Incident: Critical Windows DNS Vulnerability (SigRed) Exposed for 17 Years

Published Date: 2020-07-14

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident, known as the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS, was discovered by Check Point and reported by Microsoft on July 14, 2020 [102489].
System 1. Windows DNS software [102489]
Responsible Organization 1. The software failure incident was caused by a vulnerability named SigRed discovered by Israeli security firm Check Point [102489].
Impacted Organization 1. Small and medium-sized organizations around the world that run Windows DNS servers [102489] 2. Thousands of IT administrators who manage Windows DNS servers [102489]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a critical vulnerability named SigRed in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol, which allowed for remote code execution on Windows DNS servers [102489].
Non-software Causes 1. The architectural changes made to networks to accommodate employees working from home due to the Covid-19 pandemic, potentially leading to more exposed Windows DNS servers vulnerable to exploitation [102489].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident, known as the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS, had a critical impact as it was rated 10 out of 10 on the common vulnerability scoring system, indicating its severity [102489]. 2. The vulnerability allowed hackers to gain full remote code execution on the target server, potentially leading to complete control over the network [102489]. 3. The incident raised concerns about the potential for a new large-scale cyberattack similar to WannaCry or NotPetya if the vulnerability were to be exploited on a wide scale [102489]. 4. Organizations, especially smaller ones using Windows DNS, were at risk of exploitation due to the long-standing nature of the vulnerability dating back to 2003 [102489]. 5. The incident highlighted the need for immediate patching to prevent exploitation by well-funded adversaries and other hackers [102489].
Preventions 1. Regular security audits and penetration testing of the Windows DNS software could have potentially identified the SigRed vulnerability earlier, allowing for a patch to be developed and deployed [102489]. 2. Implementing proper network architecture and security measures, such as not exposing DNS servers directly to the internet and ensuring firewalls are properly configured to block unauthorized access, could have mitigated the risk of exploitation [102489]. 3. Educating employees on cybersecurity best practices, such as avoiding clicking on suspicious links in phishing emails, could have reduced the likelihood of successful exploitation through social engineering tactics [102489].
Fixes 1. Microsoft released a fix for the SigRed bug as part of its Patch Tuesday batch of software updates [102489].
References 1. Check Point - Israeli security firm that discovered the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS [102489] 2. Microsoft - Released a fix for the SigRed bug as part of its Patch Tuesday software updates [102489] 3. Omri Herscovici - Head of vulnerability research at Check Point, provided insights on the severity and impact of the SigRed bug [102489] 4. Jake Williams - Former National Security Agency hacker and founder of Rendition Infosec, provided analysis on the potential exploitation of the SigRed bug [102489]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS is a critical issue that has affected multiple organizations. The vulnerability has existed in Windows DNS since 2003, making practically every version of the software vulnerable [102489]. This incident highlights the importance of organizations, especially smaller ones commonly running Windows DNS, to rush to patch the SigRed bug to prevent potential exploitation [102489]. (b) The SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS has primarily impacted smaller organizations that commonly run Windows DNS, as larger organizations often use the BIND implementation of DNS on Linux servers [102489]. However, the potential architectural changes made to networks due to the Covid-19 pandemic, such as more exposed Windows DNS servers, could lead to a broader impact on organizations [102489]. The threat landscape of internet-exposed things has risen dramatically in recent months, increasing the risk of exploitation of the SigRed vulnerability across various organizations [102489].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident described in the article is related to the design phase. The vulnerability named SigRed was discovered in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol, which is a fundamental building block of the internet. The bug exploited Windows DNS, a popular DNS software, and had existed in the software for 17 years. The flaw was critical and rated 10 out of 10 on the common vulnerability scoring system. The incident highlights a failure due to contributing factors introduced during system development and updates [102489]. (b) The software failure incident also has implications for the operation phase. While the target DNS server would have to be exposed directly to the internet for a remote, no-interaction attack, it was pointed out that a hacker could trigger the same DNS server takeover by gaining access to the local network through corporate Wi-Fi or LAN. Additionally, the vulnerability could potentially be exploited with just a link in a phishing email, indicating a failure due to contributing factors introduced by the operation or misuse of the system [102489].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) The software failure incident described in the article is within_system. The vulnerability named SigRed was found in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol, specifically in the Windows DNS software that translates domain names into IP addresses. This vulnerability has existed in the software for 17 years, indicating an internal flaw within the system itself [102489]. (b) The article does not mention any contributing factors originating from outside the system that led to the software failure incident.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in Article 102489 occurred due to non-human actions. The vulnerability named SigRed in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol was discovered by Israeli security firm Check Point. This vulnerability, existing for 17 years, allowed attackers to exploit Windows DNS servers without any action on the part of the target user, creating a seamless and powerful attack [102489]. (b) The software failure incident in Article 102489 also involved human actions. The vulnerability could be exploited by hackers through various means, including accessing the corporate Wi-Fi, plugging a computer into the corporate LAN, or sending a phishing email with a malicious link. These actions by hackers could trigger the vulnerability and potentially lead to a full takeover of the target DNS server [102489].