Incident: Chrome Spyware Malware Attack on Google Chrome Web Store

Published Date: 2020-06-18

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident of the Chrome spyware attack happened in June 2020. [Article 101422]
System The systems that failed in the software failure incident reported in Article 101422 are: 1. Google Chrome Web Store's automated and manual analyses system [101422] 2. Google's detection and removal system for malicious Chrome extensions [101422] 3. Antivirus companies or security software that evaluates the reputations of web domains [101422] 4. Google's rules for extension developers to prevent malicious activities [101422]
Responsible Organization 1. Malicious developers who created and distributed the spyware-infected Chrome extensions [101422] 2. Galcomm, the registrar in Israel that sold the malicious domains used in the spyware attack [101422]
Impacted Organization 1. Google Chrome users [101422] 2. Awake Security researchers [101422]
Software Causes 1. Malicious Chrome extensions that stole browsing history and sensitive data from users, compromising their credentials for access to internal business tools [101422]. 2. Spyware that infiltrated users' computing devices through downloads of Chrome extensions, sending stolen information to a third party without the users' knowledge [101422]. 3. Failure of Google's automated and manual analyses to detect and remove the malicious Chrome extensions from its official Chrome Web Store, leading to millions of users being targeted in the spyware attack [101422].
Non-software Causes 1. The developers behind the malware supplied fake contact information when submitting the extensions to Google [101422]. 2. The domains linked to the malicious websites were purchased from a small registrar in Israel, Galcomm, which denied any involvement in malicious activities [101422].
Impacts 1. Millions of Google Chrome users were targeted in the spyware attack, with 32 million downloads of Chrome extensions compromised [101422]. 2. The spyware stole browsing history and data that provided credentials for access to internal business tools [101422]. 3. Google removed more than 70 of the malicious add-ons from its official Chrome Web Store after being alerted by security researchers [101422]. 4. The malicious Chrome store campaign was the most far-reaching to date, affecting a large number of users [101422]. 5. The spyware attack highlighted the vulnerability of popular platforms like Google Chrome to malware and malicious software [101422].
Preventions 1. Implementing stricter review processes for Chrome extensions before allowing them to be published on the Chrome Web Store could have prevented the software failure incident [101422]. 2. Enhancing automated detection mechanisms to identify and remove malicious extensions promptly could have helped prevent the incident [101422]. 3. Conducting more thorough background checks on developers submitting extensions to ensure they provide accurate contact information and have a legitimate purpose for their extensions could have mitigated the risk of such incidents [101422]. 4. Increasing collaboration and information sharing between security researchers, like Awake Security, and companies like Google to quickly identify and address potential threats could have helped prevent the incident [101422].
Fixes 1. Implement stricter review processes for Chrome extensions submitted to the Chrome Web Store to detect and remove malicious add-ons promptly [101422]. 2. Enhance automated and manual analyses to better detect and prevent malicious software from infiltrating the Chrome Web Store [101422]. 3. Increase collaboration with security researchers and firms to identify and address potential software vulnerabilities and threats [101422]. 4. Enforce stricter guidelines for extension developers to follow, ensuring compliance with security standards and practices [101422]. 5. Conduct regular sweeps and audits to identify and remove extensions using similar malicious techniques, code, and behaviors [101422].
References 1. Security researchers at Awake Security [101422] 2. Google spokesperson Scott Westover [101422] 3. Awake co-founder and chief scientist Gary Golomb [101422] 4. Galcomm owner Moshe Fogel [101422] 5. Internet Corp for Assigned Names and Numbers [101422] 6. Former National Security Agency engineer Ben Johnson [101422] 7. Independent researcher Jamila Kaya and Cisco Systems' Duo Security [101422]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the Chrome spyware attack has happened again within the same organization, Google. In 2018, Google had set new rules for extension developers to follow or face the possibility of having their extension removed from the Chrome store after one in 10 submissions was deemed malicious [101422]. This indicates that Google had faced similar issues with malicious extensions in the past, leading to the implementation of stricter rules. (b) The incident of malicious software being distributed through Google's Chrome Store is not unique to Google alone. Malicious developers have been using Google's Chrome Store as a conduit for a long time due to its popularity, initially spewing unwanted advertisements and now installing additional malicious programs or tracking users for espionage purposes [101422]. Additionally, in February, an independent researcher and Cisco Systems' Duo Security uncovered a similar Chrome campaign that stole data from about 1.7 million users, with Google finding 500 fraudulent extensions [101422]. This suggests that similar incidents have occurred with other organizations or their products and services as well.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be attributed to the malicious Chrome extensions that were developed and distributed through Google's Chrome Web Store. Security researchers discovered malware that compromised users through downloads of these extensions, which were designed to appear as legitimate tools for warning users about questionable websites or converting files. However, instead of serving their stated purposes, these extensions siphoned off browsing history and sensitive data, leading to a significant security breach [101422]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be linked to the users who downloaded and installed the malicious Chrome extensions. These users unknowingly exposed their browsing history and sensitive information to the attackers behind the spyware campaign. The operation of the system, in this case, involved users interacting with the compromised extensions on their Chrome browsers, ultimately leading to the theft of their data [101422].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Chrome spyware attack on Google Chrome extensions can be categorized as a within_system failure. The malicious Chrome extensions were able to compromise users and steal sensitive information due to the fact that they were able to bypass Google's security measures and infiltrate the Chrome Web Store, which is a part of the Chrome browser system itself [101422]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident can also be attributed to contributing factors that originate from outside the system. The developers behind the malicious Chrome extensions supplied fake contact information when submitting the extensions to Google, making it difficult for Google to detect the malicious intent initially. Additionally, the domains used in the attack were purchased from an external registrar in Israel, Galcomm, which claimed innocence and cooperation with law enforcement to prevent malicious activities [101422].