Incident: Cyberattack on FireEye's Red Team Assessment Tools by Nation-State.

Published Date: 2020-12-08

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident at FireEye happened on an unspecified date mentioned in the article [108769]. As the article does not provide a specific date for the incident, and there are no clear clues to estimate the timeline, the exact date of the software failure incident remains unknown.
System 1. FireEye's systems and Red Team assessment tools [108769]
Responsible Organization 1. Highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state were responsible for causing the software failure incident at FireEye [108769].
Impacted Organization 1. FireEye and its systems, including its Red Team assessment tools, were impacted by the cyberattack [108769]. 2. FireEye's clients, including its government customers, could be indirectly affected by the breach [108769]. 3. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has been working with FireEye to determine the scope of the attack and implement countermeasures across federal networks and with private sector partners [108769].
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a cyberattack by "highly sophisticated" actors likely sponsored by a nation-state, leading to the compromise of FireEye's systems and theft of certain Red Team assessment tools used to test customers' security [108769].
Non-software Causes 1. The cyberattack on FireEye was caused by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state, indicating a deliberate and targeted attack [108769]. 2. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, implying a breach in FireEye's own systems [108769]. 3. The attack was highly customized to target FireEye's systems, indicating a tailored approach by the attackers [108769]. 4. The attackers attempted to access information related to certain government customers of FireEye, highlighting the potential impact on government entities [108769].
Impacts 1. The cybersecurity firm FireEye experienced a cyberattack by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state, compromising the company's systems and potentially giving the attackers the ability to launch further attacks [108769]. 2. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, potentially affecting many of FireEye's clients, including government customers [108769]. 3. FireEye developed over 300 countermeasures to minimize the potential impact of the theft of their tools and is working with the FBI, Microsoft, and other partners to investigate the breach [108769]. 4. The attack did not involve any stolen cybersecurity tools with zero-day exploits, which are particularly dangerous vulnerabilities that have not been publicly identified or patched [108769]. 5. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has been collaborating with FireEye to determine the scope of the attack and implement countermeasures across federal networks and with private sector partners [108769]. 6. The breach at FireEye was considered an extraordinarily significant attack due to the company's prominent position in the cybersecurity industry and its involvement in researching sophisticated hacking groups [108769].
Preventions 1. Implementing strong access controls and multi-factor authentication to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive tools and systems [108769]. 2. Regularly updating and patching software to address known vulnerabilities, including zero-day exploits [108769]. 3. Conducting regular security assessments and audits to identify and address potential weaknesses in the system [108769]. 4. Enhancing employee training and awareness on cybersecurity best practices to prevent social engineering attacks and phishing attempts [108769].
Fixes 1. Enhancing cybersecurity measures and protocols to prevent future cyberattacks [108769]. 2. Implementing additional security layers and monitoring systems to detect and respond to potential breaches more effectively [108769]. 3. Collaborating with law enforcement agencies and cybersecurity experts to investigate the incident thoroughly and identify the vulnerabilities that were exploited [108769]. 4. Developing and deploying countermeasures to mitigate the potential impact of the stolen Red Team tools on FireEye's clients and the broader community [108769].
References 1. FireEye (FEYE) cybersecurity firm [108769] 2. Kevin Mandia, Chief Executive Officer of FireEye [108769] 3. Matt Gorham, assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division [108769] 4. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [108769] 5. Mike Chapple, cybersecurity expert at the University of Notre Dame [108769]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to FireEye being cyberattacked is a rare and extremely serious instance for the company. FireEye mentioned that the attack was highly customized to target their systems and unlike any they had responded to in the past [108769]. This indicates that this specific type of cyberattack had not happened before at FireEye. (b) The incident at FireEye is significant not only for the company itself but also for its clients, including government customers, as the breach could indirectly affect them. FireEye stated that they are proactively releasing methods and means to detect the use of their stolen Red Team tools, implying that many of their clients could be impacted by the breach [108769]. This suggests that the incident could have implications for multiple organizations that are clients of FireEye.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase in this case is the cyberattack on FireEye. The cybersecurity firm was compromised by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, indicating a failure in the design or security measures of these tools [108769]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is the potential misuse of the stolen Red Team tools by the attackers. FireEye mentioned that they are proactively releasing methods and means to detect the use of the stolen tools, indicating a concern about the operation or potential misuse of these tools by the attackers [108769].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident at FireEye was due to a highly sophisticated cyberattack that targeted the company's systems. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, indicating that the breach originated from within the system itself [108769]. (b) outside_system: The cyberattack on FireEye was described as being likely sponsored by a nation-state with top-tier offensive capabilities. This implies that the contributing factors leading to the software failure incident originated from outside the system, specifically from a sophisticated external actor [108769].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions (a) The software failure incident at FireEye was due to non-human actions, specifically a cyberattack by "highly sophisticated" actors likely sponsored by a nation-state [108769]. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test customers' security, indicating that the breach was caused by external factors beyond human control. Additionally, the stolen cybersecurity tools did not contain zero-day exploits, which are software vulnerabilities that have never been publicly identified or patched [108769]. (b) The software failure incident at FireEye was not directly caused by human actions but rather by the cyberattack orchestrated by sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state [108769]. The breach was highly customized to target FireEye's systems and was described as unlike any the company had responded to in the past, indicating that the failure was not a result of internal human errors or actions.