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 102489 is related to a vulnerability in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol, specifically in Windows DNS software. This vulnerability, named SigRed, has existed in the software for 17 years and allows attackers to gain full remote code execution on the target server by exploiting a certain piece of data handling in the DNSSEC key exchange process. This vulnerability is a hardware-related failure as it originates in the hardware infrastructure running the Windows DNS servers [102489]. (b) The software failure incident in Article 102489 is primarily due to contributing factors that originate in software. The SigRed bug is a critical vulnerability in the Windows DNS software that allows for remote code execution and potential full control of the target server. The bug exploits a flaw in the software's handling of a specific piece of data related to DNSSEC key exchange, enabling attackers to overwrite memory and execute malicious code. This software vulnerability has significant implications for the security of Windows DNS servers and the networks they operate in [102489].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involves a critical vulnerability named SigRed discovered by Check Point in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol. This vulnerability allows for remote code execution on the target server, potentially leading to full control of the system by an attacker. The article highlights that the flaw is wormable, meaning an attack can spread from one machine to another with no human interaction, and it has a severity rating of 10 out of 10 on the common vulnerability scoring system. The article also mentions the potential for targeted attacks by well-funded adversaries exploiting this vulnerability [102489]. (b) The incident is non-malicious in the sense that it is not caused by accidental or unintentional factors. The vulnerability exploited in the Windows DNS software has existed for 17 years, indicating a long-standing issue rather than a recent mistake or oversight. However, the exploitation of this vulnerability is intentional and aimed at gaining unauthorized access and control over systems, making it a malicious software failure incident [102489].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) accidental_decisions Accidental_decisions: The software failure incident related to the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS was not due to poor decisions but rather due to a long-standing bug that existed in the software for 17 years. The vulnerability was discovered by Israeli security firm Check Point, and it was a critical flaw with a severity rating of 10 out of 10 on the common vulnerability scoring system. The incident was not a result of poor decisions but rather a long-standing issue in the software that was exploited by hackers [102489].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident described in the article is not related to development incompetence. The vulnerability named SigRed in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol was discovered by Israeli security firm Check Point after existing in the software for 17 years. The severity of the flaw was rated 10 out of 10 on the common vulnerability scoring system, indicating a critical issue that could lead to remote code execution on the target server [102489]. (b) The software failure incident related to the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS was accidental in nature. The vulnerability was not intentionally introduced but was a result of a flaw in the software that allowed hackers to exploit a certain piece of data in the key exchange process, ultimately gaining full remote code execution on the target server. The accidental nature of the vulnerability is evident from the fact that it went undetected for 17 years until it was discovered by Check Point researchers [102489].
Duration temporary The software failure incident described in the article [102489] is temporary. The vulnerability named SigRed in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol has been present for 17 years but was discovered and patched by Microsoft in response to the findings by Check Point. The incident is temporary in the sense that the vulnerability existed due to certain circumstances (implementation flaw) but was not a permanent failure as it was addressed through a software update.
Behaviour crash, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article involves a crash scenario where the Windows DNS server can be crashed or hijacked due to the SigRed vulnerability. The vulnerability allows a hacker to overwrite chunks of memory they're not meant to have access to, ultimately gaining full remote code execution on the target server, leading to a crash or takeover of the DNS server [102489]. (b) omission: The article does not mention any specific instances of omission as part of the software failure incident. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not involve timing issues where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early. (d) value: The software failure incident falls under the category of performing its intended functions incorrectly due to the SigRed vulnerability in Windows DNS, allowing for unauthorized access and control of the DNS server [102489]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit byzantine behavior with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The other behavior exhibited in this software failure incident is the potential for the vulnerability to be exploited in targeted attacks rather than spreading as a worm due to the nature of the SigRed bug. This behavior is described as more likely to be exploited in a targeted manner rather than through a widespread worm attack [102489].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the provided article [102489]. (b) harm: The article does not mention any physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure incident [102489]. (c) basic: The incident did not impact people's access to food or shelter [102489]. (d) property: The software failure incident could potentially impact people's material goods, money, or data as it involves a critical vulnerability in Windows DNS servers that could lead to full remote code execution on the target server [102489]. (e) delay: There is no mention of any activities being postponed due to the software failure incident [102489]. (f) non-human: The software failure incident primarily affects Windows DNS servers and network infrastructure, which are non-human entities [102489]. (g) no_consequence: The article does not mention any observed consequences of the software failure incident [102489]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The article discusses potential consequences of the software failure incident, such as the possibility of a new widespread worm similar to WannaCry being created if the vulnerability is exploited [102489]. (i) other: The article does not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond those discussed in the options (a) to (h) [102489].
Domain information (a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to the information industry, specifically the security industry scrutinizing Windows bugs that could potentially lead to world-shaking worms like WannaCry and NotPetya. The vulnerability named SigRed discovered by Check Point in Microsoft's implementation of the domain name system protocol is a critical flaw that could allow for remote code execution on target servers, potentially leading to widespread attacks [Article 102489].

Sources

Back to List