Incident: Failure to Conduct Data Protection Impact Assessment for UK Test-and-Trace Program.

Published Date: 2020-07-20

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident related to the UK government's test-and-trace programme happened before July 20, 2020, as the article discussing the incident was published on that date [102290].
System 1. NHS Test and Trace programme 2. Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) process 3. Serco (private company contracted to run the programme) 4. Ventrica (another private company) 5. Lack of legislation governing the test-and-trace programme [102290]
Responsible Organization 1. The UK government - The UK government was responsible for causing the software failure incident by rolling out the test-and-trace programme without a full assessment of the privacy implications, leading to data breaches and privacy concerns [102290].
Impacted Organization 1. Personal data of individuals involved in the test-and-trace programme [102290] 2. Contact details of subcontractors of Serco [102290] 3. Name and number of a contact of someone with a positive Covid-19 test result [102290]
Software Causes 1. Lack of conducting a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) before rolling out the test-and-trace programme, leading to privacy breaches [102290]. 2. Failure to properly redact personal information in training materials, leading to a data breach [102290]. 3. Accidental exposure of contact details due to mishandling of group emails by a private company involved in the programme [102290]. 4. Inadequate data governance practices and rushed-out system compromising data safety [102290].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of a full assessment of privacy implications before rolling out the test-and-trace programme [102290] 2. Failure to conduct a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) before processing personal data [102290] 3. Data breaches involving email mishaps and unredacted personal information being shared in training materials [102290] 4. Failure to properly redact personal information in training materials [102290] 5. Keeping personal data for an extended period without clear justification [102290] 6. Lack of legislation governing the test-and-trace programme [102290]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident led to three data breaches involving email mishaps and unredacted personal information being shared in training materials [102290]. 2. The incident undermined mutual trust between the public and the government, which is crucial in the fight against the pandemic [102290]. 3. The rushed-out system compromised by unsafe processing practices risked the integrity of the system [102290]. 4. The incident resulted in the government breaking the law by rolling out the test-and-trace programme without a full assessment of the privacy implications [102290].
Preventions 1. Conducting a thorough Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) before rolling out the test-and-trace programme could have prevented the software failure incident [102290]. 2. Implementing proper data redaction procedures to ensure sensitive information is not exposed in training materials or communications could have helped prevent data breaches [102290]. 3. Following legal requirements and guidelines for processing personal data, especially in high-risk situations, could have mitigated risks and prevented the software failure incident [102290].
Fixes 1. Conducting a full Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) before implementing any high-risk processing of personal data to ensure risks are mitigated and privacy safeguards are in place [102290]. 2. Implementing proper data redaction processes to prevent the exposure of personal information in training materials or communication channels [102290]. 3. Introducing legislation to govern the scope and limitations of the test-and-trace programme to prevent ad-hoc decision-making and ensure public trust [102290].
References 1. Department of Health and Social Care 2. Open Rights Group (ORG) 3. Data rights agency AWO 4. Serco 5. Ventrica 6. Information Commissioner’s Office 7. Senior politicians 8. NHS Test and Trace spokesperson 9. Harriet Harman, chair of the joint committee on human rights The articles gather information from these specific entities [102290].