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is not attributed to hardware issues but rather to a cyberattack by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state [108769]. The attack targeted FireEye's systems and involved the theft of certain Red Team assessment tools used to test customers' security. This incident is described as a breach rather than a hardware failure. (b) The software failure incident is directly related to software, as the attackers accessed and stole Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye, which are software tools designed for testing security systems [108769]. The breach did not involve hardware failure but rather a cyberattack on the software systems of the cybersecurity firm.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is malicious in nature. FireEye, a cybersecurity firm, was targeted by a cyberattack by "highly sophisticated" actors likely sponsored by a nation-state. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, potentially giving them the means to launch attacks against other targets. The attack was highly customized to target FireEye's systems and was described as unlike any the company had responded to in the past. The FBI's Cyber Division indicated that the sophistication of the attack was consistent with a nation-state actor, and early evidence suggested a Russia-linked actor was behind the operation [108769].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) unknown (a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions but rather a highly sophisticated cyberattack likely sponsored by a nation-state targeting the cybersecurity firm FireEye. The attack was described as being highly customized to target FireEye's systems and was unlike any the company had responded to in the past. FireEye's CEO concluded that they were witnessing an attack by a nation with top-tier offensive capabilities [108769].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is not related to development incompetence. The incident was a cyberattack on the cybersecurity firm FireEye by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state. The attackers accessed certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, indicating a targeted and sophisticated attack [108769]. (b) The software failure incident can be categorized as accidental. FireEye was compromised by a cyberattack that was highly customized to target their systems, and the attack was described as unlike any the company had responded to in the past. The breach was not due to incompetence but rather the result of a deliberate and sophisticated attack by actors with top-tier offensive capabilities, likely sponsored by a nation-state [108769].
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in the article [108769] is temporary. The incident involved a cyberattack on the cybersecurity firm FireEye by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state. The attack was highly customized to target FireEye's systems and involved the theft of certain Red Team assessment tools used to test customers' security. FireEye proactively released countermeasures to minimize the potential impact of the stolen tools. The company is working with the FBI and other partners to investigate the incident, and early evidence suggests a Russia-linked actor was behind the operation. FireEye has not found evidence that customer information was stolen, and none of the stolen cybersecurity tools contained zero-day exploits. The incident is ongoing, with efforts to share and implement countermeasures across federal networks and with private sector partners [108769].
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article is not described as a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [108769]. (b) omission: The incident does not mention the failure as an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [108769]. (c) timing: The incident does not relate to a timing failure where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [108769]. (d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [108769]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions, which would classify it as a byzantine failure [108769]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article is related to a cyberattack by highly sophisticated actors likely sponsored by a nation-state, compromising the cybersecurity firm FireEye's systems and potentially giving the attackers the means to launch attacks against other targets. This behavior falls under the category of a security breach due to external malicious activity rather than a typical software failure as described in options (a) to (e) [108769].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any individuals losing their lives due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [108769]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of individuals being physically harmed due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [108769]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [108769]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident resulted in the theft of certain Red Team assessment tools used by FireEye to test their customers' security, potentially affecting their clients, including government customers [108769]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [108769]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident impacted FireEye's systems and potentially their clients' security due to the theft of Red Team assessment tools [108769]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had significant consequences, including the potential for the attackers to launch attacks against other targets and the need for FireEye to develop countermeasures to minimize the impact of the stolen tools [108769]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The potential consequences discussed include the attackers potentially using the stolen tools to compromise high-value systems or selling exploits, but there is no evidence of these theoretical consequences occurring yet [108769]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond the theft of Red Team assessment tools and the potential implications for FireEye and its clients [108769].
Domain unknown (a) The failed system in the reported incident was related to the cybersecurity industry, specifically affecting the operations of the cybersecurity firm FireEye [108769].

Sources

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