Incident: Hackers Extort $1.14m from University of California, San Francisco

Published Date: 2020-06-29

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) happened on June 1, as mentioned in the article [101234].
System 1. University of California San Francisco's computer systems [101234]
Responsible Organization 1. Netwalker criminal gang [101234]
Impacted Organization 1. University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) [101234]
Software Causes 1. Ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang on the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) [101234] 2. Malware spreading through computers at UCSF due to the ransomware attack [101234] 3. Negotiations with the hackers conducted through a live chat on the dark web [101234] 4. Encryption of important data at UCSF by the malware [101234] 5. Financial impact of the coronavirus pandemic on UCSF leading to the decision to pay the ransom [101234]
Non-software Causes 1. Financial impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) leading to difficulties in negotiating the ransom amount [101234]. 2. The decision-making process within UCSF regarding the ransom payment, including the consideration of the importance of the encrypted data for academic work [101234].
Impacts 1. The University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) suffered financial losses amounting to $1.14 million as a result of the ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang [101234]. 2. The incident disrupted UCSF's operations as IT staff had to unplug computers to prevent the malware from spreading, impacting their ability to carry out important academic work [101234]. 3. The ransomware attack led to a loss of control over encrypted data, forcing UCSF to negotiate with the hackers and ultimately pay a significant sum to regain access to their data [101234]. 4. The incident highlighted the financial challenges faced by UCSF, exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, as they struggled to meet the demands of the hackers and secure their data [101234]. 5. The ransomware attack raised concerns about the security of universities and the need for better cybersecurity measures to protect against such incidents in the future [101234].
Preventions 1. Regularly back-up data offline: Organisations, including universities like UCSF, should regularly back up their data offline to prevent data loss in case of ransomware attacks [101234]. 2. Strengthen cybersecurity measures: Implement robust cybersecurity measures to prevent unauthorized access to systems and networks, such as using multi-factor authentication, keeping software up to date, and conducting regular security audits [101234]. 3. Employee training: Provide comprehensive training to employees on cybersecurity best practices, including how to identify phishing emails and avoid clicking on malicious links or attachments [101234]. 4. Collaboration with law enforcement: Collaborate with law enforcement agencies like the FBI and Europol to report incidents promptly and work towards disrupting criminal enterprises engaged in ransomware attacks [101234].
Fixes 1. Enhancing cybersecurity measures to prevent future ransomware attacks, such as improving network security, implementing multi-factor authentication, and conducting regular security audits [101234]. 2. Educating staff and students at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) about cybersecurity best practices to prevent falling victim to phishing emails or other social engineering tactics used by hackers [101234]. 3. Implementing robust data backup procedures to ensure critical data is regularly backed up offline, reducing the impact of ransomware attacks and enabling quicker recovery [101234]. 4. Collaborating with law enforcement agencies like the FBI and Europol to investigate the incident, track down the perpetrators, and disrupt criminal enterprises involved in ransomware attacks [101234].
References 1. University of California San Francisco (UCSF) [101234] 2. Netwalker criminal gang [101234] 3. FBI [101234] 4. Europol [101234] 5. UK's National Cyber Security Centre [101234] 6. Cyber-security experts [101234] 7. No More Ransom project by Europol [101234] 8. Cyber-security company Emsisoft [101234] 9. Proofpoint's cyber-security analysts [101234] 10. Proofpoint's Ryan Kalember [101234]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - Netwalker criminal gang, responsible for the ransomware attack on the University of California San Francisco (UCSF), has been linked to at least two other ransomware attacks on universities in the past two months [101234]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The article mentions that criminal gangs, in general, are increasingly using tools that can gain access to systems via a single download, and there have been more than one million emails with phishing lures sent to organizations in various countries [101234].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in Article 101234 was primarily due to a design-related factor introduced by the cybercriminals who developed and deployed the ransomware attack on the University of California San Francisco (UCSF). The Netwalker criminal gang attacked UCSF's systems with malware, encrypting important data and demanding a ransom for decryption [101234]. (b) Additionally, the operation of the system played a role in the software failure incident. The IT staff at UCSF had to unplug computers in a race to stop the malware from spreading further, indicating that the operation of the system was impacted by the attack [101234].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) was primarily caused by the Netwalker criminal gang's ransomware attack on UCSF's systems. The attack led to the encryption of important data, prompting UCSF to negotiate with the hackers and eventually pay a ransom of $1.14 million to obtain a decryption tool [101234]. (b) outside_system: The external contributing factors to the software failure incident include the actions of the Netwalker criminal gang, who initiated the ransomware attack on UCSF's systems from outside the university's network. Additionally, the incident involved negotiations with the hackers on the dark web, indicating external involvement in the resolution of the attack [101234].