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring unknown The articles do not mention any specific instances of the software failure incident happening again at the same organization or at multiple organizations. Therefore, the information related to the recurrence of the software failure incident is unknown.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article as the UK government admitted breaking the law by rolling out its test-and-trace programme without a full assessment of the privacy implications. This failure was attributed to ignoring a vital safety step known as the data protection impact assessment (DPIA), which is a required process before carrying out any "high risk" processing of personal data [102290]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted in the article through three data breaches involving email mishaps and unredacted personal information being shared in training materials within the test-and-trace programme. These breaches were a result of operational errors, such as accidentally sending out group emails exposing contact details and failing to properly redact sensitive information from training videos [102290].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the UK government's test-and-trace programme was primarily due to factors originating from within the system. The failure was attributed to the government's failure to conduct a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) before rolling out the programme, which led to privacy breaches and data mishaps [102290]. The incident highlighted the rushed-out system compromised by unsafe processing practices within the government's implementation of the programme. Additionally, the failure to properly redact personal information in training materials and the mishandling of personal data by private companies involved in the programme were internal factors contributing to the software failure incident [102290].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the test-and-trace programme was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically related to data breaches and privacy implications. The incident involved three data breaches, including email mishaps and unredacted personal information being shared in training materials, which were not intentional human actions but rather mistakes or faults in the system [102290]. (b) However, human actions also played a role in the failure as the UK government admitted to breaking the law by rolling out the programme without a full assessment of the privacy implications. The decision to ignore the data protection impact assessment (DPIA) and the rushed-out system compromised by unsafe processing practices were human actions that contributed to the software failure incident [102290].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The article does not mention any specific software failure incident related to hardware issues [102290]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The UK government's test-and-trace programme faced data breaches involving email mishaps and unredacted personal information being shared in training materials, indicating a software failure related to software issues [102290].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The software failure incident related to the UK government's test-and-trace programme can be categorized as non-malicious. The failure was primarily due to the government's failure to conduct a full assessment of the privacy implications and ignoring the legal requirement of a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) before rolling out the programme [102290]. The incident involved data breaches, email mishaps, unredacted personal information being shared in training materials, and improper handling of personal data by private companies contracted to run the programme. These issues were a result of negligence and lack of proper safeguards rather than malicious intent to harm the system.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the UK government's test-and-trace programme can be attributed to poor decisions. The Department of Health and Social Care admitted to breaking the law by rolling out the programme without a full assessment of the privacy implications, specifically by not conducting a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) which is a legally required safety step [102290]. This failure to follow legal requirements and ensure basic privacy safeguards demonstrates poor decision-making on the part of the government. Additionally, the incident involved multiple data breaches, including email mishaps and sharing unredacted personal information in training materials, further highlighting the consequences of poor decisions in implementing the programme.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the UK government's test-and-trace programme rollout. The Department of Health and Social Care admitted breaking the law by not conducting a full assessment of privacy implications before implementing the programme [102290]. This failure was attributed to the government's reckless behavior in ignoring the vital step of a data protection impact assessment (DPIA), which is a legally required safety measure to mitigate risks before processing personal data. The rushed-out system compromised by unsafe processing practices highlights a lack of professional competence in ensuring privacy safeguards were in place [102290]. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is seen in the data breaches that occurred within the test-and-trace programme. For instance, Serco, a private company involved in the programme, accidentally exposed contact details of subcontractors by sending out group emails using the "cc" function [102290]. Additionally, Ventrica, another private company, failed to properly redact personal information from a training video, leading to a data breach [102290]. These incidents point to failures introduced accidentally during the operation of the programme.
Duration temporary The software failure incident related to the UK government's test-and-trace programme does not seem to fall under the category of a permanent software failure. The issues highlighted in the articles, such as data breaches, lack of privacy safeguards, and legal challenges, point more towards temporary failures caused by specific circumstances and actions taken by the government and the contracted companies involved in the programme [102290].
Behaviour crash, omission, other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the UK government's test-and-trace programme can be associated with a crash behavior. The incident involved data breaches, email mishaps, and unredacted personal information being shared, indicating a failure of the system losing state and not performing its intended functions [102290]. (b) omission: The incident also reflects an omission behavior as the software failed to include basic privacy safeguards and a required data protection impact assessment (DPIA) before rolling out the test-and-trace programme, leading to breaches and compromised processing practices [102290]. (c) timing: There is no specific indication in the articles that the software failure incident was related to timing issues. (d) value: The software failure incident does not directly point to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. (e) byzantine: The incident does not suggest a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident could be described as a failure due to a lack of proper risk mitigation measures and rushed-out system implementation, compromising the integrity of the system [102290].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: There is no mention of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident in the provided article [102290]. (b) harm: The software failure incident did not result in physical harm to individuals as per the information in the article [102290]. (c) basic: The software failure incident did not impact people's access to food or shelter [102290]. (d) property: The software failure incident did impact people's personal data security as there were three data breaches involving personal information being shared [102290]. (e) delay: There is no mention of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident in the provided article [102290]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were not directly impacted by the software failure incident as per the information in the article [102290]. (g) no_consequence: The software failure incident did have observed consequences, particularly related to data breaches and privacy implications [102290]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The article discusses potential consequences of the software failure incident, such as endangering public health, undermining mutual trust between the public and the government, and compromising data processing practices [102290]. (i) other: The software failure incident also led to concerns about the government not having legislation governing the test-and-trace program, potentially impacting public opinion and the handling of personal data [102290].
Domain health, government The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to the **health** industry. The failed system in question is the UK government's test-and-trace programme, which is a crucial element in the fight against the pandemic and involves handling detailed personal information from patients across the country [Article 102290]. The programme has experienced data breaches, mishandling of personal information, and privacy implications due to the lack of proper assessments and safeguards, which are critical in the healthcare sector to protect patient data and ensure public trust in the system.

Sources

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