| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to Haystack happened within the same organization, the Censorship Research Center (CRC). The leading developer, Daniel Colascione, resigned from the CRC due to the failure of the Haystack program and the organization's inability to operate effectively and responsibly [Article 3121].
(b) The software failure incident related to Haystack also involved multiple organizations. The US government granted Haystack an export license without independent verification of its security. Additionally, the software received extensive coverage from various media organizations such as the BBC, US National Public Radio, the International Herald Tribune, and The Guardian, which awarded the developer, Austin Heap, the title of "Innovator of the Year" [Article 2971]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the development of the Haystack software. The incident occurred due to security vulnerabilities in the system that could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users. The developers of Haystack, including Austin Heap and Daniel Colascione, faced criticism for failing to vet the tool with security professionals before distributing it for use. Colascione acknowledged that there were mistakes in how the distribution of the tool was controlled, with unauthorized distribution to testers leading to potential risks for users [3121, 2971].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the actual use of the Haystack software by testers and users. Experts raised serious questions about the security of Haystack, indicating that instead of making users anonymous, it could reveal key information about them to the Iranian authorities. Users were asked to stop using the software after concerns were raised about its security flaws. The operation of the software in real-world scenarios highlighted its inability to provide the safety for users that had been claimed, leading to the withdrawal of the software by its author, Austin Heap [2971]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Haystack tool can be attributed to factors within the system. The incident was primarily caused by security vulnerabilities in the system that were discovered by independent researchers [3121]. The vulnerabilities in the source code and implementation of the system could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users, putting their lives at risk [3121]. Additionally, mistakes in how the distribution of the tool was controlled, unauthorized distribution of the tool, and the use of a diagnostic tool that was not intended for dissemination all contributed to the failure [3121, 2971]. The internal factors such as lack of proper vetting, control over distribution, and design flaws within the system led to the software failure incident. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The software failure incident with Haystack was primarily due to security vulnerabilities in the system that could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users, as discovered by security researcher Jacob Appelbaum [3121].
- The experts who reviewed Haystack found that instead of making users anonymous, it could reveal key information about them to the Iranian authorities, indicating inherent flaws in the software itself [2971].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- Human actions played a significant role in the failure of Haystack. The author, Austin Heap, faced criticism for not allowing professionals access to the program's code to verify its security, which is a standard practice for security software [2971].
- Heap and his team were also criticized for dismissing pointed criticism, allowing the distribution of a test version without proper controls, and prioritizing hype over security, leading to the failure of the software [2971].
- Heap's decision-making, lack of transparency, and misleading statements contributed to the failure of Haystack, as highlighted by the resignation of the leading developer, Daniel Colascione, due to the organization's inability to operate effectively, maturely, and responsibly [2971]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident did not occur due to contributing factors originating in hardware. No information was provided in the articles about any hardware-related issues leading to the failure.
(b) The software failure incident occurred due to contributing factors that originated in software. The software, Haystack, was found to have security vulnerabilities in the system that could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users [3121]. Experts raised serious questions about the security of the software, indicating that it could reveal key information about users to the Iranian authorities instead of making them anonymous [2971]. Jacob Appelbaum, a security professional, concluded that Haystack did not provide the safety for users that had been claimed and criticized it as the worst piece of software he had ever encountered [2971]. Daniel Colascione, a developer on the project, also acknowledged mistakes in how the distribution of the tool was controlled, leading to a debacle and embarrassment [3121]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Haystack tool can be categorized as malicious. Security researcher Jacob Appelbaum discovered security vulnerabilities in the system that could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users, putting the lives of activists at risk [3121]. Appelbaum criticized the developers for failing to vet the tool with security professionals before distributing it for use, and he found that the vulnerabilities in the system could allow authorities to easily and quickly identify anyone who used the program [3121]. Additionally, there were concerns that the Iranian government could use the vulnerabilities to track users, indicating a malicious intent behind the failure incident.
