| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
- The incident of a cyberattack affecting the election systems in Georgia, specifically blocking the voter signature verification database, was mentioned as a software failure incident that happened again within the same organization [106330].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
- The article discusses how cyberattacks targeting election systems have occurred in different states, such as California, Indiana, and Louisiana, indicating that similar incidents have happened at multiple organizations [106330]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it mentions that the office of the Secretary of State of Georgia disabled two-factor authentication in the weeks leading up to the incident, after their election software crashed due to the influx of early voters. Two-factor authentication, a key security strategy recommended by the Department of Homeland Security for election security, was simply turned off according to internal emails [106330].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the article where it describes a cyberseizure in Gainesville, Georgia, that blocked the voter signature verification systems, forcing officials to manually record registration credentials and carefully observe signatures. This incident, although not directly targeting the elections, affected electoral systems as collateral damage, highlighting vulnerabilities in Georgia's electoral systems [106330]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the cibersecuestro in Gainesville, Georgia, which blocked the systems of verificación de firmas de votantes, was a failure within the system. The incident was caused by a cyberattack that affected the electoral systems as collateral damage. Internal emails revealed that the office of the Secretary of State of Georgia disabled two-factor authentication in the weeks leading up to the incident, after their electoral software crashed due to the influx of early voters. This action of disabling two-factor authentication, a key security strategy recommended by the Department of Homeland Security, was an internal factor contributing to the vulnerability of the system [106330].
(b) outside_system: The article mentions external factors contributing to the software failure incident, such as the actions of hackers from Russia and Iran who targeted various systems related to the election process in the United States. These external actors engaged in cyberattacks aimed at disrupting the election process and creating perceptions of fraud or manipulation. The involvement of foreign entities in these cyberattacks represents factors originating from outside the system that contributed to the software failure incidents [106330]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The article reports on a cyberattack where Russian hackers blocked access to a voter database in Georgia through a cyber hijacking, which also deleted voter registration data online [106330].
- There were concerns about potential cyber hijacks that could freeze part of the voting system and delay results, as seen in a cyber hijack incident in Gainesville, Georgia, that blocked voter signature verification systems [106330].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The article mentions instances where human actions contributed to vulnerabilities in the election systems, such as the disabling of two-factor authentication by the Georgia Secretary of State's office, which was a key security measure recommended by the Department of Homeland Security [106330].
- Human actions, such as potential misinformation and conspiracy theories spread by individuals like President Trump, were highlighted as factors that could undermine trust in the election process [106330]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article mentions a cyberattack in Gainesville, Georgia, where a cyberseizure blocked the systems for verifying voters' signatures, forcing officials to resort to manual registration and signature observation [106330].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The article discusses various cyberattacks carried out by Russian hackers targeting voter databases and election systems in different states, highlighting the vulnerability of software systems to hacking and cyber threats [106330]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious, as it was caused by a group of Russian hackers who blocked access to a voter database in Georgia and also eliminated voter registration data through a cyber hijacking. Additionally, the incident involved attacks on some electoral systems in California and Indiana by a formidable Russian hacking unit linked to the Federal Security Service (FSB) [106330]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the software failure incident where the office of the Secretary of State of Georgia disabled two-factor authentication in the weeks leading up to the incident, after their election software crashed due to the influx of early voters. This decision to disable two-factor authentication, a key security strategy recommended by the Department of Homeland Security for election security, was a poor decision that exposed vulnerabilities in Georgia's election systems [106330].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions can be observed in the incident where a cyberseizure in Gainesville, Georgia, blocked the voter signature verification systems, forcing election officials to resort to manual verification of voter credentials. This incident, which was not specifically targeted at the elections but affected electoral systems as collateral damage, highlighted the weaknesses in Georgia's election infrastructure. The internal emails revealed that the Secretary of State's office had deactivated two-factor authentication, a critical security measure, which was an accidental decision that contributed to the vulnerability exploited in the cyberseizure incident [106330]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article where it mentions that the office of the Secretary of State of Georgia disabled two-factor authentication in the weeks leading up to the incident, after their election software crashed due to the influx of early voters. Two-factor authentication, a key security measure, was part of the election security strategy recommended by the Department of Homeland Security, yet the Secretary's office simply turned it off [106330].
(b) The accidental software failure incident is highlighted in the article where it describes a cyberseizure in Gainesville, Georgia, that blocked the voter signature verification systems, forcing officials to resort to manual registration credential checks and careful signature observation. This attack, although not directly targeting the elections, affected electoral systems as collateral damage, exposing vulnerabilities in Georgia's key election state [106330]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more aligned with a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The incident involved a cyberattack that blocked the systems used for verifying voters' signatures in Georgia, leading to the need for manual verification of credentials [106330]. This indicates that the failure was due to specific circumstances (the cyberattack) rather than being a permanent issue inherent in the system. Additionally, the incident in Gainesville, Georgia, where the systems for verifying voters' signatures were blocked, also points towards a temporary failure that affected the election systems as collateral damage [106330]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The incident in Georgia involved a cyberattack that blocked access to a voter database and also deleted voter registration data online, leading to a crash in the system's functionality [106330].
(b) omission: The incident in Gainesville, Georgia, resulted in a software failure where the systems for verifying voter signatures were blocked, forcing officials to manually verify credentials and signatures, indicating an omission in the system's intended functions [106330].
(c) timing: There is no specific mention of a software failure incident related to timing in the provided article.
(d) value: The article does not provide information about a software failure incident related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The article does not mention a software failure incident related to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The incident involving the cyberattack on the Trump campaign's website, where a threatening message was displayed, could be considered as a form of software failure behavior not explicitly described in the options provided [106330]. |