Incident: Ransomware Attack on Duesseldorf Hospital Leads to Patient Death

Published Date: 2020-09-17

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident at the University Hospital in Düsseldorf, Germany, happened last week [Article 104844]. 2. Article 104844 was published on 2020-09-17. 3. Therefore, the incident occurred in September 2020.
System 1. Weak spot in widely used commercial add-on software [104844, 104844] 2. Citrix software that was not updated, leading to a breach [104694]
Responsible Organization 1. Cybercriminals were responsible for causing the software failure incident at the University Hospital in Düsseldorf, Germany [104844, 104694]. 2. The attackers breached the hospital's systems using a vulnerability in Citrix software that was not patched, allowing them to encrypt the data and disrupt the IT systems [104694].
Impacted Organization 1. Duesseldorf University Clinic [Article 104844, Article 104694] 2. Heinrich Heine University [Article 104844, Article 104694]
Software Causes 1. The failure incident at the Duesseldorf University Clinic was caused by an apparently misdirected ransomware attack on a weak spot in widely used commercial add-on software, leading to the encryption of 30 servers and the disruption of IT systems [104844, 104694]. 2. The attackers breached the hospital's systems using a vulnerability in Citrix software that had been patched in January, but the hospital failed to update its software, allowing cybercriminals to exploit the flaw and encrypt data [104694].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of timely response and action by the hospital's IT systems to the ransomware attack, leading to system disruption and data encryption [104844, 104694]. 2. Failure to update Citrix software with a known patch, allowing cybercriminals to exploit a vulnerability and breach the hospital's systems [104694].
Impacts 1. The failure of IT systems at a major hospital in Duesseldorf due to a ransomware attack resulted in a woman in a life-threatening condition being sent to a hospital 20 miles away in Wuppertal, where she died due to treatment delays [104844, 104694]. 2. Emergency patients had to be taken elsewhere, and operations at the hospital were postponed due to the disruption in systems caused by the ransomware attack [104844]. 3. The attack led to the encryption of 30 servers at the hospital, causing data access issues and system crashes [104844, 104694]. 4. The ransomware attack highlighted the vulnerability of hospitals to cybercriminals, with healthcare providers being frequent targets due to the urgency to access health records and computer systems [104694]. 5. The incident raised concerns about the potential for further attacks on critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, and the need for enhanced cybersecurity measures to prevent and deter such incidents in the future [104694].
Preventions 1. Regularly updating software: The failure incident at the Duesseldorf University Clinic could have been prevented if the hospital had regularly updated its software, specifically the Citrix software that had a known vulnerability patched in January [104694]. 2. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures: Strong cybersecurity measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and employee training on cybersecurity best practices, could have helped prevent the ransomware attack that led to the failure incident [104844, 104694]. 3. Backing up data: Regularly backing up critical data and systems could have mitigated the impact of the ransomware attack by allowing the hospital to restore its systems without paying the ransom [104844, 104694].
Fixes 1. Patching software vulnerabilities promptly: The software failure incident at the Duesseldorf University Clinic was caused by cybercriminals exploiting a hole in Citrix software that had been patched in January but was not updated by the hospital [104694]. 2. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures: Hospitals and other organizations need to enhance their cybersecurity defenses to prevent ransomware attacks. This includes measures such as network segmentation, regular security audits, employee training on cybersecurity best practices, and implementing multi-factor authentication [104694]. 3. Regular data backups: Having regular and secure backups of critical data can help organizations recover quickly from ransomware attacks without having to pay the ransom. It is essential to store backups offline or in a separate network to prevent them from being encrypted by attackers [104694]. 4. Collaboration with law enforcement: Organizations affected by ransomware attacks should work closely with law enforcement agencies to investigate the incidents and potentially track down the perpetrators. This collaboration can help in identifying and prosecuting cybercriminals responsible for such attacks [104694].
References 1. German authorities 2. Duesseldorf University Clinic 3. North Rhine-Westphalia state’s justice minister 4. Brett Callow of Emsisoft 5. University Hospital Düsseldorf 6. Threat analyst at Emsisoft 7. F.B.I. 8. Cyber insurers 9. Infrascale 10. Federal Agency for Security in Information Technology

