| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article mentions that the Tokyo Stock Exchange had faced system glitches occasionally in the past, with the last systemwide shutdown occurring in 2005 due to a software upgrade malfunction [104693]. This indicates that the Tokyo Stock Exchange has experienced similar software failures before within the same organization.
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article highlights that similar malfunctions have not been limited to Japan, citing incidents such as the New York Stock Exchange shutdown in 2015 and the Nasdaq "flash freeze" in 2013 [104693]. This suggests that software failure incidents have occurred at multiple organizations in the financial sector. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was attributed to a technical glitch that halted equities trading due to a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange. The system failed to switch to a backup in response to the problem, leading to the trading shutdown [104693].
(b) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was not attributed to operation or misuse of the system but rather to a technical glitch stemming from a hardware problem and a failure in the system to switch to a backup [104693]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was attributed to a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange, specifically a failure to switch to a backup system in response to the issue [104693]. The Japan Exchange Group, the operator of the exchange, took full responsibility for the problem and mentioned that they were considering measures to prevent such incidents from recurring [104693]. Additionally, the system at fault allowed only internal access, and no unusual network activity indicating a cyberattack was detected [104693].
(b) outside_system: The article did not mention any contributing factors originating from outside the system that led to the software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange [104693]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was primarily attributed to a technical glitch that stemmed from a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange. The system failed to switch to a backup in response to the issue, leading to the trading halt [104693].
(b) The Japan Exchange Group, the operator of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, took full responsibility for the software failure incident and expressed profound apologies for the difficulties caused to market participants and investors. The company's president mentioned that they were considering every measure to prevent such incidents from recurring in the future [104693]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was attributed to a hardware problem. The glitch that halted equities trading was caused by a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange, and the system failed to switch to a backup in response to the issue [104693].
(b) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was not attributed to software issues. The glitch that occurred was specifically mentioned to have stemmed from a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange, and there was no indication of software contributing to the failure [104693]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was determined to be non-malicious. The glitch that caused the shutdown was attributed to a technical issue in the hardware that powers the exchange, specifically a problem with the system failing to switch to a backup in response to the problem [104693]. Additionally, the company ruled out a cyberattack as the cause of the malfunction, stating that the system at fault allowed only internal access and that no unusual network activity had been detected [104693].
(b) The software failure incident was not attributed to malicious intent but rather to technical issues within the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was primarily due to poor decisions. The glitch that halted equities trading was attributed to a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange, which failed to switch to a backup system in response to the issue [104693]. The company's president acknowledged the considerable difficulties caused to market participants and investors and expressed profound apologies, indicating a recognition of poor decisions leading to the failure. Additionally, the incident raised concerns about the reliability of the Japanese stock market and the potential impact on investors' faith in the market's efficacy [104693]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was attributed to a technical glitch that halted equities trading throughout Japan. The glitch was caused by a problem in the hardware that powers the exchange, and the system failed to switch to a backup in response to the issue. The Japan Exchange Group, the exchange's operator, took responsibility for the problem and acknowledged the difficulties it created for market participants and investors [104693].
(b) The article does not provide specific information indicating that the software failure incident was accidental. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange was temporary. The exchange shut down for the day on Thursday due to a technical glitch that halted equities trading, but it resumed trading on Friday without incident [Article 104693]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident at the Tokyo Stock Exchange resulted in a crash, as the system failed to switch to a backup in response to a hardware problem, leading to a complete halt in equities trading for the entire day [104693].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission, as the system omitted to perform its intended functions by not allowing market participants and investors to place orders, ultimately leading to the shutdown of trading for the day [104693].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was crucial, as it occurred on a day when Japan was the only major market expected to open, with other exchanges in the region closed for holidays. The incident happened just before the release of a quarterly report from the Bank of Japan, impacting investors who were awaiting important economic data [104693].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve a failure in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit behavior characteristic of a byzantine failure, as there were no reports of inconsistent responses or interactions from the system.
(f) other: The software failure incident could be categorized as an "other" behavior due to the system's failure to switch to a backup in response to a hardware problem, causing a complete shutdown of trading for the day, which may not fit precisely into the crash or omission categories [104693]. |