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident related to non-human actions in this case was the distribution of malware through malicious Chrome extensions. Security researchers discovered that the spyware attacked users through 32 million downloads of Chrome extensions, which siphoned off browsing history and data without the users' knowledge [101422]. (b) The software failure incident related to human actions in this case involved the malicious developers who supplied fake contact information when submitting the extensions to Google. Additionally, the developers designed the extensions to avoid detection by antivirus companies or security software, showing deliberate actions to evade detection [101422].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The incident reported in the news article [101422] is primarily related to software failure due to malicious Chrome extensions that compromised users through downloads. The malware attacked users through 32 million downloads of Chrome extensions, which were designed to steal browsing history and data for access to internal business tools. This indicates that the failure originated in the software domain rather than hardware. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The software failure incident reported in the news article [101422] is directly related to software issues. The incident involved the distribution of malicious Chrome extensions that acted as spyware, stealing information from users' computers and sending it to a third party. The malicious software infiltrated computing devices through the Chrome Web Store, highlighting a software-related failure in terms of security vulnerabilities and malicious code execution.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is malicious in nature. Security researchers discovered malware that compromised users through downloads of extensions to Google's Chrome web browser. The malware, described as 'spyware,' attacked users through 32 million downloads of Chrome extensions, which were designed to steal browsing history and data for unauthorized access to internal business tools [101422]. The malicious developers behind the spyware campaign supplied fake contact information when submitting the extensions to Google, and the extensions were designed to avoid detection by antivirus companies or security software [101422]. Additionally, the incident involved the purchase of more than 15,000 malicious domains linked to each other from a small registrar in Israel, Galcomm. The registrar denied involvement in any malicious activity and claimed to cooperate with law enforcement and security bodies to prevent such activities [101422]. Former National Security Agency engineer Ben Johnson highlighted that malicious developers have been using the Chrome Store to install additional malicious programs or track users' activities for espionage purposes [101422]. Google had set new rules for extension developers to follow to prevent such incidents, but similar campaigns have been uncovered in the past, indicating a persistent threat from malicious actors targeting Chrome users [101422].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor decisions made by the malicious developers who created the spyware-infected Chrome extensions. These developers supplied fake contact information when submitting the extensions to Google, designed the extensions to avoid detection by antivirus companies, and purchased malicious domains to hide their activities [101422]. These actions demonstrate a deliberate effort to deceive users and evade detection, indicating a clear intent to compromise users' data for malicious purposes.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the malware attack on Google Chrome users through malicious extensions. Security researchers discovered that the spyware attack compromised users through 32 million downloads of Chrome extensions, which were designed to steal browsing history and credentials for internal business tools [101422]. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is seen in the oversight by Google in detecting and removing the malicious Chrome extensions on its own. Despite the widespread impact of the spyware attack on millions of Google Chrome users, Google had not detected and removed the malicious add-ons until alerted by the researchers [101422].
Duration permanent, temporary (a) The software failure incident in the articles can be considered as a permanent failure. The malware that compromised users through Chrome extensions was a deliberate and malicious act by developers who supplied fake contact information and designed the extensions to avoid detection by antivirus companies or security software [101422]. Additionally, the incident involved a significant number of downloads (32 million) of the malicious Chrome extensions, indicating a widespread and enduring impact on users [101422]. (b) The software failure incident can also be seen as a temporary failure in the sense that Google took action to remove more than 70 of the malicious add-ons from its official Chrome Web Store after being alerted by security researchers [101422]. This action by Google can be seen as a temporary resolution to the immediate threat posed by the malware-infected extensions.
Behaviour omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the Chrome spyware attack did not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The spyware extensions were actively stealing browsing history and data, indicating that the system was still functioning to some extent [101422]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can be categorized under omission, as the malicious Chrome extensions omitted to perform their intended functions of warning users about questionable websites or converting files, instead siphoning off browsing history and sensitive data without the users' knowledge [101422]. (c) timing: The software failure incident was not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early. The spyware extensions were actively collecting and transmitting data in real-time, indicating no timing-related failures [101422]. (d) value: The software failure incident falls under the category of value, as the malicious Chrome extensions were performing their intended functions incorrectly by stealing sensitive information from users' computers and sending it to a third party without the users' knowledge [101422]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The spyware extensions consistently stole information from users' computers and sent it to a third party without deviation [101422]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized under a form of data breach or cyber attack, where the malicious Chrome extensions were designed to deceive users by offering seemingly legitimate functions while actually stealing sensitive information. This behavior could be classified as a deceptive tactic leading to a security breach [101422].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident involving the malicious Chrome extensions led to the compromise of users' browsing history and data, which provided credentials for access to internal business tools. This resulted in the theft of sensitive information from users' computing devices, including internet usage data and personal information, which was then sent to third parties without the users' knowledge [101422].
Domain information (a) The software failure incident reported in the news article is related to the information industry, specifically targeting Google Chrome users through malicious extensions that stole browsing history and sensitive data [101422]. The incident involved the compromise of users' information and credentials, highlighting the importance of cybersecurity in the production and distribution of information.

Sources

Back to List