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - The incident at the University Hospital in Düsseldorf, Germany, where a ransomware attack led to the death of a patient, is a tragic example of a software failure incident that has occurred within the same organization [Article 104844, Article 104694]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The articles mention previous ransomware attacks on healthcare facilities, such as the WannaCry attack in the UK and the NotPetya attack in the US, which also resulted in hospitals being forced to turn away patients due to system disruptions [Article 104694].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in the hospital in Duesseldorf, Germany, was primarily due to a ransomware attack that exploited a weakness in "widely used commercial add-on software" [Article 104844]. The attack led to the encryption of 30 servers at the hospital, causing system disruptions and preventing access to data, ultimately resulting in the death of a patient who needed urgent treatment. This incident highlights a failure related to the design phase, where vulnerabilities in the software allowed hackers to infiltrate the system and cause significant harm. (b) Additionally, the failure in the hospital's IT systems resulted in emergency patients being redirected to other hospitals, causing delays in treatment and, tragically, leading to the death of a patient who was sent to a hospital 20 miles away [Article 104694]. This aspect of the incident points to a failure related to the operation phase, where the operation and response to the system failure, including the decision-making process that led to redirecting patients, contributed to the negative outcome.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident at the Duesseldorf University Clinic was caused by an apparently misdirected ransomware attack on a weak spot in widely used commercial add-on software within the hospital's IT systems. The attack led to the encryption of 30 servers at the hospital, disrupting operations and preventing access to data, ultimately resulting in the death of a patient who needed urgent admission [104844, 104694]. (b) outside_system: The ransomware attack on the hospital's IT systems was initiated by cybercriminals from outside the system. The attackers exploited a vulnerability in Citrix software that had been patched earlier but was not updated by the hospital, allowing the cybercriminals to breach the system and encrypt the data [104694].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a ransomware attack on the hospital's IT systems. The attack was described as a misdirected ransomware attack that caused the failure of IT systems at the hospital in Duesseldorf [104844]. The attack resulted in the encryption of 30 servers at the hospital, leading to system crashes and the inability to access data, ultimately affecting patient care and resulting in the death of a woman who needed urgent admission [104844, 104694]. (b) Human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The failure was exacerbated by the fact that the hospital failed to update its Citrix software, leaving a vulnerability that cybercriminals exploited to breach the hospital's systems and encrypt the data [104694]. Additionally, there were negotiations between the perpetrators and the authorities, where the police had to establish contact with the attackers to clarify that the hospital, not the university, had been affected, highlighting the human involvement in the incident [104694].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was primarily due to contributing factors originating in software. The incident involved a ransomware attack on the IT systems of a major hospital in Duesseldorf, Germany, which caused the systems to crash and disrupted operations, leading to the death of a patient who had to be redirected to another hospital [104844, 104694]. The attack was specifically described as a ransomware attack, where hackers encrypted data and held it hostage until a ransom was paid. The attack targeted weak spots in widely used commercial add-on software at the hospital, leading to the encryption of 30 servers and the disruption of operations [104844, 104694]. The incident highlights the vulnerability of healthcare institutions to cyberattacks, particularly ransomware attacks, which can have severe consequences on patient care and safety. The attack on the hospital's IT systems, resulting in the death of a patient, underscores the critical importance of cybersecurity measures in protecting against such software failures originating from malicious activities.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident in this case was malicious. It was caused by a ransomware attack on the Duesseldorf University Clinic's IT systems, which resulted in the encryption of 30 servers and the hospital being unable to access critical data. The attackers left an extortion note and demanded a ransom, leading to the hospital's systems crashing and emergency patients being redirected to other hospitals, ultimately resulting in the death of a woman who needed urgent treatment [104844, 104694]. (b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by accidental or unintentional factors within the system itself. The failure was a direct result of a deliberate ransomware attack carried out by cybercriminals with the intent to disrupt the hospital's operations and extort money [104844, 104694].