Recurring |
unknown |
a) The software failure incident related to the Elector app used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party is a unique incident that has not been reported to have happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The article does not mention any previous occurrences of similar incidents within the Likud party or with the Elector app specifically.
b) The article mentions that the Elector app has been downloaded in countries like Moldova, China, Russia, and the United States, indicating that the software failure incident could potentially impact users in these countries as well. However, there is no specific mention of similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services in the articles provided [95937]. |
Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the Elector app used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party was due to a security flaw in the design phase. The flaw allowed anyone to access and download the voter registry by simply viewing the source code on the app's website, without requiring advanced hacking skills [95937].
(b) The software failure incident can also be attributed to operational factors as the sensitive voter data was available for at least 24 hours and possibly longer before being fixed. The flaw was discovered by a software developer who was tipped off by an anonymous source and notified the developer of the issue. The incident highlights the importance of operational security measures to prevent unauthorized access to critical information [95937]. |
Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system:
The software failure incident in the Elector app used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party was due to a security flaw within the system itself. The flaw allowed easy access to the personal data of all eligible voters in Israel, exposing names, addresses, and identity card numbers. The flaw was described as a simple and stupid hack that didn't require advanced hacking skills to exploit. Users could view the source code on the app's website, revealing system administrator logins and enabling the download of the voter registry [95937]. The incident was attributed to a lack of proper security measures within the app itself.
(b) outside_system:
There is no specific mention in the article of the software failure incident being caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system. The focus of the incident was on the security flaw within the Elector app that exposed sensitive voter data. |
Nature (Human/Non-human) |
human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the Elector app used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party was primarily due to a security flaw, which exposed the personal data of all eligible voters in Israel. This flaw allowed anyone to access and download the voter registry without requiring advanced hacking skills. The flaw was described as a "very simple, very stupid hack" that didn't involve advanced technical knowledge [95937].
(b) Human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The developer of the Elector app, Zuriel Yamin, and the development firm, Feed-b, were responsible for the security of the app. The developer tried to downplay the security flaw as a "one-off incident" that was immediately dealt with, and security measures were said to have been improved. The Likud party, which encouraged its supporters to download the app, also shifted the blame to the developer, stating that the professional and legal responsibility lies with them. Additionally, the Privacy Protection Authority in the Ministry of Justice opened an oversight procedure due to the security breach and emphasized that compliance with privacy and election laws is the responsibility of the parties involved [95937]. |
Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the article was primarily due to a security flaw in the mobile app called Elector used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party. This security flaw exposed the personal data of every eligible voter in Israel, including names, addresses, and identity card numbers. The flaw allowed users to easily access and download the voter registry without requiring advanced hacking knowledge. The flaw was described as a simple and stupid hack that didn't require technical expertise [95937].
(b) The software failure incident was specifically attributed to a security flaw in the Elector app, indicating that the contributing factors that led to the failure originated in the software itself. The flaw allowed unauthorized access to sensitive voter data and was described as a significant embarrassment in a country known for its cybersecurity prowess. The software developer who exposed the flaw highlighted that it was not a sophisticated hack but rather a simple exploit in the app's code [95937]. |
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was non-malicious. The security flaw in the Elector app was not intentionally introduced to harm the system. It was a result of a simple and easily exploitable flaw that allowed access to sensitive voter data without requiring advanced hacking skills [95937]. The developer of the app downplayed the incident as a "one-off" occurrence that was immediately addressed, indicating that there was no malicious intent behind the flaw [95937].
(b) The incident was not malicious, as there is no indication in the articles that the security flaw was introduced with the intent to harm the system or compromise voter data. It was described as a significant embarrassment for a country known for its cybersecurity prowess, highlighting the non-malicious nature of the failure [95937]. |
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the security flaw in the Elector app used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party was primarily due to poor decisions. The flaw exposed the personal data of every eligible voter in Israel, including names, addresses, and identity card numbers, to anyone with basic access to the app's website without requiring advanced hacking skills [95937]. The incident was described as a "very simple, very stupid hack" that allowed easy access to critical information, indicating a lack of proper security measures and poor decision-making in the app's development and maintenance. Additionally, the developer of the app tried to downplay the security flaw as a "one-off incident" that was immediately dealt with, suggesting a lack of accountability and responsibility for the data breach. |
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the Elector app used by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party was due to development incompetence. The security flaw that exposed the personal data of all eligible voters in Israel was described as "very simple, very stupid hack" by software developer Ran Bar-Zik, who discovered the flaw [95937]. The developer of the app, Zuriel Yamin, downplayed the security flaw as a "one-off incident that was immediately dealt with" and mentioned that security measures had been improved [95937].
(b) The software failure incident was accidental in nature as the flaw in the Elector app was not intentional but rather a result of a simple vulnerability that allowed anyone to access and download the voter registry without advanced hacking knowledge [95937]. The developer, Feed-b, mentioned that the security flaw was a one-off incident that was immediately addressed, indicating that it was not a deliberate act [95937]. |
Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The security flaw in the Elector app that exposed the personal data of Israeli voters was fixed by the developer within a relatively short timeframe after being notified about the issue. The flaw was reported to have been fixed from Friday evening to Saturday evening, indicating that the incident was not permanent [95937]. |
Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the Elector app can be categorized as a crash. The flaw in the app allowed users to access the source code, revealing critical information such as voter registry data. This unauthorized access and exposure of sensitive data can be considered a crash as the system lost control over its data security, leading to a significant breach [95937].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The flaw in the app allowed users to view the source code, which revealed the logins of system administrators, enabling anyone to access and download the voter registry. This omission of proper access controls and security measures led to the exposure of personal data of millions of Israeli citizens [95937].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not seem to align with a timing failure. The issue was not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early but rather the system failing to secure sensitive data properly [95937].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized as a value failure. The flaw in the app resulted in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly by allowing unauthorized access to critical information like names, addresses, and identity card numbers of all eligible voters in Israel. This incorrect behavior compromised the value of the system in safeguarding private data [95937].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure. There were no indications of inconsistent responses or interactions within the system that would classify it as a byzantine failure [95937].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be further described as a significant security breach that exposed the personal data of millions of Israeli citizens due to a flaw in the app's design. The incident highlighted a severe oversight in the system's security measures, leading to a breach of trust and privacy for the users [95937]. |