(b) The software failure incident was also non-malicious in nature. The developers of the Haystack tool, Austin Heap and Daniel Colascione, initially intended to create an anti-censorship tool to help Iranian activists circumvent state spying and censorship [3121]. However, mistakes were made in how the distribution of the tool was controlled, with unauthorized distribution to testers without proper authorization and knowledge [3121]. Colascione acknowledged errors in the distribution process and expressed regret for exposing users to undue risk, indicating a lack of malicious intent behind the failure incident [2971]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The incident involving the software Haystack was primarily due to poor decisions made by the developers and those involved in the project. The software was released without proper vetting by security professionals, leading to serious security vulnerabilities being discovered [3121].
- The developers distributed a diagnostic version of the software to users without adequate controls, leading to unauthorized distribution and potential risks to users [3121].
- The software was not intended for widespread use but was still distributed to users, causing concerns about its security and effectiveness [2971].
- The US government fast-tracked the approval process for the software without independent verification of its security, contributing to the failure of the software [2971].
- The developers dismissed pointed criticism and allowed hype to trump security concerns, leading to the failure of the software [2971]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles. The incident involving the software called Haystack was primarily due to the lack of professional competence by the developers and the organization behind it. The developers, including Austin Heap and Daniel Colascione, faced criticism for not vetting the tool with security professionals before distributing it for use [3121]. There were vulnerabilities discovered in the source code and implementation of the system that could potentially place the lives of activists at risk, indicating a lack of proper development practices [3121]. Additionally, there were mistakes in how the distribution of the tool was controlled, with one tester distributing the copy without authorization and without the knowledge of the developers [3121]. The developers themselves acknowledged errors in the development process, with Colascione expressing regret over allowing the distribution of the flawed "test" program and the hype trumping security concerns [2971].
(b) The software failure incident also had accidental elements. The incident involving Haystack can be seen as a failure introduced accidentally, as the developers initially intended the software as a diagnostic tool and not for dissemination or hype [2971]. The software was not intended for widespread use and was only a test version, but it ended up being distributed to users in Iran, leading to unintended consequences [2971]. Heap and Colascione did not anticipate the risks associated with the distribution of the tool, and Colascione expressed regret over exposing users to undue risk due to the accidental multiplication of the initial risk by users and uses [2971]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be permanent. The Haystack software, designed to help Iranian activists circumvent state spying and censorship, was disabled after security vulnerabilities were discovered in the system that could potentially expose the identities of anonymous users. Users were instructed to destroy all copies of the software, and the developers vowed to obtain a third-party audit of the code and release most of it as open source before distributing anything to activists again [3121]. The author of the software, Austin Heap, acknowledged the criticisms about the security of Haystack and asked users to stop using it [2971]. Additionally, Daniel Colascione, a developer on the project, resigned from the Censorship Research Center, stating that the organization's actions had done "irreparable" damage [3121].
(b) The software failure incident could also be considered temporary in the sense that the software was initially intended as a test version and not for widespread use. Heap mentioned that the software that was criticized was not intended for widespread use and was only a test version [2971]. Colascione also emphasized that the software was a diagnostic tool never intended for dissemination or hype, and he believed that the final version would have worked as intended [2971]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [3121, 2971].
(b) omission: The failure of the software incident can be categorized as an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The software, Haystack, failed to provide the level of anonymity and security it claimed, potentially exposing users to risks and revealing key information to Iranian authorities [3121, 2971].
(c) timing: The failure of the software incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [3121, 2971].
(d) value: The failure of the software incident can be categorized as a value failure where the system performs its intended functions incorrectly. The software, Haystack, did not provide the level of privacy and security it promised, potentially putting users at risk [3121, 2971].
(e) byzantine: The failure of the software incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [3121, 2971].
(f) other: The failure of the software incident can be described as a failure due to the system behaving in a way not described in the options (a to e). The software, Haystack, failed to meet security standards, did not provide the expected level of anonymity, and was criticized for its lack of transparency and security testing before distribution [3121, 2971]. |