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions: - The software failure incident at the Duesseldorf University Clinic was caused by a ransomware attack on a weak spot in widely used commercial add-on software, which was not identified [104844]. - The hospital failed to update its Citrix software, leaving a hole that cybercriminals exploited to breach the system and encrypt data [104694]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions: - The attack on the hospital in Düsseldorf was reported to be the first known death from a cyberattack, indicating that the consequences were unintended [104694]. - The ransom note was initially addressed to Heinrich Heine University, not the hospital itself, suggesting that the hospital may have been collateral damage in an attack on the university [104694].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident in the articles appears to be more related to accidental factors rather than development incompetence. The incident was caused by a ransomware attack on a weak spot in widely used commercial add-on software at a major hospital in Duesseldorf [104844]. The attack resulted in the encryption of 30 servers at the hospital, leading to system crashes and the inability to access data, ultimately causing the death of a patient who had to be taken to another city for treatment [104844, 104694]. The attack was not directly linked to development incompetence but rather to the vulnerability exploited by cybercriminals due to the hospital's failure to update its software, allowing the attackers to breach the system and encrypt the data [104694]. (b) The software failure incident can also be attributed to accidental factors. The attack on the hospital's IT systems was not intentional on the part of the hospital or its staff but was initiated by cybercriminals who targeted the hospital with ransomware [104844, 104694]. The hospital did not receive a concrete ransom demand, and the perpetrators initially targeted the university affiliated with the hospital, indicating that the attack may have been accidental in terms of the specific target [104844]. Additionally, the hospital's failure to update its Citrix software, which had a known vulnerability that was patched earlier, can be seen as an accidental oversight that allowed the cybercriminals to exploit the system [104694].
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident in the articles was temporary. The failure was caused by a ransomware attack on the hospital's IT systems, leading to the encryption of data on 30 servers and disrupting operations at the University Hospital in Düsseldorf [Article 104844, Article 104694]. The incident resulted in emergency patients being redirected to other hospitals, operations being postponed, and the hospital unable to access critical data. However, the perpetrators eventually provided a digital key to decrypt the data, allowing the hospital to gradually restart its IT systems [Article 104844, Article 104694].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The incident at the University Hospital in Düsseldorf resulted in the hospital's IT systems being disrupted for a week, leading to systems gradually crashing and the hospital being unable to access data, causing emergency patients to be taken elsewhere and operations to be postponed [104844]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. Due to the ransomware attack on the hospital's systems, emergency patients had to be turned away, and a woman in a life-threatening condition had to be sent to a hospital 20 miles away, resulting in treatment delays that led to her death [104694]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident can be considered a factor in the failure. The attack on the hospital's systems caused delays in accessing critical data and providing timely treatment to emergency patients, ultimately resulting in the death of a woman who needed urgent admission [104844, 104694]. (d) value: The software failure incident can also be attributed to a failure in value. The attack on the hospital's systems led to the encryption of data, making it inaccessible and holding it hostage until a ransom was paid. This incorrect behavior of the system in handling data compromised the value of the information and services provided by the hospital [104844, 104694]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident primarily involved a ransomware attack that encrypted data and disrupted the hospital's IT systems, leading to operational failures and delays in patient care [104844, 104694]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be further described as a failure resulting from a cyberattack involving ransomware. The attack targeted the hospital's systems, encrypted data, disrupted operations, and led to the tragic death of a patient who needed urgent medical attention. This type of failure highlights the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, such as healthcare facilities, to malicious cyber activities [104844, 104694].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence death, harm, property, delay (a) death: The software failure incident resulted in the death of a woman who needed urgent admission to a hospital in Duesseldorf, Germany. Due to the ransomware attack on the hospital's IT systems, the woman had to be taken to another city for treatment, causing delays that ultimately led to her death [104844, 104694].
Domain health (a) The failed system was intended to support the healthcare industry. The incident involved a major hospital in Duesseldorf, Germany, where IT systems failed due to a ransomware attack, leading to the death of a patient who needed urgent admission [Article 104844, Article 104694]. (j) The healthcare industry was directly impacted by the software failure incident, as the hospital's IT systems were disrupted, emergency patients had to be taken elsewhere, and operations were postponed due to the ransomware attack [Article 104844, Article 104694].

Sources

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