| Recurring |
multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article does not provide any information indicating that a similar incident has happened before or again within the same organization or with its products and services. Therefore, it is unknown if this specific software failure incident has occurred again at the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington [105060].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that the security breach at the Jewish Federation is part of a new wave of cyberattacks that have proliferated since employees began teleworking earlier in the year due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This indicates that similar incidents have been occurring at multiple organizations as a result of the increased vulnerability to hacks during remote work [105060]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to the design phase. The hack that drained $7.5 million from the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington's endowment fund was initiated by targeting an employee using a personal computer while working from home. This indicates that the initial attack was made possible due to vulnerabilities introduced in the system design or procedures to operate the system [105060].
(b) Additionally, the operation phase also played a role in the failure. The hackers gained access to the system in early summer, indicating that the operation or misuse of the system, such as employees using personal computers for work, contributed to the security breach [105060]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in Article 105060 was due to contributing factors that originated from within the system. The hack that drained $7.5 million from the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington's endowment fund was initiated by targeting an employee using a personal computer while working from home. The attack targeted an agency fund within the federation's endowment, indicating that the breach occurred internally within the organization's systems [105060]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was not directly attributed to non-human actions. The incident was a result of a hack that targeted an employee using a personal computer while working from home [105060]. The attack involved human actors who gained unauthorized access to the system and transferred funds into international accounts.
(b) Human actions played a significant role in this software failure incident. The initial attack targeted an employee using a personal computer while working from home, indicating that human actions contributed to the vulnerability exploited by the hackers [105060]. Additionally, the federation's response included measures such as prohibiting employees from using personal computers and working with legal and cybersecurity experts to investigate the theft, highlighting the importance of human actions in addressing and mitigating the consequences of the incident. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 105060 was not attributed to hardware issues. The incident was a result of a hack that targeted an employee using a personal computer while working from home. The attack led to the draining of $7.5 million from the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington's endowment fund [105060].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 105060 was a result of a hack, indicating a failure originating in software vulnerabilities rather than hardware issues. The hackers gained access to the system through an employee's email account, highlighting a software-related security breach [105060]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 105060 is malicious in nature. The incident involved a hack that targeted an employee using a personal computer while working from home, resulting in the theft of $7.5 million from the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington's endowment fund. The attack was described as "heartbreaking and devastating" by the CEO, and the FBI is assisting in the investigation of the incident. The hackers funneled the stolen money into international accounts, indicating a deliberate attempt to harm the organization [105060]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions but rather due to a deliberate hack targeting an employee using a personal computer while working from home. The hack drained $7.5 million from the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington's endowment fund and funneled the money into international accounts [105060]. The incident was described as a targeted attack on an agency fund within the federation's endowment, indicating a deliberate and malicious intent behind the software failure. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was not due to development incompetence but rather a targeted hack that drained $7.5 million from the Jewish Federation of Greater Washington's endowment fund [105060].
(b) The software failure incident was accidental in nature as it was a result of a hack that targeted an employee using a personal computer while working from home. The hackers gained access to the system in early summer, and the federation's information-technology contractor detected suspicious activity in an employee's email account, leading to the discovery of the hack [105060]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be temporary. The incident was triggered by the initial attack targeting an employee using a personal computer while working from home [105060]. Additionally, the hackers gained access to the system in early summer, indicating a specific timeframe for the breach. The organization took immediate actions to investigate the theft, prohibit the use of personal computers, and engage legal and cybersecurity experts to address the issue. These actions suggest that the failure was not permanent but rather a temporary breach that required containment and remediation efforts. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in this case does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident is related to a hack that drained funds from the Jewish Federation's endowment fund [Article 105060].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The incident is more about a security breach and unauthorized fund transfer rather than the system failing to perform its functions [Article 105060].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early. The incident is more about a security breach and unauthorized fund transfer rather than timing-related failures [Article 105060].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Instead, the incident is related to a hack that led to the unauthorized transfer of funds from the Jewish Federation's endowment fund [Article 105060].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit behaviors of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident is more about a security breach and unauthorized fund transfer rather than inconsistent system behavior [Article 105060].
(f) other: The software failure incident in this case is primarily related to a security breach and unauthorized fund transfer, which is not covered by the specific failure behaviors listed. The incident involves a hack that targeted an employee's personal computer while working from home, leading to the transfer of $7.5 million from the endowment fund into international accounts [Article 105060]. |