. (c) The failure related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed was not specifically mentioned in the articles. (d) The failure related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed was not specifically mentioned in the articles. (e) The failure related to the perception layer of the cyber physical system that failed was due to contributing factors introduced by embedded software error. The second recall affects 14,583 vehicles due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function, where the engine may not restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button [94789]. |
Communication | connectivity_level | The software failure incident reported in Article 94789 is related to the connectivity level of the cyber-physical system. The second recall affecting 14,583 vehicles was due to a software programming fault with the start/stop function, where the engine may not restart after being in idle stop mode until the vehicle is restarted using the start/stop button. This issue indicates a failure at the software level that affects the connectivity or communication between the engine and the start/stop system, which is a network or transport layer issue in the cyber-physical system. |
Application | FALSE | The software failure incident related to the Mazda recalls does not specifically mention that the failure was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The articles focus on issues with the Smart Brake Support system and a software programming fault with the start/stop function, but do not provide details indicating that the failure was specifically due to bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, or incorrect usage at the application layer. Therefore, it is unknown if the failure was related to the application layer based on the information provided in the articles. |
Category | Option | Rationale |
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Consequence | harm, property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the articles [94789]. (b) harm: The articles mention an increased risk of accidents and injury to the driver, occupants of the Mazda 3 vehicles, and other cars on the road due to the software programming fault with the start/stop function [94789]. (c) basic: There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident in the articles [94789]. (d) property: The software programming fault with the start/stop function could impact people's material goods (vehicles) due to the engine not restarting after being in idle stop mode [94789]. (e) delay: There is no mention of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident in the articles [94789]. (f) non-human: The software failure incident impacted the Smart Brake Support (SBS) system and the start/stop function in Mazda 3 vehicles [94789]. (g) no_consequence: There were observed consequences of the software failure incident, such as an increased risk of accidents and injury, as mentioned in the articles [94789]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss the potential consequences of accidents and injuries resulting from the software programming fault with the start/stop function in Mazda 3 vehicles [94789]. (i) other: There are no other consequences of the software failure incident mentioned in the articles [94789]. |
Domain | transportation | (a) The failed system in the software failure incident reported in Article 94789 was intended to support the transportation industry. The recalls issued by Mazda for faulty brakes and engines on the Mazda 3 (BP) MY2019 vehicles directly impact the transportation sector as these issues pose risks to the drivers, occupants, and other cars on the road [94789]. |
Article ID: 94789