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in Article 101234 occurred due to non-human actions, specifically a ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang. The attack involved malware spreading through the university's computers, leading to the encryption of important data. The ransomware attack was initiated by the hackers without direct human participation in introducing the contributing factors that caused the failure [101234]. (b) The software failure incident in Article 101234 also involved human actions in the form of negotiations between the university and the hackers. The university engaged in live chat negotiations on the dark web with the hackers to determine the ransom amount and secure the decryption software. Human actions, such as negotiating the ransom amount and making decisions on payment, played a significant role in the resolution of the incident [101234].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 101234 was not due to hardware issues but rather a ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang. The attack involved malware spreading through the university's computers, leading to data encryption and extortion of a ransom payment [101234]. (b) The software failure incident in Article 101234 was primarily caused by software-related factors, specifically a ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang. The malware encrypted data on the university's systems, leading to the need for a ransom payment to unlock the data. This incident highlights the impact of software vulnerabilities and cyber threats on organizations [101234].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 101234 is malicious in nature. The incident involved a ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang on the University of California San Francisco (UCSF). The hackers encrypted important data of the university and demanded a ransom of $1.14 million in exchange for a tool to unlock the encrypted data and the return of the data they obtained. The hackers engaged in live negotiations with the university on the dark web, demonstrating a deliberate intent to harm the system and extort money from the institution [101234].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor decisions made by the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) in response to the ransomware attack. Despite being advised against it by law enforcement agencies like the FBI, Europol, and the UK's National Cyber Security Centre, UCSF decided to engage in ransom negotiations with the Netwalker criminal gang and ultimately paid a ransom of $1.14 million to retrieve their encrypted data [101234]. This decision to pay the ransom can be considered a poor decision as it goes against the recommended best practices of not financing criminals and encouraging illegal activities. (b) The intent of the software failure incident was also influenced by accidental decisions made during the negotiation process. Initially, the hackers demanded $3 million from UCSF, but the university explained the financial impact of the coronavirus pandemic and offered $780,000. After negotiations, UCSF managed to gather more funds and made a final offer of $1,140,895, which was accepted by the criminals. This back-and-forth negotiation process and the final decision to pay the ransom can be seen as accidental decisions driven by the circumstances and pressures faced by UCSF during the incident [101234].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) was not attributed to development incompetence. The incident was a result of a ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang, where hackers encrypted UCSF's data and demanded a ransom of $1.14 million [101234]. (b) The software failure incident at UCSF was accidental in the sense that the ransomware attack was not intentionally caused by the university or its IT staff. It was an external attack by hackers who exploited vulnerabilities in the university's systems, leading to the encryption of important data [101234].
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in Article 101234 was temporary. The incident involved a ransomware attack by the Netwalker criminal gang on the University of California San Francisco (UCSF), which resulted in the encryption of important data. The incident lasted for a specific duration during which negotiations took place between the hackers and the university. The negotiations involved discussions on the ransom amount, with the university eventually paying $1.14 million to the hackers for a decryption tool to unlock the encrypted data [101234].
Behaviour crash, other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved malware spreading through the University of California San Francisco's (UCSF) computers, leading the IT staff to unplug the computers in a race to stop the malware from spreading [101234]. (b) omission: The software failure incident does not directly involve an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The incident primarily revolves around a ransomware attack and the subsequent negotiations for payment to unlock encrypted data [101234]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with a timing failure where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident mainly focuses on the ransom negotiations and the eventual payment made to the hackers [101234]. (d) value: The software failure incident does not relate to a value failure where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. The incident primarily involves the ransomware attack, negotiation for payment, and the eventual decryption of the data [101234]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident mainly revolves around the ransomware attack, negotiation process, and the eventual decryption of the data [101234]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a ransomware attack leading to data encryption, negotiation for ransom payment, and eventual decryption of the data. The incident showcases the impact of cybercriminal activities on organizations and the difficult decisions they face in such situations [101234].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident described in the article resulted in the University of California San Francisco (UCSF) paying hackers a ransom of $1.14 million after being attacked by the Netwalker criminal gang. The hackers encrypted important data related to academic work at the university, and UCSF made the decision to pay the ransom in exchange for a tool to unlock the encrypted data and the return of the obtained data [101234].
Domain knowledge, health (a) The failed system was intended to support the health industry. The incident involved a leading medical-research institution, the University of California San Francisco (UCSF), which was working on a cure for Covid-19 [Article 101234]. The ransomware attack targeted the university's systems, affecting important academic work related to public health. (j) The software failure incident was directly related to the health industry, specifically medical research and academic work at the University of California San Francisco [Article 101234].

Sources

Back to List